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Hall,  Francis  J.  1857-1932. 
Evolution  and  the  fall 


EVOLUTION    AND    THE    FALL 


V 

THE  BISHOP   PADDOCK   LECTURES 
1909-1910 


•^p  tht  ^ame  9ltit!}or 


Introduction  to  Dogmatic  Theology:  crown 
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Authority,  Ecclesiastical  and  Biblical:  crown 
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The  Being  and  Attributes  of  God:   crown  8vo. 

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Theological    Outlines  —  Three   Volumes,  iimo. 

Vol.      I.    THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 

Second  edition,  revised 

Vol.    II.    THE  DOCTRINE  OF  MAN  AND  OF  THE 
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/ 

EVOLUTION    AND 


THE  FALL 


BY   THE, 

Rev.  FRANCIS    J.  I^ALL,  D.D. 

PROFESSOR  OF   DOGMATIC  THEOLOGY   IN  THE   WESTERN  THEOLOGICAL 
SEMINARY,  CHICAGO,  ILLINOIS 


LONGMANS,   GREEN,  AND  CO. 

91    AND    93    FIFTH    AVENUE,  NEW    YORK 

LONDON,  BOMBAY,  AND  CALCUTTA 

I9IO 


Copyright,  igio,  hy 
Longmans,  Green,  and  Co. 


The  Plimpton  Press  Norwood  Mass.  U.S.A. 


£)cliicatci 

TO   THE 

BLESSED    MEMORY 

OF 

SAINT   ATHANASIUS 

WHOSE   EXPOSITION   OF   THE   CATHOLIC    DOCTRINE 
OF  SIN  IS  HELPFXJL  AT  THIS  TIME 


THE   BISHOP   PADDOCK  LECTURES 

In  the  summer  of  the  year  1880,  George  A.  Jarvis, 
of  Brooklyn,  New  York,  moved  by  his  sense  of  the 
great  good  which  might  thereby  accrue  to  the  cause 
of  Christ,  and  to  the  Church  of  which  he  was  an  ever- 
grateful  member,  gave  to  the  General  Theological 
Seminary  of  the  Protestant  Episcopal  Church  certain 
securities,  exceeding  in  value  eleven  thousand  dollars, 
for  the  foundation  and  maintenance  of  a  lectureship 
in  said  seminary. 

Out  of  love  to  a  former  pastor  and  enduring  friend, 
the  Right  Reverend  Benjamin  Henry  Paddock,  D.D., 
Bishop  of  Massachusetts,  he  named  the  foundation 
''The  Bishop  Paddock  Lectureship." 

The  deed  of  trust  declares  that — 

"  The  subjects  of  the  lectures  shall  be  such  as  appertain  to 
the  defence  of  the  religion  of  Jesus  Christ,  as  revealed  in  the 
Holy  Bible,  and  illustrated  in  the  Book  of  Common  Prayer j 
against  the  varying  errors  of  the  day,  whether  materialistic, 
rationalistic,  or  professedly  religious,  and  also  to  its  defence 
and  confirmation  in  respect  of  such  central  truths  as  the 
Trinity,  the  Atonement,  Justification,  and  the  Inspiration  of 
the  Word  of  God  ;  and  of  such  central  facts  as  the  Church's 
Divine  Order  and  Sacraments,  her  historical  Reformation,  and 
her  rights  and  powers  as  a  pure  and  national  Church.  And 
other  subjects  may  be  chosen  if  unanimously  approved  by  the 
Board  of  Appointment  as  being  both  timely  and  also  within 
the  true  intent  of  this  Lectureship." 

vii 


viii  THE  BISHOP  PADDOCK  LECTURES 

Under  the  appointment  of  the  Board  created  by  the 
Trust,  the  Reverend  Francis  J.  Hall,  D.D.,  Professor 
of  Dogmatic  Theology  in  the  Western  Theological 
Seminary,  Chicago,  Illinois,  delivered  the  lectures 
for  the  year  1 909-1 910,  contained  in  this  volume. 


PREFACE 

In  common  with  a  large  and  increasing  number  of 
theological  writers  who  firmly  maintain  the  cathoHc 
faith,  the  author  of  these  lectures  beHeves  that,  at  the 
present  stage  of  advance  in  natural  science,  the  evo- 
lutionary theory  affords  the  best  available  working 
hypothesis  of  the  origin  of  species;  and  that  this 
hypothesis  is  apphcable  to  the  human  species  in  its 
physical  aspects.  Whether  the  evolutionary  theory  can 
sustain  the  test  of  further  scientific  investigation  and 
of  wider  induction  —  that  is,  whether  it  constitutes 
the  final  word  of  science,  the  lecturer  does  not  pretend 
to  judge.  But  in  the  present  state  of  knowledge,  it 
seems  presumptuous  and  futile  for  one  who  is  not  an 
expert  in  natural  science  to  join  issue  with  scientists 
on  the  subject. 

What  we  are  saying  has  exclusive  reference  to  the 
general  scientific  doctrine  that  the  origin  of  existing 
species  is  to  be  described  on  its  physical  side  by  natural 
variations  in  primitive  forms  of  organic  life,  by  inheri- 
tance of  such  variations,  and  by  the  persistence  of  those 
forms  that  are  best  fitted  to  survive  in  the  struggle  for 
existence.  We  do  not  acknowledge  that  the  more 
specific  explanations  of  evolution,  and  of  its  factors, 
whether  Darwinian  or  other,  have  attained  to  the  same 
scientific  rank.     No  one  of  them  can  claim  general 

ix 


X  PREFACE 

acceptance  among  competent  investigators.  Nor  do 
we  acknowledge  that  the  naturalistic  philosophy,  which 
is  often  associated  w^ith  the  evolutionary  hypothesis, 
and  which  determines  the  theological  implications 
which  many  detect  in  the  evolutionary  theory,  has  any 
scientific  validity.  It  is  purely  speculative  and  to  be 
rejected. 

The  impression  prevails  among  many  natural  scien- 
tists and  theological  writers  that  belief  in  the  natural 
evolution  of  man's  physical  organism  is  fatal  to  a  con- 
tinued maintenance  of  the  ancient  Christian  doctrine 
of  the  origin  of  sin.  An  attempt  has  been  made  in 
these  lectures  to  show  that  this  impression  is  erroneous 
—  at  least  so  far  as  the  catholic  doctrine  is  concerned. 
To  show  this  it  has  been  necessary  to  distinguish 
between  truly  ecumenical  doctrine  and  certain  specu- 
lative accretions  that  are  often  confused  therewith  — 
especially  those  discoverable  in  Augustinian  and  Cal- 
vinistic  literature. 

The  lecturer  has  endeavoured  to  avoid  unnecessary 
polemical  references  to  the  arguments  of  individual 
theological  writers;  but  he  has  felt  constrained  to  notice 
some  of  the  more  important  arguments  of  Dr.  F.  R. 
Tennant,  contained  in  his  Origin  of  Sin,  and  in  his 
Sources  of  the  Doctrines  of  the  Fall  and  Original  Sin. 
These  works  contain  the  most  important  argument  on 
the  theological  side  for  the  position  which  is  here  re- 
jected —  that  the  evolutionary  origin  of  man  requires 
an  abandonment  of  the  ancient  doctrines  of  man's 
primitive  state   and   of  original  sin.     It  has  seemed 


PREFACE  xi 

necessary,  therefore,  to  refer  to  some  of  that  writer's 
arguments,  and  to  give  reasons  for  regarding  them  as 
inconclusive.  No  attempt  is  made,  however,  to  give 
a  formal  or  exhaustive  criticism  of  the  two  works  to 
which  we  refer.  Dissenting  as  we  do  from  the  position 
therein  maintained,  and  rejecting  the  sufficiency  of  the 
arguments  by  which  it  is  supported,  we  gladly  acknowl- 
edge that  Dr.  Tennant  has  presented  valuable  data, 
and  has  thrown  needed  light  upon  certain  aspects  of 
the  problem  of  sin. 

Owing  to  the  brevity  with  which  he  has  been  com- 
pelled to  treat  of  certain  points,  and  to  the  fact  that 
his  method  of  treatment  is  in  some  respects  peculiar, 
the  writer  has  ventured  to  give  a  number  of  references 
to  his  own  previous  works,  in  which  these  matters  are 
more  fully  discussed. 

Some  repetitions  will  be  found  in  these  pages.  They 
are  to  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  form  and 
sequence  of  argument  were  controlled  by  the  exigen- 
cies of  prospective  oral  delivery. 


CONTENTS 

LECTURE   I 

MODERN  DIFFICULTIES 

PAGE 

Difficulties  of  faith,  now  wide-spread,  are  inevitable     ...         i 
The  subject  and  plan  of  these  lectures 6 

I.    Causes  of  Modern  Difficulties 

(a)  Enlargement  of  knowledge 8 

(b)  Development  of  criticism  and  of  the  critical  temper      .      .  9 

(c)  Doctrinal  conflicts  between  "the  Churches"       ....  10 
To  surrender  particular  doctrines,  really  catholic,  in  order  to 

save  the  rest,  is  unnecessary,  futile,  and  perilous    ...  10 

II.    Forms  of  Attack 

(a)  Rationalism  in  biblical  criticism 12 

(6)  Pantheism 16 

The  supernatural 19 

(c)  Naturalism 21 

Agnosticism  connected  therewith 22 

III.    The  Function,  Methods,  and  Limitations  of  Sciences 

The  nature  and  range  of  sciences 26 

Intersecting  specialties  of  particular  sciences,  and  the  necessity 

of  co-ordinating  their  conclusions 28 

Sciences  are  progressive,  their  hypotheses  provisional    ...  32 

The  proper  attitude  of  theologians  towards  physical  hypotheses  34 

LECTURE    II 

THE  EVOLUTIONARY  THEORY 

Resume  and  introduction 37 

xiii 


xiv  CONTENTS 

I.    General  Definition 

PAGE 

A  theory  of  natural  descent  of  existing  species  from  earlier  forms 

of  organic  life 38 

To  be  distinguished  from  monistic  theories,  especially  of  the 

materialistic  type 40 

II.    Early  Views 

Previous  to  the  time  of  Lamarck 45 

Lamarck's  theory 47 

Darwin's  success  made  possible  by  Lyell,  Malthus,  and  others       50 

III.    Darwin's  Theory 

Its  revolutionary  effect 52 

Its  reception 54 

Its  nature  and  basis 55 

IV.    Subsequent  Discussions  and  Views 

Objections  advanced  against  Darwin's  theory  by  evolutionists  60 
Weismann's  argument   against    the    transmission   of   acquired 

characters 65 

His  germ-plasm  theory 67 

Mendel's  law 68 

The  mutations  theory 69 

Minor  theories  and  outlook 72 

LECTURE    III 

EVIDENCES   AND   LIMITATIONS 

What  evidence  ought  to  be  required 75 

I.    Summary  of  Evidence 

Its  general  nature 76 

1.  Variation  and  heredity 77 

2.  Homologous  structures 78 

3.  Gradation  of  organisms 79 

4.  Embryology 80 


CONTENTS  XV 

PAGE 

5.  Rudimentary  organs 80 

6.  Paleontology 81 

7.  Geographical  distribution 83 

These  evidences   indirect.     Much  direct  evidence   not  to  be 

hoped  for 84 

8.  Artificial  selection 85 

9.  Natural  mutations 87 

The  evidence  as  a  whole  very  convincing 88 

II.    Limitations 

The  physical  cannot  of  itself  explain  the  superphysical  .  .  89 
Nor  can  purely  physical  evolution  account  for  life,  reason,  and 

moral  sense.     Involution  necessary 90 

Acknowledged  unknown  factors  of  directive  nature  are  best 

explained  by  theistic  teleology 93 

III.    The  Evolution  of  Man 

The  position  here  taken.     The  state  of  opinion 95 

The  general  basis  of  argument 97 

The  principle  of  continuity  thought  to  be  involved  ....  99 
Arguments: 

1.  Certain  human  faculties  useless  for  natural  selection     .      .  100 

2.  Excessive  variations  between  human  individuals  .  .  .  100 
Wallace's  three  stages  of  evolution loi 

3.  The  differences  between  human  and  brute  intelligence        .  102 

4.  No  intelligence  describable  in  physical  terms      ....  103 

5.  The  body,  apart  from  mind,  a  closed  circle  of  energy  .      .  105 

6.  Disparity  between  physical  and  mental  variations  in   the 

evolution  of  man 106 

Conclusion 107 

LECTURE    IV 

THEOLOGICAL   IMPLICATIONS 

Resume  of  conclusions 109 

Dogmas  and  speculative  opinions no 


xvi  CONTENTS 

I.    Implications  at  Large 

PAGE 

(a)    Christian  theism 112 

(6)    Creation 116 

(c)    Biblical  infallibility 119 

II.    The  Doctrine  of  Man's  Primitive  State 

The  rule  of  faith  involved 123 

What  is  distinctive  in  the  Christian  doctrine  of  sin  .      .      .     .  126 

The  catholic  doctrine  of  the  primitive  state  defined.      .      .      .  127 

Speculative  accretions 130 

Biblical  induction 132 

III.    The  Doctrine  of  the  Fall 

The  catholic  doctrine  defined 133 

Speculative  accretions 138 

Biblical  induction 139 

Augustinianism 146 

General  view  of  the  ancients 147 

LECTURE    V 

man's  primitive  state 

Truth  and  counter-truth 150 

Propositions  to  be  reconciled  and  the  premise  adopted.     .     .     155 

I.    Conclusions  of  Evolutionary  Science 

1.  Primitive  man,  physically  speaking,  a  product  of  natural 

evolution 157 

2.  Such  evolution  accounts  for  his  existing  propensities,  so  far 

as  their  natural  causation  is  concerned 157 

3.  His  moral  depravity  is  proportionate  in  its  degree  to  his  an- 

tiquity       158 

4.  Natural  investigation  affords  no  evidence  that  the  continuity 

of  animal  development  has  been  interrupted  in  man's  case    160 
The  effect  of  these  conclusions  upon  men's  attitude  towards  our 

doctrine         160 


CONTENTS  xvii 

II.    The  Principle  of  Contimdty 

PAGE 
That  all  events  are  connected  in  causal  and  rational  sequence 

is  postulated  by  both  natural  and  theological  science        .     162 
In  practical  application,  unless  the  divine  plan  and  its  super- 
natural factors  are  reckoned  with,  gaps  appear       .      .      .     164 
The  issue  lies  between  the  naturalistic  and  the  theistic  views  of 

world-history 166 

III.    Application  to  Man's  Primitive  State 

The  supernatural  defined.     How  it  is  involved 167 

The  difficulty  of  belief  therein  is  not  scientific  but  philosoph- 
ical      168 

Divine  righteousness  involved  in  the  belief  that  man's  primitive 

state  was  partly  supernatural 170 

A  denial  of  an  original  righteousness,  made  possible  by  grace, 
makes  evolution  miss  the  mark  at  its  highest  stage,  and 
involves  a  breach  of  continuity 175 

A  similar  argument  with  reference  to  primitive  immortality     .     177 

IV.    Evolutionary  Science  not  in  Conflict  with  Catholic 
Doctrine 

1.  As  to  the  evolutionary  theory  at  large 180 

2.  As  to  our  existing  state  being  in  line  with  natural  evolution  181 

3.  As  to  man's  development  from  ancient  savagery      .      .      .  182 

4.  As  to  the  continuity  of  history 183 

Practical  importance  of  the  catholic  doctrine 184 

LECTURE   VI 

ORIGINAL  SIN 

The  question  to  be  considered 187 

I.    Side  Issues  Eliminated 

Speculative  accretions  need  not  be  regarded 191 

1.  Theories  of  predestination  and  irresistible  grace       .      .     -     192 

2.  Transmitted  guilt ^94 


xviii  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

3.  Total  depravity 198 

4.  That  all  the  unregenerate  lie  under  divine  anger  and  are 

everlastingly  to  be  punished 199 

Meanings  of  deserve 201 

II.    Transmission  of  Acquired  Characters 

Weismann's  theory  and  argument 204 

It  is  not  established  but  may  not  be  disregarded  ....  207 
The  transmission  of  disease  makes  for  a  transmission  of  the 

natural  effects  of  x\dam's  sin         207 

But  original  sin  is  not  an  acquired  character 211 

Catholic  doctrine  permits  us  to  combine  the  evolutionary  and 

the  theological  explanation  of  sin 212 

III.    Concluding  Matters 

Traducianism  and  creationism 213 

Theological  necessity  of  the  catholic  doctrine  of  sin  resumed  .  218 

Its  necessity  for  theodicy 219 

And  for  an  adequate  estimate  of  sin 222 


EVOLUTION  AND   THE   FALL 
LECTURE    I 

MODERN  DIFFICULTIES 

It  is  indisputable  that  difficulties  of  faith  are  very 
widely  felt  to-day;  and  multitudes  are  ceasing  to  regard 
the  contents  of  Christian  doctrine  either  as  capable  of 
proof  or  as  coming  within  the  range  of  that  kind  of 
certainty  which  is  ordinarily  termed  knowledge. 

It  would  be  a  mistake,  however,  to  suppose  that 
difficulties  of  faith  are  peculiarly  modern.  No  doubt 
they  are  more  widely  felt  in  our  day  than  in  previous 
ages  of  Christian  history;  but  this  is  largely  because 
education  is  more  general  than  ever  before,  and  the 
problems  which  try  the  souls  of  advanced  thinkers 
are  being  ventilated  and  discussed  everywhere,  instead 
of  being,  as  in  earlier  centuries,  considered  only  by 
scholars  and  philosophers.  It  is  an  age  in  which  almost 
every  one  knows,  or  thinks  that  he  knows,  a  little  about 
everything;  and  a  little  knowledge  is  a  dangerous 
thing,  since  it  raises  problems  without  enabling  men 
either  to  solve  them  or  to  realize  that  their  inability  to 
solve  them  is  not  necessarily  a  reason  for  unbelief. 

But  every  age  has  its  own  difficulties  of  faith;  and 
it  is  not  invariably  a  proof  of  insincerity  that  professing 


2  MODERN   DIFFICULTIES 

Christians  should  feel  these  difficulties,  and  should  fail 
to  attain  to  that  certainty  touching  Christian  doctrine 
which  characterizes  faith  in  its  perfection.  Faith  may 
be  very  genuine,  and  yet  be  attended  by  tormenting 
doubts.  One  may  cry,  ''I  believe;  help  Thou  mine 
unbelief,"  ^  without  misrepresenting  himself  in  either 
half  of  the  cry.  Belief  has  many  stages,  reaching  all 
the  way  from  hesitating  opinion  up  to  the  full  assurance 
of  knowledge;  and  if  its  goal  is  freedom  from  doubt, 
that  goal  is  won,  in  countless  instances  among  sincere 
believers,  only  by  long  continued  struggle  with  diffi- 
culties of  faith. 

Obvious  reasons  for  this  exist.  The  truths  of  religion 
are  exceedingly  mysterious.  They  may  indeed  be  re- 
vealed in  very  definite  and  intelligible  terms  —  terms 
which  are  true  so  far  as  they  go,  and  which  will  never 
cease  to  be  true.  But  the  realities  with  which  these 
terms  are  concerned  transcend  any  capacity  of  ours 
adequately  to  grasp  them.  And  while  it  is  possible 
for  us  to  gain  true  knowledge  concerning  them,  this 
knowledge  is  exceedingly  fragmentary  —  so  fragmen- 
tary that  the  darkness  of  our  ignorance  often  threatens 
to  swallow  up  and  hide  from  view  the  light  of  the 
knowledge  which  is  actually  available. 

The  result  is  that  the  language  of  dogma  and  of 
theology  is  to  some  degree  symbolical.  That  does  not 
mean  that  it  is  untrue,  or  that  we  err  in  insisting  that 
it  will  never  cease  to  be  true.  It  really  means  that  the 
conception  of  truth  which  theological  language  conveys 

1  St.  Mark  ix.  24. 


INEVITABLE  3 

to  our  minds  is  incipient  rather  than  full  formed,  inade- 
quate, and  certain  to  be  misleading,  if  we  treat  it  as 
complete,  or  as  sufficient  to  justify  the  hope  of  being 
able  to  construct  a  complete  and  final  system  of  the- 
ology.^ Theology  is  as  truly  a  progressive  science  as  is 
any  physical  science,  and  not  less  truly  so  because  its 
most  significant  data  are  divinely  revealed.  The  best 
man-made  systems  of  doctrine  contain  speculative 
elements,  and  therefore  each  development  of  human 
thought  necessitates  their  modification.  Theological 
reconstruction  has  to  be  undertaken  repeatedly,  and 
no  conservative  influences  are  strong  enough  to  pre- 
vent an  unceasing  development  of  doctrine.^  This 
being  the  case,  v^e  ought  to  feel  no  surprise  when  we 
find  that  many  thoughtful  men  are  more  impressed 
with  the  non-finality  of  theological  systems  than  with 
the  reasons  for  believing  that  their  primary  data  have 
been  divinely  revealed,  and  can  be  rationally  accepted 
with  the  certainty  which  is  usually  described  by  the 
word  knowledge. 

Again,  the  scriptural  assertion  that  spiritual  things 
are  "spiritually  examined"  ^  is  a  strictly  scientific 
proposition.  Every  science  has  its  own  methods  of 
investigation,  and  these  methods  are  determined  by 
the  nature  of  what  is  investigated.  Mental  phenomena 
cannot  be  successfully  examined  or  interpreted  by  the 

J  See  J.  B.  Mozley,  Predestination,  ch.  ii,  init.  We  return  to  the 
subject  in  Lee.  v,  init. 

2  On  the  development  of  doctrine  see  the  author's  Authority, 
Eccles.  and  Biblical,  ch.  ix,  where  numerous  references  are  given. 

3  I  Cor.  ii.  14. 


4  MODERN   DIFFICULTIES 

methods  of  astronomy,  nor  can  spiritual  realities  be 
discovered  or  understood  by  the  methods  of  the  labora- 
tory. To  understand  spiritual  things  requires  the  em- 
ployment of  a  spiritual  faculty,  just  as  the  perception  of 
beauty  calls  into  exercise  an  aesthetic  faculty.  It  also 
requires  a  certain  moral  attitude — a  predisposition 
towards  the  consideration  of  divine  things,  and  a  readi- 
ness to  accept  truths  which  can  be  seen  to  involve  in 
their  acceptance  an  enlargement  of  responsibihties  from 
which  carnally  minded  men  recoil.  The  development 
of  this  spiritual  faculty  and  disposition  depends  upon 
supernatural  assistance  by  the  Holy  Spirit  as  well  as 
upon  self-discipline.  The  sum  of  the  matter  is  that 
conditions  have  to  be  fulfilled,  and  methods  have  to 
be  employed,  in  the  investigation  of  spiritual  realities 
which  differ  widely  from  the  conditions  and  methods  to 
which  most  men  are  habituated  and  which  they  are 
naturally  disposed  to  appropriate.  Theology  appears 
very  unlike  anything  that  the  majority  of  modern 
scientists  are  accustomed  to  regard  as  scientific,  or  as 
concerned  wdth  true  knowledge  of  reality.  This 
unlikeness  is  apt  to  suggest  the  conclusion  that  faith 
and  spiritual  knowledge  lie  outside  the  domain  of 
reason  altogether.  Christian  believers  are  able  to  see 
that  belief  and  knowledge  do  not  cease  to  be  rational 
when  concerned  with  spiritual  things,  and  that  divine 
grace  is  not  a  substitute  for  sound  reason  but  its 
spiritual  telescope,  so  to  speak,  and  its  equipment  for 
a  spiritual  line  of  activity.  They  can  also  see  that 
the  reason  which  is  employed  in  faith  is  the  reason 


INEVITABLE  5 

upon  which  we  depend  in  every  sphere  of  rational 
thinking.  There  is  but  one  human  reason,  and  to 
abandon  its  use  in  any  field  is  to  become  irrational. 
An  irrational  faith  can  never  hold  its  own  among 
rational  men.  But,  and  this  is  the  point,  no  man  can 
see  all  this  until  he  has  had  some  experience  in  spiritual 
knowledge,  and  the  natural  man  needs  to  be  moved 
by  higher  than  merely  natural  considerations  before 
he  will  set  himself  to  acquire  spiritual  experience. 

Nor  is  this  all;  the  faculties  of  the  mind  which  are 
called  into  exercise  in  the  investigation  and  assimila- 
tion of  spiritual  verities  are  very  subtle,  and  are  more 
easily  deranged  than  any  others  —  especially  by  moral 
causes.  Faith  is  not  only  a  mental  act,  but  also,  by 
reason  of  the  conditions  of  its  successful  exercise,  a 
virtue.  I  do  not  mean  that  it  is  impossible  to  possess 
a  genuine  faith  without  having  perfect  character.  The 
capacity  to  believe  and  to  exercise  the  reason  success- 
fully in  spiritual  things  lies  within  the  reach  of  all 
who  will  submit  to  the  conditions  of  spiritual  knowl- 
edge. But  perfect  faith  and  complete  emancipation 
from  doubt,  like  perfect  virtue,  is  the  goal,  rather  than 
an  early  stage  of  spiritual  growth.  The  beginner,  if 
he  is  sincere  in  his  efforts  to  lay  hold  upon  divine  truth, 
can  acquire  a  very  genuine  faith  —  one  which  is  the 
earnest  of  a  final  acquisition  of  the  certainty  which  is 
called  knowledge.  But  at  every  stage  of  its  growth 
the  capacity  to  assimilate  divine  truth  depends  upon  a 
combination  of  conditions  which  may  easily  be  dis- 
turbed;   and  when  they  are  disturbed  doubt  obtrudes 


6  MODERN    DIFFICULTIES 

itself,  and  every  argument  for  unbelief  and  for  denial 
of  the  possibility  of  spiritual  knowledge  then  becomes 
formidable.^ 

The  conclusion  of  the  matter  is  that  difficulties  of 
faith  must  always  be  felt  even  among  sincere  truth- 
seekers,  and  the  fact  that  they  are  felt  to-day  does  not 
afford  sufficient  reason  either  for  undiscriminating  con- 
demnation of  doubters  or  for  a  pessimistic  estimate  of 
the  state  of  behef  in  this  age.  Much  doubt  is  in  evi- 
dence, and  there  has  never  been  a  more  urgent  need  of 
efforts  to  succour  distressed  faith.  But  there  is  an- 
other and  more  encouraging  aspect  of  the  situation. 
There  have  never  been  more  truth-seekers  than  at  this 
moment.  Multitudes  are  turning  their  faces  earnestly 
towards  the  light;  and  if  their  faith  is  attended  by  the 
torment  of  doubt,  it  is,  in  very  many  instances,  their 
faith  rather  than  their  doubts  w^hich  determines  their 
ideals  of  life.  This  fact  affords  abundant  reason  for 
the  hope  and  conviction  that  the  faith  which  is  now 
struggling  with  doubt  will  in  due  season  win  the  vic- 
tory. At  all  events  a  true  apologetic  should  be  both 
sympathetic  and  hopeful. 

My  subject  in  these  lectures  is  Evohition  and  the 
Fall,  and  I  have  chosen  such  a  topic  for  several  reasons. 
In  the  first  place  the  doctrine  of  the  fall  has  been  thought 
by  many  to  be  peculiarly  difficult  to  maintain  under  the 
conditions  of  modern  thought;   and  this  is  largely  due 

^  The  author  has  more  fully  discussed  the  subject  of  the  part  of 
reason  in  faith  and  spiritual  knowledge  in  his  Introd.  to  Dog.  TheoL, 
chh.  iv,  V. 


INEVITABLE  7 

to  a  supposed  impossibility  of  reconciling  its  contents 
with  the  evolutionary  hypothesis.  I  beHeve  that  an  im- 
portant reason  for  this  appearance  of  contradiction  is  a 
mistaken  conception  of  the  doctrine  in  question,  and  I 
am  moved  to  do  what  I  can  to  correct  this  conception. 

Again,  as  you  no  doubt  are  aware,  the  scientific 
world  has  this  year  been  celebrating  the  centennial  of 
the  birth  of  Charles  Darwin  and  the  fiftieth  anniversary 
of  the  publication  of  his  Origin  of  Species,  the  book 
which  first  secured  for  the  evolutionary  hypothesis  a 
recognized  place  in  scientific  thought.  It  appears, 
therefore,  a  suitable  time  to  reconsider  this  theory  and 
its  bearings,  so  far  as  it  has  any,  on  Christian  doctrine. 
There  is  the  more  reason  for  undertaking  such  recon- 
sideration in  view  of  a  rather  important  modification 
of  the  Darwinian  hypothesis  which  has  been  thought 
by  some  scientists  to  be  required  by  the  results  of 
recent  biological  investigation.* 

After  a  brief  survey  of  the  chief  causes  and  forms  of 
opposition  to  Christian  doctrine  that  are  in  evidence 
at  the  present  time,  I  shall  devote  the  rest  of  this  lecture 
to  a  consideration  of  the  aims,  methods,  and  limita- 
tions of  sciences  in  general,  and  of  physical  sciences  in 
particular,  and  to  an  effort  to  define  the  attitude  to- 
wards scientific  conclusions  which  Christian  believers 
and  theologians  ought  to  adopt.  The  next  two  lec- 
tures will  be  concerned  with  the  evolutionary  theory  — 

1  The  allusion  is  to  the  investigations  of  de  Vries  and  others,  and 
to  the  mutations  theory  which  is  based  upon  them.  See  Lee.  ii, 
Pt.  IV,  below. 


8  MODERN   DIFFICULTIES 

its  historical  forms,  and  the  arguments  by  which  it  is 
supported.  In  the  fourth  lecture  I  intend  to  discuss 
the  bearings  of  evolutionary  views  upon  Christian  doc- 
trines at  large;  and  in  the  last  two  lectures  I  expect 
to  consider  their  bearing  upon  the  doctrine  of  man's 
primitive  state  and  fall. 


This  is  truly  an  age  of  faith.  But  it  is  also  an  age 
of  doubt,  and  faith  reveals  itself  in  a  multitude  of  in- 
stances in  the  form  of  battle  with  doubt.  The  fierce- 
ness of  the  battle,  while  it  shows  that  peculiar  diffi- 
culties have  to  be  overcome  before  faith  can  be  made 
secure,  also  shows  that  faith  is  full  of  fighting  energy, 
and  that  the  desire  to  believe  is  wide-spread.  It  is 
possible  to  detect  several  causes  of  the  present  power 
of  doubt. 

{a)  One  cause  is  the  vast  enlargement  of  scientific 
knowledge  which  has  occurred  during  the  past  century, 
and  the  suddenness  with  which  it  has  been  brought 
about.  This  enlargement  is  perhaps  greater  than  that 
of  all  previous  centuries  put  together.  Discovery  has 
followed  discovery  with  bewildering  rapidity,  and  it  has 
been  impossible  for  ordinary  men  to  keep  pace  with 
the  progress  of  the  sciences  in  their  efforts  to  adjust 
their  conceptions  of  the  universe  to  the  latest  knowledge. 
This  larger  knowledge  is  not  only  vast  in  range,  but  re- 
opens questions  which  our  forefathers  regarded  as 
settled,  and  appears  to  have  important  bearings  on 
Christian  doctrine.     In  brief,  men's  mental  perspec- 


THEIR  CAUSES  9 

tives  have  been  shaken  as  by  an  earthquake;  and 
ordinary  men  have  not  yet  had  time  to  recover  from 
their  consequent  dizziness,  and  to  distinguish  between 
what  has  been  either  changed  or  destroyed  and  what 
remains  unchanged  in  the  new  outlook. 

(b)  This  and  other  causes  have  led  to  the  develop- 
ment of  a  highly  critical  temper  —  one  which  is  by  no 
means  confined  to  specialists  in  criticism,  but  which 
has  modified  the  mental  attitude  of  millions  in  every 
walk  of  life.  The  scientific  as  well  as  the  common- 
sense  principle,  that  previously  accepted  conclusions 
and  beliefs  ought  not  to  be  repudiated  or  abandoned 
without  adequate  proof  that  they  are  no  longer  tenable, 
has  ceased  to  control  the  ''modern  mind."  Instead 
of  realizing  that  the  burden  of  proof  lies  with  those  who 
innovate  upon  traditional  positions,  men  are  apt  to 
assume  that  the  traditional  must  be  false.  Because 
some  of  its  particulars  require  correction,  men  are  led 
to  think  that  all  must  be  changed,  and  that  the  real 
truth  in  every  direction  must  wait  for  its  manifestation 
upon  the  labours  of  modern  experts.  The  theories  of 
experts,  however  conjectural,  are  frequently  regarded 
as  more  weighty  than  the  most  fundamental  con\ic- 
tions  and  postulates  upon  which  Christian  thought  has 
heretofore  been  based.  In  former  days  novelty  in 
Christian  doctrine  was  thought  to  be  a  proof  of  error. 
To-day  the  tendency  of  many  is  to  regard  the  antiquity 
of  any  doctrine  as  a  sufficient  reason  for  disputing  its 
credibility.  Such  a  tendency  makes  for  confusion 
rather  than  for  an  inteUigent  faith. 


lO  MODERN    DIFFICULTIES 

(c)  Finally  there  is  what  has  been  called  "  the  babel 
of  sects,"  which  very  seriously  interferes  with  every 
attempt  to  make  known  the  contents  of  the  historic 
faith  of  Christendom.  The  world  at  large  can  hardly 
be  expected  to  discriminate  intelligently  between  the 
claims  of  rival  Christian  bodies  to  possess  the  genuine 
doctrines  of  Christianity;  and  when  the  average  man 
discovers,  as  he  can  hardly  fail  to  discover,  that  every 
definite  teaching  of  ''the  Churches"  is  rejected  by  one 
or  more  of  the  Christian  denominations,  we  have  no 
reason  for  feeling  surprised  if  he  concludes  that  no 
authentic  Christian  doctrine  exists,  except  a  vague 
belief  in  the  pre-eminence  of  Jesus  Christ.  What  such 
pre-eminence  signifies,  and  upon  what  certainties  it  is 
based,  he  is  apt  to  regard  as  highly  problematical. 
''What  think  ye  of  Christ?  Whose  Son  is  He?"  Who 
can  say  with  authority?  As  for  the  spiritual  knowl- 
edge which  our  Lord  imparted  to  His  disciples  — 
knowledge  intended  and  needed  for  the  guidance  of 
our  steps  to  God — Christians  are  hopelessly  disagreed 
as  to  its  content. 

The  result  of  the  doctrinal  conflicts  which  were 
inaugurated  in  the  sixteenth  century  has  been  to  pro- 
duce serious  doubts  as  to  the  possibility  of  acquiring 
any  sure  knowledge  of  spiritual  things;  and  professing 
Christians  are  drifting  into  the  habit  of  substituting 
conduct  for  the  knowledge  which  makes  a  correct  deter- 
mination of  conduct  possible.  This  is  as  if  one  should 
say  that,  provided  one  seeks  to  apply  truth  to  life,  it  is 
unimportant  whether  or  not  he  is  acquainted  with  the 


THEIR  CAUSES  II 

truth  which  he  seeks  to  apply.  Determinate  Christian 
doctrines  are  now  commonly  identified  in  men's  minds 
with  partisan  shibboleths  concerning  the  unknowable. 
This  attitude  —  an  attitude  which  is  really  sceptical 
and  anti-Christian,  although  it  is  assumed  by  men  who 
sincerely  profess  Christianity  —  accounts  for,  and  is 
illustrated  by,  the  demand  which  is  now  being  made 
that  "the  Churches"  get  together  and  bury  their  doc- 
trinal differences  in  museums  of  antiquities.  Of  course, 
if,  as  St.  Paul  says,  Christ  made  His  ministers  stewards 
of  the  mysteries  of  God  which  He  revealed,  we  cannot 
be  faithful  Christian  ministers  unless  we  share  in  the 
sentiment  which  dictated  the  words,  "Woe  is  me,  if 
I  preach  not  the  Gospel."  However  shameful  the 
divisions  of  Christendom  may  be,  and  however  impera- 
tive it  is  that  we  should  display  love  towards  all  the 
brethren  for  whom  Christ  died,  to  seek  Church  unity 
at  the  cost  of  sacrificing  the  propagation  of  what  Christ 
committed  to  His  Church  to  proclaim,  is  as  if  we  should 
seek  to  speak  the  truth  in  love  by  ceasing  to  speak  it 
altogether.  It  is  also  to  acquiesce  in  an  agnosticism 
which  must  inevitably  kill  the  Christianity  of  any 
religious  body  that  is  permanently  dominated  by  it. 

Unless  Christ  prayed  in  vain  for  unity.  Christians 
will  certainly,  in  God's  own  time,  get  together.  But 
to  suppose  that  this  glorious  event  is  possible  apart 
from  the  working  out  of  the  practical  axiom  —  "  Truth 
is  mighty  and  will  prevail,"  is  to  adopt  an  unintelli- 
gent supposition.  And  Christian  apologists  cannot 
successfully  meet  the  difficulties  of  our  age,  or  of  any 


12  MODERN   DIFFICULTIES 

age,  by  proclaiming  an  emasculated  Christianity.  If 
Christianity  is  true,  its  truth  and  reasonableness  will 
be  most  adequately  exhibited  when  its  doctrines  are 
fully  and  coherently  set  forth.  This  ought  carefully 
to  be  remembered  by  you,  who  are  preparing  to  become 
preachers  of  the  Gospel  and  apologists  in  behalf  of  a 
religion  upon  the  successful  propagation  of  which 
depends  the  higher  welfare  of  mankind.  From  the 
moment  that  you  surrender  to  the  demands  of  the  age 
one  single  genuine  content  of  the  historic  faith  of 
Christendom  you  also  begin  to  surrender  in  effect  the 
task  of  propagating  the  actual  rehgion  which  the  great 
Redeemer  established.  You  must  indeed  translate  an- 
cient phrases  into  language  which  moderns  can  under- 
stand, but  to  translate  means  to  convey  the  original 
meaning  of  what  is  translated.  You  will  also  have 
need  to  distinguish  between  the  historic  faith  and  the 
speculative  opinions  of  later  theologians  and  schools, 
refusing  to  be  hampered  by  the  latter.  But  a  Chris- 
tian apologist  is  an  apologist  of  Christianity  —  that  is, 
of  a  religion  which  is  now  nineteen  centuries  old,  and 
which,  like  its  Founder,  is  ''the  same  yesterday,  to-day, 
and  forever." 

n 

Having  considered  the  chief  causes  of  modern  diffi- 
culties of  faith,  let  us  define  for  ourselves  the  leading 
forms  of  opposition  to  Christian  doctrine  with  which 
Christian  apologists  now  have  to  deal.  They  are 
rationalistic  biblical  criticism,  pantheism,  and  natural- 


FORMS   OF   ATTACK  13 

ism.  It  is  the  last  named  which  demands  especial 
attention  in  connection  with  the  task  undertaken  in 
these  lectures,  but  a  rapid  survey  of  the  whole  field  of 
conflict  seems  desirable. 

(a)  By  rationalistic  biblical  criticism  I  mean  criti- 
cism which  is  controlled  in  method  and  result  by  the 
presupposition  that  the  supernatural  does  not  need  to 
be  allowed  for  in  determining  the  dates,  authorships, 
texts,  and  truth  of  the  several  portions  and  teachings 
of  the  Scriptures.  The  Scriptures  may  not  be  regarded 
as  exempt  from  sound  criticism,  which  is  nothing  more 
than  a  scientific  scrutiny  of  their  form  and  contents. 
If  this  scrutiny  is  really  scientific  —  that  is,  sound  in 
presuppositions  and  method,  and  adequate  in  the  data 
with  which  it  reckons  —  no  genuine  truth-seeker  will 
fail  to  welcome  it  and  be  guided  by  its  final  results. 
For  a  Christian  to  fear  the  truth  in  any  domain  is  for 
him  to  cause  a  well-grounded  suspicion  that  he  pre- 
fers the  triumph  of  opinions  to  a  victory  of  truth. 
No  thoughtful  person  will  attempt  to  justify  such  a 
position. 

That  many  modern  critics  refuse  to  allow  for  super- 
natural factors  in  the  history  of  Israel,  and  in  the  pro- 
duction of  the  Scriptures  in  the  canonical  form  in  which 
they  have  come  to  us,  is  too  notorious  to  be  disputed. 
They  insist  that  biblical  literature  must  be  criticised 
exactly  like  any  other  literature  —  that  is,  as  deter- 
mined in  form  and  content  by  purely  human  causes. 
If  they  are  mistaken,  and  if  it  is  a  fact  that  super- 
natural causes  have  been  at  work,  and  that  the  Scrip- 


14  MODERN   DIFFICULTIES 

tures  are  supernaturally  inspired,  then  their  criticism 
is  based  upon  inadequate  data,  and  their  failure  to  allow 
for  supernatural  factors  destroys  the  finality  of  their 
conclusions.  In  brief,  they  presuppose  what  in  view 
of  immemorial  Christian  doctrine  they  ought  to  have 
proved,  that  the  Scriptures  are  not  affected  in  either 
language  or  teaching  by  other  causes  than  those  which 
are  summed  up  in  the  phrase,  "natural  evolution  of 
religion."  Similarly,  it  is  unscientific  to  take  for 
granted,  as  many  do,  that  the  miracles  alleged  in  Scrip- 
ture are  one  and  all  to  be  regarded  as  suspicious  because 
miraculous.  Their  reality  is  a  question  of  evidence, 
and  to  assume  without  serious  consideration  of  the 
evidence  that  they  must  be  explained  away  is  to  vitiate 
criticism  and  to  nulHfy  the  scientific  validity  of  its 
results. 

It  is  impossible  in  these  lectures  to  discuss  the  matter 
at  length.  I  can  only  state  my  conviction,  based  upon 
careful  study,  that  while  bibhcal  criticism  has  thrown 
much  needed  light  upon  the  human  aspects  of  the 
Scriptures,  and  has  clarified  our  notions  touching  the 
methods  of  inspiration,  as  distinguished  from  the  fact 
that  it  is  supernatural  in  causation,  it  has  not  estabhshed 
one  single  conclusion  which  ought  to  hinder  men  from 
believing  the  Bible  to  be  of  divine  authority,  and  to 
be  infallible  within  the  sphere  of  its  inspired  purpose. 
Just  as  an  infallible  watch  means  one  which  can  be 
impHcitly  trusted  as  a  timekeeper,  so  the  Bible  can 
still  be  trusted  without  reserve,  when  correctly  used 
and  interpreted,  for  the  purely  religious  purposes  of 


FORMS   OF   ATTACK 


15 


its  inspiration.^  Not  one  conclusion  of  biblical  critics 
can  be  alleged  to  the  contrary  which  cannot  be  shown 
to  be  unscientific  by  reason  of  the  question-begging 
and  rationalistic  denial  of  the  supernatural  upon  which 
it  is  based.  Certain  alleged  results  of  criticism,  which 
seem,  to  ordinary  men  at  least,  to  nullify  Christian  doc- 
trines, are  supported  by  very  plausible  arguments. 
But  in  every  instance  of  this  kind  careful  scrutiny  will 
bring  to  light  the  vitiating  fallacy  of  which  I  have  been 
speaking.  The  plausibility  depends  upon  the  premises; 
and  naturalistic  premises  should  be  proved.  They 
may  not,  scientifically  speaking,  be  taken  for  granted. 
But  the  most  disturbing  effect  of  biblical  criticism  is 
this,  that  not  even  a  beHef  in  the  supernatural  can 
account  for  what  appears  to  be  the  presence  of  his- 
torical and  scientific  inaccuracies  in  Scripture.  Few 
scholars  can  be  found  to-day  who  will  venture  to 
maintain  the  historical  and  scientific  value  of  the 
early  chapters  of  Genesis,  and  the  entire  freedom  of 
the  Gospel  narratives  from  mutual  inconsistencies  of 
detail.  Those  who  have  adequately  considered  this 
difficulty  are  not  troubled  by  it.  The  Bible  was  not 
inspired  for  historical  and  scientific  purposes,  but  for 
rehgious  ends.  And  these  ends  did  not  require  that 
the  sacred  writers  should  be  made  infallible  in  his- 
tory and  science.  So  far  as  the  narratives  of  Scrip- 
ture embody  what  is  taught  by  catholic  dogma,  they 
are  not  found  to  be  erroneous;   and  the  mutual  varia- 

1 1  borrow  this  watch  illustration  from  Marcus  Dods,  The  Bible, 
ch.  V. 


1 6  MODERN    DIFFICULTIES 

tions  of  the  Gospel  narratives  strengthen  rather  than 
weaken  their  concurrent  witness  to  the  fundamental 
facts  upon  which  the  Christian  religion  is  based.  But 
those  who  have  not  mastered  the  arguments  of  Chris- 
tian apologists  are  confused  by  the  attacks  of  biblical 
critics  upon  the  historical  trustworthiness  of  Scripture; 
and,  as  a  result,  many  are  losing  confidence  in  the  credi- 
bility of  historical  Christianity.  I  believe  that  the 
ground  which  is  being  lost  on  this  account  is  destined 
fully  to  be  recovered.  But  the  victory  will  not  be  won 
by  abandoning  the  ancient  doctrine  of  bibhcal  inspira- 
tion. It  w^ill  be  achieved  rather  by  propagating  sound 
views  of  the  purpose  of  such  inspiration,  and  of  the 
proper  interpretation  and  use  of  Scripture.^ 

(b)  A  second  form  of  opposition  to  Christian  doc- 
trine is  pantheism  —  a  name  which  stands  for  various 
systems  of  thought  that  are  inconsistent  with  any  clear 
distinction  between  the  Creator  and  His  creatures. 
Pantheistic  forms  of  thought  and  language  are  some- 
what widely  prevalent,  even  among  those  who  would 
repudiate  any  clear  assertion  of  the  identity  of  God 
and  the  universe.  The  chief  cause  of  this  is  a  new  way 
of  regarding  the  universe  which  has  been  brought  in 
by  evolutionary  thought.  Before  the  time  of  Darwin 
men  were  apt  to  think  of  the  universe  as  a  vast  machine 
which  God  created  and  completed  once  for  all,  and 
with  which   He  cannot   interfere  without   subverting 

1  The  position  here  taken  is  more  elaborately  exhibited  and  de- 
fended in  the  author's  Authority,  Eccles.  and  Biblical,  chh.  vi,  vii. 
See  pp.  1 1 9-1 23,  below,  for  a  continuation  of  the  subject  of  biblical 
infallibility. 


FORMS    OF   ATTACK  1 7 

the  laws  by  which  its  operations  are  governed.  God 
was  conceived  of  as  external  to  His  universe,  and  as  a 
Mechanic  who  is  debarred  from  tampering  with  what 
He  has  constructed.  Darwinism  has  caused  a  strong 
reaction  against  such  a  conception  of  things;  and  has 
led  men  to  look  upon  the  world  as  a  growing  thing, 
having  the  principle  of  its  development  within  itself. 
An  evolutionary  theist  naturally  considers  God  to  be 
this  interior  principle  of  evolution,  and  is  led  to  dwell 
upon  divine  immanence  rather  than,  as  his  predeces- 
sors did,  upon  the  transcendence  of  God.  A  sound 
theologian  is  able  to  see  that  the  truths  of  transcendence 
and  immanence  are  equally  essential  to  a  correct  notion 
of  God,  and  neither  of  them  has  lacked  emphasis  in 
catholic  theology.  But  they  must  be  held  together, 
if  we  are  to  avoid  onesidedness  and  caricature  of  the 
doctrine  of  God. 

If  the  eighteenth-century  tendency  was  to  bow  the 
Creator  out  of  His  universe,  the  present  tendency  is 
often  to  submerge  God  in  the  world,  and  to  reduce  Him 
to  an  impersonal  and  immanent  force  —  a  sort  of 
anima  mundi;  —  and  this  line  of  thought  has  pantheism 
for  its  logical  conclusion.  That  any  genuine  form  of 
pantheism  can  be  reconciled  with  Christian  doctrine 
cannot  be  conceded  by  one  who  has  rightly  understood 
such  doctrine.  Pantheism  nulHfies  the  validity  of 
moral  distinctions,  and  is  as  fatal  to  the  Christian 
postulate  of  a  personal  Creator  and  providential  Gov- 
ernor of  the  world  as  any  theory  can  be.  The  mystery 
of  personality  is  profound,  and  those  who  are  not  dis- 
3 


l8  MODERN    DIFFICULTIES 

posed  to  acquiesce  in  mystery  are  being  led  by  their 
efforts  to  solve  the  problem  of  personality  into  what 
in  reality  is  an  anti-theistic  position.  The  combined 
influence  of  pantheistic  idealism  and  agnosticism  causes 
many  to  regard  the  conception  of  divine  personaHty  as 
hopelessly  and  misleadingly  anthropomorphic.  Some 
are  trying  to  substitute  the  supra-personal  for  the 
personal,  which  is  as  if  we  should  substitute  the  supra- 
highest  for  the  highest.  No  term  is  adequate  to  de- 
scribe the  Supreme  Being;  but  no  sound  thinker  either 
forgets  this  or  conceives  of  God  as  limited  by  the  finite 
connotations  of  the  terms  by  which  His  attributes  are 
symbolized.  To  call  God  personal  is  to  insist  that  He 
is  not  inferior  to  His  creatures,  and  to  deny  that  He  is 
personal  is  to  nullify  the  validity  of  all  religious  and 
moral  truths  and  principles.  And  right  here  lies  the 
real  fallacy  of  every  form  of  pantheistic  immanation- 
ism.  No  view  of  things  which  either  disregards,  ex- 
plains away,  or  nullifies  the  facts  of  religious  and  moral 
experience  can  be  accepted  as  either  adequate  or  true. 
The  proposition  that  God  is  personal,  and  other  in 
being  than  His  creatures,  is  the  fundamental  postulate 
of  all  religion  and  morality.  That  God  is  immanent 
we  must  believe,  but  every  form  of  assertion  of  this 
truth  which  fails  to  leave  room  for  an  insistence  upon 
His  transcendence  and  personal  control  of  all  things 
is  anti-Christian  in  its  logic.^ 

1  On  pantheism,  see  Flint,  Anti-theistic  Theories,  Lees.  IX,  X; 
Fraser,  Philos.  of  Theism,  pp.  76-103;  Liddon,  Some  Elements  of 
Religion,  pp.  59-66;  Christlieb,  Modern  Doubt,  pp.  161-190.  Cf.  the 
author's  Being  and  Attributes  of  God,  ch.  ix.  §  5. 


FORMS    OF   ATTACK  19 

The  distinction  between  the  natural  and  the  super- 
natural is  necessarily  brought  to  mind  when  we  do 
justice  to  the  personal  sovereignty  of  God  over  the  uni- 
verse. If  God  is  the  true  Cause  of  all  reality,  and  if 
His  will  is  expressed  and  fulfilled  by  the  progress  of 
things,  there  must  be  operations  which  are  supernatural 
to  the  things  which  by  means  of  them  are  lifted  to  a 
higher  level  of  being  and  life.  And  this  holds  good 
whether  the  progress  takes  place  by  law  or  by  inno- 
vating fiat,  whether  by  imperceptible  variation  or  by 
sudden  mutation.  No  nature  can  evolve  itself  into  a 
nature  that  is  higher  in  kind  except  by  higher  forces 
than  the  nature  thus  developed  originally  possesses. 
And,  if  the  course  of  events  is  working  out  a  rational 
plan,  the  occurrence  of  phenomena  which  imply  the 
operation  of  supernatural  forces  —  forces,  that  is,  that 
are  not  resident  in  previously  existing  natures  —  is  to 
be  expected.  No  event,  however  amazing  and  exceed- 
ing the  capacity  of  scientists  to  co-ordinate  with  previ- 
ous events,  may  be  regarded  as  irrational  or  incredible, 
unless  it  can  be  seen  to  have  no  place  in  the  larger  plan 
of  God.  The  miracles  of  the  Gospel  are  as  well  attested 
as  any  ancient  events  well  can  be;  and,  when  viewed 
from  a  Christian  standpoint,  they  are  seen  to  be  rational, 
because  they  have  an  intelligible  place  in  the  history 
of  divine  operations  in  general.  The  phenomena 
which  are  caused  by  the  operations  of  a  professional 
breeder  of  varieties  in  artificial  selection  constitute 
surprising  innovations  upon  the  previously  established 
order;    and   they  are  distinctly  supernatural   to   the 


20  MODERN   DIFFICULTIES 

organisms  affected,  in  so  far  at  least  as  these  organisms 
were  not  evolved  into  their  new  forms  or  varieties 
without  the  higher  and  intelligent  action  of  the  breeder.^ 
(When,  therefore.  Darwinians   describe    the   evolution 
•of  species  in  general  by  the  phrase  "natural  selection," 
they  suggest  the  inference  that  a  similar  dependence 
;  upon  supernatural  and  intelligent  operation  and  con- 
/  trol  is  involved ;  and  they  cannot  exclude  this  inference 
I  so  long  as  they  employ  the  phenomena  of  artificial 
'  selection  as  evidence  of  natural  selection.     No  doubt 
they  substitute  natural  law  for  the  personal  breeder. 
But   if   the  work   done   by  natural   law  is  correctly 
described  in  the  terms  of  personal  agency,  we  cannot 
reasonably  escape  the  inference  that  such  law  is  simply 
the  method   employed   by  an  inteUigent   and   super- 
natural Person.^    No  one  who  gets  thus  far  can  con- 
sistently limit  the  operations  of  this  supernatural  Person 
by  the  native  capacities  and  resident  forces  of  existing 
organisms.     Supernatural  involutions  and  miraculous 
interventions,  so  far  as  they  are  involved  in  progress 
and  in  the  general  plan  of  God,  are  obviously  to  be 

^  The  varieties  which  are  produced  by  artificial  selection  do  not 
diflfer  in  kind  from  the  species  which  are  thus  modified,  and  the 
possibility  that  the  slower  operations  of  nature  might  produce  the 
same  results  is  a  real  one.  The  supernatural  factor  appears  in 
the  rapidity  and  personal  control  of  the  change, 

2  The  phrase  "natural  evolution"  describes  merely  the  sphere  of 
the  process  —  not  its  whole  method,  nor  all  of  its  factors.  That 
of  "survival  of  the  fittest"  describes  only  its  result.  "Natural 
selection"  is  the  only  phrase,  generally  employed,  which  can  be 
taken  as  descriptive  of  the  method  of  evolution;  and  when  this 
phrase  is  scrutinized,  it  is  seen  to  imply  personal  agency. 


FORMS    OF   ATTACK  21 

expected ;  and  to  refuse  to  consider  the  evidence  of  their 
occurrence  is  to  dogmatize  concerning  a  plan  which 
confessedly  is  more  comprehensive  than  can  be  ex- 
hibited by  natural  science.^ 

(c)  This  distinction  between  the  natural  and  the 
supernatural  is  necessarily  repudiated  by  pantheists. 
But  my  emphasis  upon  it  at  this  point  ^  has  particular 
reference  to  another  form  of  opposition  to  Christian 
doctrine.  I  refer  to  naturalism,  the  very  name  of  which 
implies  a  refusal  to  allow  for  the  supernatural  factor 
in  the  history  of  the  universe  and  of  man.  It  is  this 
form  of  opposition  that  demands  especial  considera- 
tion in  connection  with  the  subject-matter  of  these 
lectures.  Briefly  defined,  naturaHsm  maintains  that 
all  knowable  realities  are  physical  and  mechanical,  and 
are  to  be  described  and  interpreted  in  exclusively  me-j 
chanical  terms.  Formerly,  Professor  James  Ward  tells  1 
us,  "naturalism  tended  dogmatically  to  deny  the  exist- 
ence of  things  divine  or  spiritual,  and  dogmatically' 
to  assert  that  matter  was  the  one  absolute  reality." 
That  is,  naturalism  meant  materialism  pure  and 
simple.  But  the  materialistic  position  has  become 
less  and  less  tenable  as  the  range  of  scientific  inquiry 
has  widened  so  as  to  include  a  more  adequate  study  of 
the  phenomena  of  Hfe  and  of  mind.  The  supporters 
of  naturalism  have  accordingly  somewhat  shifted  their 

1  The  author's  argument  as  to  the  supernatural  is  more  largely 
given  in  Introd.  to  Dog.  TheoL,  ch.  ii. 

2  An  emphasis  which  will  be  necessary  to  repeat  at  later  stages  in 
the  general  argument  of  these  lectures.  See  especially  Lee.  v.  Pt. 
III. 


22  MODERN   DIFFICULTIES 

ground,  and  have  taken  up  an  agnostic  position  towards 
everything  superphysical.  Quoting  Professor  Ward 
again,  the  philosophy  which  now  controls  the  minds 
of  many  physical  scientists  contends  that  *'so  far  as 
knowledge  extends  all  is  law,  and  law  ultimately  and 
most  clearly  to  be  formulated  in  terms  of  matter  and 
motion.  Knowledge,  it  is  now  said,  can  never  trans- 
cend the  phenomenal;  concerning  'unknown  and 
hypothetical'  existences  beyond  and  beneath  the  phe- 
nomenal, whether  called  Matter  or  Mind  or  God, 
science  will  not  dogmatize  either  by  affir'ming  or  deny- 
ing. .  .  .  The  eternities  safely  left  aside,  the  relativities 
become  at  once  amenable  to  system."  ^ 

It  can  be  seen  that  naturaHsm  in  our  day  combines 
agnosticism  towards  the  superphysical  with  insistence 
upon  a  purely  mechanical  method  of  interpreting  all 
knowable  realities.  It  is  desirable  to  reckon  separately 
with  these  two  aspects  of  the  system  under  considera- 
tion. 

The  name  "agnostic"  was  coined  by  the  late  Thomas 
Huxley.  He  says  that  agnosticism  ''is  not  a  creed, 
but  a  method,  the  essence  of  which  lies  in  the  rigorous 
appHcation  of  a  single  principle  ...  it  is  the  great 
principle  of  Descartes;  it  is  the  fundamental  axiom 
of  modern  science.  Positively  the  principle  may  be 
expressed:  In  matters  of  the  intellect,  follow  your 
reason  as  far  as  it  will  take  you,  without  regard  to  any 

1  Jas.  Ward,  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism,  p.  20.  This  work  is 
the  most  elaborate  and  important  attack  upon  naturalism,  and  de- 
mands careful  study.  Balfour's  Foundations  of  Belief  attacks  the 
philosophical  basis  of  naturalism. 


FORMS    OF   ATTACK  23 

other  consideration.  And  negatively:  In  matters  of 
intellect,  do  not  pretend  that  conclusions  are  certain 
which  are  not  demonstrated  or  demonstrable.  .  .  .  The 
only  negative  fixed  points  will  be  those  negations  which 
flow  from  the  demonstrable  limitation  of  our  faculties. 
And  the  only  obligation  accepted  is  to  have  the  mind 
always  open  to  conviction."  ^ 

If  we  consider  Mr.  Huxley's  language  closely,  we 
shall  see  that  three  contentions  are  made.  In  the  first 
place  he  insists  that  we  must  be  guided  in  matters  of 
intellect  by  pure  reason;  which  means  that  we  ought 
to  exclude  every  influence  of  desire  and  will.  This  is 
bad  psychology.  The  emotional,  volitional,  and  intel- 
lectual functions  of  personality  are  not  separable 
faculties,  but  are  invariably  exercised  together,  —  in 
varying  proportions,  no  doubt,  but  —  as  inseparable 
parts  of  personal  functioning.  In  no  department  of 
truth-seeking  can  one  exercise  his  reason  to  effect 
unless  impelled  by  interest,  disposition  to  learn,  and 
will  to  attend.  Moreover,  one's  conclusions  are  deter- ' 
mined  in  the  consideration  of  scientific  problems,  and 
in  scientific  inductions,  by  the  proportionate  degrees 
of  attention  that  are  given  to  particular  data,  that  is 
by  the  will  —  the  will  in  turn  being  influenced  by  per- 
sonal preconceptions  and  predispositions.  In  brief, 
personaHty  is  as  certainly  a  determining  factor  in  the 
success  of  physical  investigation  as  it  is  in  that  of 
spiritual  truth-seeking;  and  when  naturaHsm  urges  the 

^Nineteenth  Century,  Feb.,  1889,  in  an  article  entitled  "Agnos- 
ticism." 


24  MODERN    DIFFICULTIES 

presence  of  emotional  and  volitional  factors  in  the 
attainment  of  spiritual  knowledge  as  an  argument  for 
agnosticism  towards  such  knowledge,  it  saws  off  the 
branch  upon  which  it  sits.^ 

Mr.  Huxley's  second  contention  is  that  no  conclu- 
sions can  be  certain  which  are  neither  demonstrated 
nor  demonstrable.  Taking  the  word  '^ demonstrable" 
to  mean  justifiable  on  grounds  which  can  be  reasonably 
regarded  as  sufficient,  this  is  of  course  true.  But  Mr. 
Huxley  did  not  regard  any  grounds  of  certainty  as  suffi- 
cient except  naturalistic  ones.  That  is,  he  was  agnos- 
tic with  reference  to  everything  which  is  not  subject  to 
physical  and  mechanical  interpretation. 

This  agnosticism  is  embodied  in  his  third  contention, 
that  ^'the  only  negative  fixed  points  will  be  those  nega- 
tions which  flow  from  the  demonstrable  limitation  of 
our  faculties."  Naturalism  maintains  that  our  facul- 
ties are  incapable  of  knowing  anything  beyond  the 
phenomenal  contents  of  sensible  experience  —  that  is, 
beyond  the  physical  and  mechanical.  This  is  what 
Mr.  Huxley  meant  by  ^'the  demonstrable  limitation  of 
our  faculties";  but  neither  could  he,  nor  any  one  else, 
demonstrate  what  constitutes  this  limitation.  Cer- 
tainly it  is  impossible  to  demonstrate  that  the  super- 
physical  and  non-mechanical  is  unknowable.  The 
most  complete  and  direct  knowledge  that  we  have  is 
concerned  with  our  own  mental  activities.     Are  these 

1  See  the  author's  Introd.  to  Dog.  Theol.,  ch.  iv.  §§  4,  5;  Illingworth, 
Divine  Immanence,  pp.  59-73;  Romanes,  Thoughts  on  Religion, 
pp.  140-147. 


FORMS    OF   ATTACK  25 

physical?  To  assert  that  they  are  is  pure  dogmatism, 
and  a  dogmatism  which  contradicts  the  testimony  of 
consciousness.  We  know  our  own  personahty,  and 
that  knowledge  opens  up  the  superphysical  world 
just  as  really  as  the  knowledge  of  sensible  phenomena 
opens  up  the  physical  world.  Having  once  gained 
access  to  the  superphysical,  the  only  way  in  which  we 
can  ascertain  the  limits  of  our  possible  knowledge 
thereof  is  by  trying  to  know  as  much  of  it  as  we  can.^ 
This  is  true  of  every  kind  of  knowledge.  It  is  impos- 
sible to  get  a  mental  standpoint  outside  of  knowledge, 
and  only  from  such  a  standpoint  is  it  possible  to  dog- 
matize in  advance  as  to  how  much  we  can  know  in 
any  sphere  of  realities  that  is  accessible  to  our  minds.^ 
Our  knowledge  of  human  personality  is  the  gateway 
to  knowledge  of  divine  personality;  and  Christians 
claim  to  possess  a  real,  although,  of  course,  a  very 
partial,  knowledge  of  God.  This  knowledge  is  obtained 
by  divine  grace,  and  grace  is  the  telescope,  so  to  speak, 
by  which  we  are  enabled  to  explore  the  spiritual  heavens. 
For  those  who  will  not  employ  this  telescope  to  deny 
the  rational  validity  of  the  knowledge  which  is  gained 
by  its  use  is  a  species  of  a  priori  dogmatism  which 
cannot  demonstrate  its  conclusion   by  any  evidence 

1  Even  Sir  Wm.  Hamilton  says,  "We  know,  and  can  know,  nothing 
a  priori  of  what  is  possible  or  impossible  to  mind,  and  it  is  only  by 
observation  and  generalization  a  posteriori  that  we  can  ever  hope  to 
attain  insight  into  the  question."  Cf.  Schurman,  Belief  in  God, 
pp.  27,  28. 

2  See  the  author's  Being  and  Attributes  of  God,  ch.  ii.  §  8,  and 
Introd.  to  Dog.  TheoL,  ch.  v.  Pt.  I, 


26  MODERN   DIFFICULTIES 

whatsoever.  Those  who  try  to  know  spiritual  real- 
ities, submitting  to  the  conditions  of  such  knowledge, 
and  employing  the  spiritual  methods  by  which  alone 
they  can  successfully  be  examined,  they  are  the  only 
ones  who  are  competent  to  judge  concerning  the 
knowability  of  spiritual  things.  Such  people  claim  to 
know  them.^ 

Ill 

We  now  come  to  the  other  aspect  of  naturalism  — 
its  insistence  upon  a  purely  mechanical  method  of  in- 
terpreting all  knowable  realities.  The  fallacies  which 
vitiate  such  a  position  are  most  clearly  exhibited  by 
the  indirect  method  of  positively  defining  for  ourselves 
the  proper  function,  range,  and  methods  of  sciences, 
and  their  real  limitations. 

Like  any  other  primary  conception  of  the  human 
mind,  the  idea  signified  by  the  term  "knowledge" 
escapes  definition,  because  it  is  unique,  and  definition 
involves  a  comparison  of  what  is  defined  with  other 
things.  Where  there  is  no  basis  of  comparison  there 
can  be  no  definition  in  the  strict  sense  of  that  term. 
But  we  have  no  difficulty  in  identifying  knowledge  in 
practice,  and  it  can  be  described  with  sufficient  prac- 
tical accuracy  as  the  attainment  of  a  rationally  justifi- 
able certainty  concerning  reality.  Its  content  is  never 
exhaustive,  or  adequate  to  reality,  but  if  this  content  is, 
so  far  as  it  goes,  in  working  accord  with  the  real,  it 

1  The  philosophical  form  of  agnosticism  defended  by  Herbert 
Spencer  has  been  considered  in  the  author's  Being  and  Attributes  of 
Cod,  ch.  ii.     Many  references  are  there  given. 


THE  SCIENCES  27 

constitutes  what  scientists  mean  by  knowledge,  and 
is  the  only  knowledge  which  men  can  possess. 

Knowledge  may  be  concerned  either  with  single 
particulars  of  experience,  whether  physical  or  super- 
physical,  or  with  numerous  particulars,  viewed  to- 
gether and  in  their  mutual  relations.  Now  it  is  the 
function  of  sciences  to  develop  the  latter  kind  of  knowl- 
edge, and  scientific  knowledge  is  generalized  knowledge. 
In  more  specific  terms,  the  function  of  a  science  is  to 
investigate,  generalize,  co-ordinate,  and  reduce  to  intel- 
ligible unity  all  that  can  be  ascertained  concerning  some 
department  or  aspect  of  reality.  The  subject-matter  of 
every  science  is  some  department  or  aspect  of  the 
knowable,  which  in  its  totality  is  assumed  to  constitute 
a  unity  and  to  be  susceptible  of  being  to  some  extent 
understood  in  its  unity.  How  far  the  knowable  extends 
can  be  determined  only  by  the  results  of  practical  efforts 
to  gain  knowledge  —  not  by  any  preconceptions  or 
speculative  theories  whatsoever.  Our  theories  con- 
cerning knowledge  depend  for  their  validity  upon  what 
we  already  know,  and  when  they  are  based  upon  igno- 
rance they  become  mere  intellectual  gymnastics. 

Wherever  men  have  in  fact  made  progress  in  knowl- 
edge of  reality  there  is  a  place  for  science;  and  the 
claim  of  theology  to  be  a  science  cannot  be  rejected 
except  upon  the  supposition  that  its  ostensible  subject- 
matter  is  either  wholly  unknowable  or,  if  knowable, 
entirely  chaotic.^     Science  must  assume  that  the  uni- 

1  The  author  has  treated  of  the  scientific  claim  of  theology  in 
Introd.  to  Dog.  Theol.,  ch.  i. 


'    / 


28  MODERN   DIFFICULTIES 

verse  of  reality  contains  no  chaotic  part;  that  all  is 
{:  coherent;  that  part  is  related  to  part  and  fact  to  fact; 
so  that  a  correct  knowledge  of  things  means  a  knowl- 
edge of  them  as  interrelated,  and  as  capable  of  being 
described  in  terms  of  intelligible  unity.  Thus  the 
phenomena  of  heat,  light,  and  electricity  are  described 
in  relation  to  those  of  energy  and  motion;  organic 
matter  must  be  described  in  relation  to  the  phenomena 
of  life;  and  physical  and  mental  phenomena  have  to 
be  described  as  parts  of  one  system  of  reality,  how- 
ever diverse  they  may  be  in  themselves.  Unless  all 
this  is  taken  for  granted,  no  rational  basis  exists  for 
the  undertaking  of  science  to  generalize,  co-ordinate 
and  unify.  A  chaos  can  never  be  the  subject-matter 
of  science. 

No  intelligent  scientist  denies  this.  But  scientific 
specialists  are  often  prevented  by  their  exclusive  devo- 
tion to  limited  aspects  of  reality  from  realizing  that  no 
department  of  reality  can  logically  be  excluded  from 
the  realm  of  order,  unity,  and  rational  intelligibiHty. 
Reality  and  intelligibility  go  together,  and  to  repudiate 
the  applicability  of  scientific  methods  to  the  spiritual 
realm  cannot  be  justified  except  by  a  repudiation  of  the 
reality  of  the  spiritual.  The  point  to  which  I  am 
coming  is  this :  that  the  task  of  science  can  never  fully 
be  achieved  until  all  departments  of  reality  are  co-ordi- 
/  nated  and  all  knowledge,  whether  of  the  natural  or  of 
j  the  supernatural,  is  brought  into  intelligible  unity. 
Two  important  consequences  follow.  The  first  of  these 
is  generally  granted;  that  is,  that  no  theological  knowl- 


THE  SCIENCES  29 

edge  can  make  good  its  claim  to  be  true  knowledge  if  it 
can  be  demonstrated  to  be  contradictory  to  genuine 
knowledge  in  the  sphere  of  non-theological  sciences. 
But  it  is  equally  to  be  maintained  that  no  proposition 
advanced  by  natural  scientists  can  rightly  be  regarded 
as  final  which  contradicts  genuine  theological  knowl- 
edge. In  brief,  the  harmony  which  must  exist  between 
theological  and  non-theological  knowledge  is  a  mutual 
one,  and  neither  theological  nor  non-theological  science 
is  in  a  position  rightly  to  dictate  terms  to  the  other.  And 
this  contention  is  not  in  the  least  degree  qualified 
when  we  acknowledge  that  theology,  like  physical  sci- 
ence, is  a  progressive  science,  and  makes  progress  by 
the  correction  of  speculative  errors  as  well  as  by  a 
more  complete  knowledge  of  its  divinely,  revealed  and 
therefore  indisputable  data.^ 

All  reality  constitutes  a  unity;  but  the  complexity 
and  variety  which  is  discernible  in  the  totality  of  things 
is  very  great,  so  great  that  no  one  mind  is  capable  of 
adequately  investigating  and  generalizing  all  realities 
in  one  science.  Consequently  a  division  of  labour  is 
the  first  requirement  of  scientific  method.  The  task 
which  cannot  successfully  be  undertaken  in  its  compre- 

1  The  data  of  revelation  are  analogous  to  those  of  physical  science 
in  so  far  as  they  consist  of  phenomena  that  have  been  experi- 
enced; and  for  this  reason  they  constitute  the  fixed  premises  of  theolog- 
ical speculation.  When  Christians  insist  that  the  faith  was  once  for 
all  delivered,  and  cannot  be  changed,  they  act  on  the  principle  which 
moves  a  modern  scientist  to  insist  upon  his  facts  while  modifying 
his  theories.  The  insistence  in  both  cases  means  that  experience 
cannot  be  repudiated. 


30  MODERN    DIFFICULTIES 

hensive  totality  has  to  be  dealt  with  piecemeal.  Ac- 
cordingly there  are  many  sciences,  and  each  science 
represents  specialization  —  a  more  or  less  exclusive 
consideration  of  limited  departments  or  aspects  of 
reality,  each  having  its  distinctive  methods  of  investiga- 
tion and  interpretation.  It  is  the  fact  that  certain 
subject-matters  can  be  successfully  investigated  by 
similar  methods  which  causes  them  to  be  included 
within  the  purview  of  one  science.  This  is  so  for  the 
obvious  reason  that  success  in  scientific  work  depends 
upon  specialization  in  method.  But  such  a  principle 
of  division  causes  a  certain  overlapping  of  sciences, 
which  are  often  concerned  with  the  same  realities, 
although  with  diverse  aspects  of  them,  and  from  dif- 
ferent points  of  view.  Thus  the  natural  sciences  in 
their  several  ways  deal  with  nature  in  its  phenomenal 
and  mechanical  aspects.  As  Mr.  W.  C.  D.  Whetham 
says,  "the  object  of  Natural  Science  ...  is  to  fit  to- 
gether a  consistent  and  harmonious  model  which  shall 
represent  to  our  minds  the  phenomena  which  act  on 
our  senses."  ^  On  the  other  hand  theological  science 
treats  of  nature  in  superphysical  aspects,  as  exhibiting 
the  handiwork  of  God  and  as  having  place  in  the  divine 
plan,  a  determinative  interpretation  of  which  has  been 
made  possible  by  supernatural  revelation.  It  is  as  if 
nature  were  cut  through  in  various  directions,  the 
several  intersecting  sections  thus  laid  bare  being 
investigated  in  different  sciences  —  the  physical  aspects 

*  Recent  Development   of  Physical  Science,  p.   15.      The  whole 
chapter  is  valuable. 


THE  SCIENCES  31 

of  nature  being  exhibited  in  certain  sections,  the  theo- 
logical in  other  sections. 

It  can  be  seen  that  no  particular  section  completely 
exhibits  the  whole  of  nature;  and,  therefore,  that  no 
particular  science  ought  to  be  regarded  as  self-sufhcient. 
Every  scientific  hypothesis  has  this  limitation,  that  it 
describes  partial  aspects  only  of  reality;  and  its  validity 
depends  upon  its  harmony  with  correct  descriptions 
of  other  aspects  of  the  same  reality/  To  give  an  illus- 
tration suggested  by  the  subject  of  these  lectures,  a 
physical  scientist  describes  primitive  man  as  he  would 
have  been  if  his  condition  had  been  determined  exclu- 
sively by  natural  evolution  from  the  lower  species  — 
a  very  legitimate  line  of  investigation.  A  theologian 
describes  man's  primitive  condition  from  the  point  of 
view  of  supernatural  revelation,  and  as  brought  about, 
in  part  at  least,  by  the  coming  in  of  supernatural  grace. 
These  two  aspects  of  primitive  man  need  not  be 
regarded  as  mutually  contradictory,  for  the  supernat- 
ural is  not  the  contra-natural;  and  they  may  not  be 
so  regarded  if  both  are  real.  But  the  two  descriptions 
are  concerned  with  the  same  concrete  matter,  and  there- 
fore neither  the  evolutionary  nor  the  theological  descrip- 
tion of  primitive  man  can  be  regarded  as  beyond 
dispute,  if  it  appears  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  data  upon 
which  the  other  is  based.  Let  me  anticipate  at  this 
point,  and  state  my  conviction  that  only  on  the  untrue 
assumption  that  man's  primitive  state  was  exclusively 
due  to  natural  development  can  any  mutual  contra- 

1  Cf.  O.  Lodge,  Life  and  Matter,  pp.  53-61,  74,  75,  140-143. 


32  MODERN   DIFFICULTIES 

diction  be  established  in  this  matter  between  catholic 
doctrine  and  the  evolutionary  hypothesis/  In  saying 
this  I  shut  out  from  consideration  the  inferences  from 
this  hypothesis  which  naturalistic  philosophers  make. 
These  inferences  are  not  scientific,  but  purely  specu- 
lative.^ 

Particular  sciences,  we  have  seen,  are  limited  in  their 
possibilities  by  the  fragmentariness  of  their  respective 
subject-matters  —  as  if  we  should  investigate  one  side 
of  a  triangle,  in  utter  isolation  from  the  other  sides,  and 
expect  thus  to  gain  an  adequate  understanding  of  its 
place  and  value  in  the  triangle.  But  sciences  are  also 
limited  by  the  very  partial  nature  of  the  knowledge 
that  can  be  obtained  even  of  the  data  with  which  they 
are  especially  concerned.  It  is  impossible  within  the 
limited  time  at  my  disposal  adequately  to  illustrate  this 
statement,  which  is,  however,  quite  indisputable.  In 
every  sphere  of  physical  science  the  known  is  like  the 
area  of  light  produced  by  a  camp  fire  in  the  midst  of 
surrounding  darkness.  And,  although  the  known  con- 
tinually becomes  more  extensive,  the  unknown  remains 
ever  an  overwhelmingly  vast  terra  incognita.  My 
thought  is  justified  at  large  by  Professor  James  Ward's 
Naturalism  and  Agnosticism,  a  work  which  I  commend 
most  earnestly  to  your  attention.  He  shows  with 
abundant  illustrations  that,  inasmuch  as  the  physical 
sciences  treat  of  phemonena  in  their  mechanical  aspects 

1  See  pp.  1 08,  156,  below. 

2  Illingworth  points  out,  in  Reason  and  Revelation,  pp.  245,  246, 
that  the  alleged  conflict  between  theology  and  natural  science  is 
really  between  theology  and  speculative  philosophy. 


THE  SCIENCES  33 

only,  their  conclusions  are  largely  of  an  abstract  nature 
and  more  simple  than  are  the  concrete  realities  which 
they  are  thought  to  describe.  Moreover  the  "laws"  of 
natural  science,  in  which  its  descriptions  of  nature  are 
summarized,  are  approximate  rather  than  exact.  In  / 
the  strictest  sense  of  the  phrase  "exact"  physical 
sciences  do  not  exist. 

Then  too,  scientific  inductions,  even  in  their  own 
sphere,  are  based  upon  very  incomplete  data,  and  have  / 
to  be  regarded  as  provisional.  They  are  subject  to 
modification,  and  frequently  are  modified  to  agree  with 
newly  discovered  facts.  A  good  example  of  this  is  the 
atomic  theory,  which  has  been  undergoing  very  impor- 
tant modification  since  the  discovery  of  certain  facts 
connected  with  radium  —  facts  which  appear  to  estab- 
lish the  existence  of  particles  of  matter  much  smaller 
than  atoms,  and  which  suggest  new  conceptions  of 
matter  and  of  its  fundamental  constitution.^ 

You  will  quite  misunderstand  the  bearing  of  what  I 
have  been  saying,  however,  if  you  infer  that  the  work 
of  physical  scientists  is  valueless,  and  that  the  apparent 
theological  bearings  of  their  hypotheses  may  safely  be 
either  ignored  or  treated  as  unimportant.  To  revert  to 
a  figure  of  speech  previously  employed  in  this  lecture, 
the  sections  of  the  model  of  nature  which  are  examined 
by  physical  and  theological  sciences  intersect  each 
other  at  certain  points,  and  the  attempts  to  describe 

1  On  the  phenomena  of  radio-activity  and  the  theories  based  upon 
them,  see  R.  K.  Duncan,  The  New  Knowledge;  and  W.  C.  D. 
Whetham,  op.  cit.,  chh.  vi,  vii. 

4 


<' 


34  MODERN   DIFFICULTIES 

reality  at  these  points  of  intersection  should  be  com- 
pared and  harmonized,  just  because  when  considered 
separately  each  is  inadequate  to  the  full  reahty. 

But  the  particular  point  which  I  am  now  empha- 
sizing is  the  inadequate  and  provisional  nature  of  the 
hypotheses  which  at  any  given  moment  exhibit  the 
contents  of  physical  knowledge.  All  sciences  are  pro- 
gressive, that  is,  they  are  incomplete  and  to  an  impor- 
tant degree  on  trial.  Their  progress,  however,  is  real, 
and  they  are  bringing  priceless  benefits  to  mankind. 
The  manner  in  which  modern  in\'entions  have  improved 
the  conditions  of  civilization  affords  convincing  evidence 
of  this,  for  these  inventions  have  depended  for  their 
possibihty  upon  the  discoveries  of  physical  sciences. 
These  discoveries  have  been  brilliant,  and  they  encour- 
age us  to  hope  for  still  more  wonderful  advances  in  the 
future. 

We  need,  however,  to  remember  that  a  scientific 
hypothesis  does  not  derive  its  claim  to  acceptance  from 
its  finality,  but  from  its  working  value,  and  from  its 
being  the  best  available  generalization  of  the  data 
with  which  it  is  concerned.  As  such  it  determines  the 
proper  point  of  view  for  fuller  investigation  and  for 
wider  generalizations  —  at  least  until  further  knowl- 
edge requires  its  modification.^ 

The  proper  attitude  of  theologians  towards  the 
hypotheses  of  physical  science  is  one  of  discriminating 
appreciation,  humble  confidence  in  his  own  science,  and 

1  Thos.  Huxley,  Darwiniana,  pp.  374,  375;  O.  Lodge,  Life  and 
Matter,  pp.  83-86. 


THE  SCIENCES  35 

patient  waiting  for  fuller  knowledge  of  all  things. 
Theologians  should  appreciate  and  take  into  due  account 
every  increase  of  human  knowledge,  recognizing  that 
each  advance  must  ultimately  prove  helpful  in  inter- 
preting the  data  of  theological  science.^  But  in  order  to 
do  this  they  do  not  need  either  to  disparage  their  own 
science  or  to  lose  their  certainty  as  to  the  validity  of  its 
primary  data  —  such  data,  I  mean,  as  are  summed  up 
in  ''the  faith  which  was  once  for  all  dehvered  unto  the 
saints."  ^  Depending  as  they  must  upon  physical 
scientists  for  knowledge  of  the  mechanical  aspects  of 
nature,  they  ought,  none  the  less,  to  perceive  the  tenta- 
tive nature  of  physical  hypotheses,  and  of  the  theological 
inferences  which  are  at  first  made  from  them.  Time 
always  works  in  the  long  run  for  the  manifestation  of 
truth,  and  this  should  encourage  us  to  be  patient  when 
scientific  hypotheses  seem  to  contradict  theological 
conclusions.  In  such  case  more  mature  thought  may 
show  that  we  have  been  too  hasty  in  supposing  that  the 
contradiction  is  real.  If  it  is  real,  and  the  physical 
hypothesis  is  able  to  stand  the  test  of  time,  we  may 
be  sure  that  the  theological  proposition  which  requires 
modification  will  be  found  to  be  speculative,  and  ca- 
pable of  abandonment  without  prejudicing  the  genuine 
contents  of  supernatural  revelation.  The  fact  is  that 
the  abandonment  of  untenable  theological  opinions 
must  always  make  for  a  clearer  understanding  of  the 
fundamental  verities  of  our  reHgion. 

1  See  Tiling  worth,  Reason  and  Revelation,  pp.  84-87. 

2  St.  Judes. 


36  MODERN    DIFFICULTIES 

An  impatient  temper  is  certain  to  reduce  the  value 
of  scientific  work  in  any  department;  and  theologians 
who  are  over  eager  to  get  into  line  with  the  latest  theories 
of  natural  scientists  are  likely  to  be  led  by  their  hasty 
inferences  into  the  fogs  of  doubt  instead  of  into  the  light 
of  genuine  scientific  knowledge. 


LECTURE    II 

THE  EVOLUTIONARY  THEORY 

In  my  first  lecture  I  endeavoured  to  clear  the  ground 
of  some  of  the  difficulties  which  interfere  with  an 
intelHgent  discussion  of  the  bearing  of  the  evolutionary 
theory  upon  Christian  doctrine.  If  I  succeeded  in  my 
purpose,  I  have  justified  your  acceptance  of  the  gen- 
eral presupposition  that  the  alleged  opposition  between 
natural  science  and  theology  is  in  reahty  a  conflict 
between  speculative  philosophies;  and  that  it  is  the 
naturalistic  philosophy  of  certain  physical  scientists, 
rather  than  the  estabHshed  results  of  their  investiga- 
tions, which  is  inconsistent  with  Christian  doctrine. 
''Who  would  pay  the  sHghtest  attention  to  naturalism," 
Mr.  A.  J.  Balfour  asks,  "if  it  did  not  force  itself  into 
the  retinue  of  science,  assume  her  livery,  and  claim,  as 
a  kind  of  poor  relation,  in  some  sort  to  represent  her 
authority  and  to  speak  with  her  voice?"  ^ 

In  this  and  in  my  next  lecture  I  ask  you  to  consider 
the  evolutionary  hypothesis,  its  various  forms,  and 
the  evidence  by  which  it  is  supported.  No  doubt 
others  have  covered  this  ground  with  far  greater  claims 
to  be  heard  than  I  can  advance,^  and  some  of  you  at 

*  Foundations  of  Belief,  p.  35. 

2  The  bibliography  of  the  subject  of  organic  evolution  is  large, 
and  is  constantly  increasing.     The  following  works  are  especially 

37 


38  THE    EVOLUTIONARY   THEORY 

least  have,  I  suppose,  become  familiar  with  the  evo- 
lutionary theory.  But  it  will  surely  involve  no  waste  of 
time  on  your  part  to  reconsider  the  subject.  At  all 
events  such  reconsideration  seems  to  be  indispensable 
to  a  fulfilment  of  the  purpose  of  these  lectures. 


Strictly  and  properly  speaking,  the  evolutionary 
theory  is  purely  biological,  and  is  concerned  with  the 
natural  history  of  organic  hfe.  It  does  not  profess 
to  deal  with  the  origin  or  ultimate  cause  of  hfe,  but 
presupposes  the  existence  on  this  planet  of  some  form 
or  forms  of  hving  organisms.  It  can  be  stated  very 
simply  as  the  doctrine  that  all  existing  forms  of  life  are 
derived  by  unbroken  descent   from  a  few  primitive 

to  be  recommended:  R.  H.  Lock,  Recent  Progress  in  the  Study  of 
Variation,  Heredity,  and  Evolution;  A.  R.  Wallace,  Darwinism; 
V.  L.  Kellogg,  Darwinism  To-day;  Henry  Calderwood,  Evolution 
and  Man's  Place  in  Nature;  Herbert  Spencer,  First  Principles; 
Prins.  of  Biology;  G.  J.  Romanes,  Darwin  and  After  Darwin;  Bald- 
win, Die.  of  Philos.,  s.  vv.  "Evolution";  "Lamarckism";  "Natural 
Selection";  "Organic  Selection."  Chas.  Darwin's  Origin  of  Species 
(6th  ed.)  and  Descent  of  Man  arc  of  course  of  primary  importance. 
The  former  is  not  easy  to  read.  A.  Weismann's  Evolution  Theory 
is  of  almost  equal  importance.  A  very  clear  and  popular  exposition 
of  the  Darwinian  theory  is  given  by  Thos.  Huxley,  in  Darwiniana, 
pp.  303-475.  The  bearings  of  the  evolutionary  theory  are  exhibited 
by  V.  F.  Storr,  Development  and  Divine  Purpose;  Jas.  Ward,  N'at- 
uralism  and  Agnosticism,  Vol.  I.  Lees,  vii-x;  A.  Moore,  Science  and 
the  Faith;  Essays  Scientific  and  Philosophical;  J.  Fiske,  Through 
Nature  to  God;  and  F.  B.  Jevons,  Evolution.  The  author's  foot- 
notes will  sufficiently  indicate  the  other  treatises  which  he  has  found 
useful  for  his  purpose. 


GENERAL   DEFINITION  39 

types,  perhaps  from  one,  the  present  large  number  and  ' 
diversity  of  species  being  due  to  progressive  modifica- 
tions of  earlier  species,  brought  about  by  natural  forces 
and  laws  which  still  operate.  This  theory  includes 
in  its  reference  both  the  animal  and  vegetable  king- 
doms, and  claims  in  particular  to  describe  the  produc- 
tion of  the  human  organism.  Some  evolutionists  hold 
that  the  development  of  species  is  fully  accounted  for 
by  the  operation  of  natural  forces  and  laws.  But 
others  acknowledge  that  natural  evolution  has  been 
attended  by  involution,  that  is,  by  superphysical  causa- 
tion, which  has  determined  the  upward  direction  and 
the  results  of  the  operation  of  natural  forces.  Those 
who  deny  the  superphysical  factors  have  obviously 
been  controlled  in  their  opinion  by  the  philosophy 
which  I  discussed  in  my  first  lecture  —  the  philosophy 
of  naturahsm.  Physical  data  do  not  and  cannot,  of 
themselves,  disprove  the  working  of  superphysical 
causation. 

Such  in  general  is  the  evolutionary  theory.  It 
should  not  be  confused  with  particular  explanations 
of  the  method  of  origin  of  new  species,  such  as  the 
theories  of  Lamarck  and  of  Darwin;  nor  with  wider 
theories  which  profess  to  explain  the  development  of 
the  inorganic  world,  and  the  progress  of  human  his- 
tory, thought,  and  rehgion,  by  an  exclusively  natural 
evolution.^    The  word  "evolution"  cannot  be  used  to 

1  Prof.  Le  Conte,  Evolution  in  Relation  to  Religious  Thought 
(2d  ed.),  p.  8,  defines  evolution  to  be  "a  continuous  progressive  change 
according  to  certain  laws,  by  means  of  resident  forces,"  —  a  natural- 


40  THE   EVOLUTIONARY   THEORY 

describe  non-organic  developments  without  a  change 
in  the  meaning  of  that  word  from  the  sense  in  which 
it  is  employed  in  biology.  And  the  evidence  by  which 
biological  evolution  is  said  to  be  estabhshed  cannot 
logically  be  said  to  prove  theories  of  development  in 
the  non-organic  world.  These  theories  use  the  word 
evolution  in  distinctive  senses,  and  require  other  than 
biological  evidences  for  their  support. 

In  passing,  something  ought  to  be  said  at  this  point 
concerning  what  is  called  monism — especially  the 
materiaHstic  monism  of  Professor  Ernst  Haeckel. 
By  clearly  distinguishing  monistic  theories  from  the 
biological  theory  of  evolution  we  may  save  ourselves 
from  some  confusion  of  thought. 

The  demand  for  unity  in  our  conceptions  of  reality 
is  imperative,  and  is  not  satisfied  until  every  form  of 
reality  is  co-ordinated  and  embraced  in  one  coherent 
scheme.  We  cannot  be  said  adequately  to  know  any 
thing  until  we  perceive  the  relations  in  which  it  stands 
to  other  things;  and  the  assumption  that  all  things  are 
mutually  related,  whether  immediately  or  remotely, 
is  a  fundamental  postulate  of  scientific  investigation. 
Now  monism  signifies  a  theory  which  aims  to  exhibit 

istic  definition.  Herbert  Spencer  defines  it  in  strangely  elaborate 
terms  as  "an  integration  of  matter  and  concomitant  dissipation  of 
motion;  during  which  matter  passes  from  a  relatively  indefinite, 
incoherent  homogeneity  to  a  relatively  definite,  coherent  hetero- 
geneity; and  during  which  the  retained  motion  undergoes  a  parallel 
transformation."  First  Principles  (6th  ed.),  §  145.  This  extends 
the  application  of  the  theory  beyond  the  organic  sphere,  and  is  mon- 
istic, as  well  as  naturalistic. 


GENERAL   DEFINITION  41 

the  unity  of  all  things,  giving  to  each  department  of 
reality  its  true  and  rational  place  in  the  totaHty  of 
things. 

Without  undertaking  an  elaborate  discussion  of 
monistic  theories,  we  may  group  them  all  under  the 
descriptive  heads  of  ideaHstic,  substantial,  and  teleo- 
logical.^  Idealistic  monism  tends  to  identify  thought 
and  reahty,  and  reduces  the  objective  world  to  subjec- 
tive terms  of  consciousness.  Such  a  view  is  too  ab- 
stract and  subtle  to  gain  a  permanent  hold  upon  the 
general  intelligence  of  mankind.  Substantial  monism 
reduces  all  reality  to  one  homogeneous  substance. 
The  pantheistic  Spinoza  formulated  such  a  conception 
of  things,  and  his  view  has  had  immense  influence  in 
modern  thought.  Its  most  conspicuous  weakness 
appears  in  its  failure  to  do  justice  to  the  phenomena  of 
personality,  freedom,  and  morahty.^  Substantial  mon- 
ism may  take  either  a  spirituaHstic  or  a  materialistic 
form,  and  Professor  Haeckel  is  a  champion  of  material- 
istic monism.^  Teleological  monism  acknowledges 
the  substantial  dualism  of  spirit  and  matter;  and  refuses 
to  ignore  either  the  essential  difference  between  God 
and  His  creatures,  or  the  mutually  separate  reahty  of 

1  Cf.  Sir  O.  Lodge's  subdivision,  Life  and  Matter^  pp.  6-8. 

2  Cf.  pp.  16-21,  above. 

3  Exhibited  in  his  Riddle  of  the  Universe  and  his  other  works.  It 
is  criticised  from  a  theological  point  of  view  by  J.  Orr,  God's  Image 
in  Man,  pp.  67-78,  82-89;  ^^^  from  the  point  of  view  of  modern 
science  by  O.  Lodge,  Life  and  Matter,  who  points  out,  on  p.  42,  that 
Haeckel's  explanation  of  life  and  mind  is  equivalent  to  an  assertion 
that  matter  possesses  them.     See  p.  94,  below. 


42  THE   EVOLUTIONARY   THEORY 

finite  persons.  It  discovers  the  unity  of  all  things  in 
God,  and  His  creative  purpose,  by  which  all  things 
other  than  Himself  are  caused  to  be  and  are  developed 
and  directed  to  the  fulfilment  of  a  plan  which  is  at 
unity  with  itself.  In  its  most  perfect  form  this  monism 
is  nothing  else  than  a  philosophical  formulation  of 
Christian  theism. 

No  doubt  the  term  evolution  may  be  appropriated 
by  substantial  monists  to  describe  the  process  of  devel- 
opment of  universal  and  homogeneous  substance  into 
the  forms  and  modes  of  our  experience.  But  even  if 
we  could  acknowledge  the  truth  of  such  a  theory,  we 
would  need  to  distinguish  the  monistic  use  of  the  term 
evolution  from  that  of  biologists.  Materialists  use  it 
to  describe  purely  mechanical  changes  in  the  arrange- 
ment and  motions  of  matter.  Biologists  use  it  to 
describe  organic  changes,  and  they  cannot  be  ade- 
quately described  by  purely  mechanical  terms.  No 
doubt  there  are  materiahstic  evolutionists,  who  refuse 
to  acknowledge  that  any  of  the  phenomena  of  organic 
/  life  are  superphysical.  But  their  materiahsm  does  not 
constitute  a  part  of  the  scientific  theory  of  organic 
evolution.  It  is  rather  a  philosophical  point  of  view 
that  determines  the  speculative  inferences  which  ma- 
teriaHsts  deduce  from  the  scientific  hypothesis.  The 
point  which  we  are  emphasizing  is  that  the  biological 
theory  of  evolution  which  is  now  generally  accepted 
in  the  scientific  world  is  exclusively  concerned  with 
the  development  of  forms  of  organic  fife.  It  is  not  to 
be   confused   with   theories   concerning  the   inorganic 


GENERAL    DEFINITION  43 

world,  or  with  materialistic  conceptions  of  reality. 
These  theories  and  conceptions  are  extra-scientific 
speculations,  and  we  do  not  have  to  commit  ourselves 
to  any  one  of  them  in  accepting  the  scientific  hypothesis 
with  which  this  lecture  is  concerned. 

This  conclusion  relieves  us  from  the  necessity  of 
dealing  in  these  lectures  with  the  arguments  by  which 
materiahstic  monism  is  said  to  be  supported.  That 
philosophy,  it  ought  to  be  noticed,  does  not  at  the  pres- 
ent time  exercise  the  influence  in  the  higher  world  of 
thought  that  it  did  in  the  last  generation.  The  leaders 
of  thought  of  to-day  have  largely  abandoned  it,  and 
this  fact  is  acknowledged  and  bewailed  by  its  chief 
defender,  Professor  Haeckel.^ 

I  ought  to  add,  however,  that  the  advanced  thought 
of  yesterday  is  usually  the  prevailing  thought  of  to-day 
among  untrained  and  unguided  common  folk.  Mate- 
rialism is  still  a  foe  to  be  reckoned  with  in  the  work  of 
winning  the  multitude  to  Christ.  Works  which  pre- 
sent materialistic  objections  to  Christianity  in  popular 
forms  are  published  in  cheap  editions,  and  have  a 
much  wider  sale  than  any  other  type  of  hterature  bear- 
ing on  religious  questions.  Our  apologists  and  pastors 
are  apt  to  be  oblivious  of  this  fact,  and  often  yield  to  a 
mistaken  optimism.  The  most  dangerous  effects  of 
infidel  systems  of  thought  are  produced  after  they  have 
ceased  to  influence  trained  thinkers.  This  is  so  because 
it  is  only  after  some  time  has  elapsed  that  new  thought 

1  Op.  cU.,  pp.  100-103.  He  accounts  for  it  by  the  naive  explana- 
tion of  brain  decay  in  old  age. 


44  THE   EVOLUTIONARY   THEORY 

can  be  appropriated  by  the  million.  It  is  said  that 
half  the  world  does  not  know  what  the  other  half 
thinks.  It  is  certainly  a  fact  that  the  ignorance  of  our 
clergy  as  to  the  thinking  of  our  industrial  classes  has 
much  to  do  with  their  inability  to  retain  that  class  of 
people  within  the  Church.  It  is  of  vital  importance 
for  your  future  success  in  this  direction  that  you  should 
discover  what  the  people  at  large  are  reading;  for  by 
no  other  means  can  you  gain  adequate  knowledge 
of  their  thinking.  You  will,  perhaps,  be  tempted  to 
underrate  the  influence  of  their  reading  because  of  its 
evident  shallowness.  If  so,  you  will  have  need  to 
remember  that  the  mental  training  which  enables  you 
to  perceive  its  shallowness  is  wanting  to  the  popular 
mind,  which  is  a  prey  to  any  form  of  error,  however 
shallow,  when  it  is  insistently  propagated  by  those  who 
claim  to  be  setting  forth  the  latest  results  of  scientific 
investigation  and  higher  thinking,  and  who  write  in 
terms  easily  understood  by  untrained  readers. 

To  return  to  our  present  subject,  the  theory  of  evo- 
lution with  which  we  are  concerned  in  these  lectures 
has  no  necessary  connection  with  monism,  whether 
materialistic  or  spiritualistic.  It  is  exclusively  bio- 
logical, and  is  accepted  by  theists  and  anti-theists 
alike,  being  regarded  throughout  the  scientific  world 
as  the  best  available  working  hypothesis  of  the  origin 
of  species.  The  aspect  of  this  theory  which  will 
demand  our  especial  attention  is  its  bearing  upon  the 
Christian  doctrine  concerning  man's  primitive  state 
and  fall. 


EARLY   VIEWS  45 

II 

As  a  speculative  conjecture  the  idea  of  a  development 
of  the  world  out  of  primordial  matter  is  as  ancient  as  is 
human  philosophy.^  Christianity  has  enriched  human 
thought  with  the  doctrine  of  the  creation  of  matter 
by  the  will  of  God,  and  teaches  the  doctrine  of  divine 
immanence  and  of  sovereign  control  by  God  of  the 
course  of  nature.  But  the  evolutionary  form  of  thought 
was  not  prejudiced  by  the  pubHcation  of  these  truths. 
On  the  contrary,  the  narrative  of  creation  in  Genesis, 
and  the  progressive  nature  of  God's  self-manifestation 
as  recorded  in  the  Scriptures,  were  commented  on  by 
certain  patristic  writers  in  terms  that  were  favourable 
to  evolutionary  conceptions  of  history,  whether  nat- 
ural or  spiritual.  Mediaeval  realists,  starting  with 
the  doctrine  of  an  original  creation  of  matter  ex  nihilo, 
described  its  differentiation  by  an  individualizing  prin- 
ciple into  specific  forms  in  terms  suggestive  of  evolu- 
tion. This  appears  especially  in  Duns  Scotus,  who 
used  the  figure  of  a  growing  tree  to  illustrate  his  con- 
ception. Descartes  was  governed  by  the  evolutionary 
conception  of  the  universe,  and  Hume  considered  that 
generation  and  growth  were  preferable  to  the  notion  of 

1  For  the  history  of  evolutionary  theories  both  monistic  and 
organic,  see  R.  H.  Lock,  Recent  Progress,  chh.  ii,  iii;  H.  F.  Osborn, 
From  the  Greeks  to  Darwin;  Ewd.  Clodd,  Pioneers  of  Evolution  from 
Tholes  to  Huxley;  A.  R.  Wallace,  Darwinism,  ch.  i;  A.  Weismann, 
Evolution  Theory,  chh.  i,  ii;  Chas.  Darwin,  Origin  of  Species  (6th 
ed.),  pp.  xiii-xxvi;  Thos.  Huxley,  Darwiniana,  pp.  204-239;  Jas. 
Sully,  in  Encyc.  Brit.,  9th  ed.,  s.  v.  "Evolution." 


46  THE   EVOLUTIONARY   THEORY 

sudden  creations,  as  descriptive  of  the  origin  of  things. 
The  German  philosopher,  Immanuel  Kant,  broached 
the  theory  of  a  development  of  all  things  out  of  prim- 
itive nehulcE  in  obedience  to  physical  forces  and  laws. 
ShelHng  regarded  nature  as  vital  rather  than  mechan- 
ical, and  as  a  process  of  organic  self-evolution.  Hegel 
maintained  that  God  reaHzes  Himself  in  the  evolution 
of  the  world  through  the  three  stages  of  mechanical, 
physical,  and  organic  development.  History,  he 
said,  begins  with  spirit,  which  determines  subsequent 
evolution. 

The  early  appearance  of  such  forms  of  thought,  and 
their  wide  prevalence,  were  the  natural  and  inevitable 
result  of  men's  observation  of  the  phenomena  of  growth 
in  individual  organisms,  and  of  the  gradation  of  species 
in  the  animal  and  vegetable  kingdoms.  But  previous 
to  the  development  of  modern  biological  science,  evo- 
lutionary theories  were  necessarily  conjectural;  and 
they  could  not  gain  a  serious  foothold  so  long  as  no 
credible  explanation  of  the  method  of  evolution  was 
forthcoming.  Moreover,  up  to  Paley's  time,  modern 
theologians  and  scientists  alike  beheved  in  the  fixity  of 
species.  With  a  very  few  exceptions  the  notion  that 
species  undergo  mutation  was  confined  to  speculative 
philosophers.^  The  older  allegorical  interpretation  of 
Genesis  was  without  support,  and  theologians  natu- 
rally read  existing  science  into  the  biblical  account  of 

1  The  author  of  the  scientific  doctrine  of  the  fixity  of  species  was 
John  Ray,  a  younger  contemporary  of  Milton.  It  was  accepted  by 
Linnaeus  and  Cuvier  and  became  a  scientific  postulate.  See  V.  F. 
Storr,  Development,  pp.  36,  37. 


EARLY   VIEWS  47 

creation,  assuming  that  that  account  should  be  taken 
literally,  and  should  be  regarded  because  of  its  inspira- 
tion as  scientifically  accurate.  The  conclusion  that 
the  purpose  of  bibhcal  inspiration  did  not  include  a 
revelation  beforehand  of  the  results  of  scientific  inves- 
tigation, although  clearly  expressed  in  the  twelfth  cen- 
tury by  Peter  Lombard,^  did  not  emerge  in  modern 
thought  until  the  unscientific  nature  of  the  opening 
chapters  of  Genesis  had  been  estabhshed  by  the  results 
of  nineteenth-century  scientific  induction.  Thus  it  was 
that  theologians  adopted  the  theory  of  special  crea- 
tions and  of  the  fixity  of  existing  species;  and  the  idea 
of  mutation  of  species,  upon  which  the  modern  evolu- 
tionary hypothesis  depends,  was  alien  in  the  eighteenth 
century  to  the  minds  both  of  theologians  and  scien- 
tists.^ 

As  early  as  1761,  however.  Buff  on  had  come  to  regard 
species  as  to  some  extent  mutable,  although  he  main- 
tained a  fixity  of  type  among  the  larger  animals.  He 
sought  to  explain  the  mutations  of  species  by  the  trans- 
mission to  offspring  of  variations  caused  by  environment. 
Charles  Darwin's  grandfather,  Erasmus  Darwin,  who 
died  in  1802,  devoted  some  attention  to  the  problem 
of  evolution,  as  did  also  Treviranus;  but  Jean-Baptiste 
Lamarck  (i  744-1829)  stood  sponsor  for  the  first  seri- 

1  Sentences,  Lib.  11.  Dist.  23.  Given  by  Pusey,  Un-Science,  not 
Science,  Adverse  to  Faith,  pp.  6.  7,  who  also  cites  St.  Augustine,  de 
Gen.  ad  Lit.  i.  39,  upon  the  folly  of  supporting  physical  theories  by 
an  appeal  to  Scripture. 

2  It  made  very  slow  headway  until  after  the  publication  of  Dar- 
win's theory,  1858-1859. 


48  THE   EVOLUTIONARY   THEORY 

ous  attempt  scientifically  to  explain  the  mutation  of 
species.^  His  explanation  appeared  in  1801  and  was 
published  in  a  more  elaborate  form  in  1809.  His 
theory  is  based  upon  the  well-known  fact  that  animal 
organs  are  strengthened  and  developed  by  habitual 
exercise,  and  suffer  degeneration  when  not  used. 
Without  denying  the  influence  of  external  environment 
upon  the  use  or  non-use  of  organs,  he  regarded  use 
and  non-use  as  the  actual  causes  of  variation,  and 
maintained  that  the  evolution  of  species  is  due  to  trans- 
mission to  offspring  of  characters  thus  acquired. 
Among  the  more  plausible  illustrations  which  he 
advanced  are  those  of  snakes  and  giraffes.  The  con- 
stant striving  of  certain  animals  to  pass  through  narrow 
crevices  was  thought  by  him  to  cause  an  attenuation 
of  body,  which  was  inherited  and  increased  through  a 
series  of  generations.  Again,  certain  animals  Hving  in 
arid  districts  were  forced  to  stretch  their  necks  upward 
in  order  to  feed  on  the  leaves  of  trees.  This  gradually 
caused,  by  a  similar  process  of  variation,  heredity,  and 
accumulation  of  change,  the  pecuHarity  which  most 
obviously  distinguishes  giraffes. 

Before  going  on,  two  terms  should  be  defined,  viz., 
"factors"  of  evolution,  and  "characters."  A  "factor" 
of  evolution  is  any  cause  or  condition  of  variation 
which  may  produce  or  determine  the  course  of  organic 
evolution.     Such  a  factor  may  be  either  directly  cau- 

1  His  theory  is  expounded  by  R.  H.  Lock,  Recent  Progress,  pp. 
33-37.  He  gives  the  arguments  pro  and  con,  pp.  59-72.  Cf.  V.  L. 
Kellogg,  Darwinism  To-day,  pp.  262-274,  290-309. 


EARLY   VIEWS  49 

sative  or  merely  a  limiting  and  determining  condition 
of  evolution,  the  positive  cause  of  which  must  be  found 
elsewhere.  The  factor  of  environment  belongs  to  the 
latter  class,  while  the  factor  of  use  —  called  the  La- 
marckian  factor  —  belongs  to  the  causative  category, 
as  do  also  those  of  variation  generally,  reproduction 
and  heredity.  As  will  appear  at  a  later  stage  in  this 
lecture,  natural  selection  is  not  a  causative  factor,  but 
a  Hmiting  and  directive  condition. 

A  "character"  is  any  organic  or  functional  mark 
which  serves  to  distinguish  one  organism  from  another. 
"Specific  characters"  serve  to  distinguish  the  species 
from  each  other,  and  "acquired  characters"  are  those 
which  are  gained  during  a  single  lifetime  by  individ- 
ual organisms,  whatever  may  be  the  factor  or  factors 
that  explain  their  acquisition.  Lamarck's  theory 
involved  the  assumption  that  acquired  characters  are 
transmitted  to  offspring;  and  this  doctrine,  as  we  shall 
see,  has  been  rejected  by  the  neo-Darwinians.  The 
question  is  thought  to  have  some  bearing  on  the 
doctrine  of  original  sin. 

Lamarck's  theory  produced  Httle  impression  upon 
the  scientific  world.  It  seemed  obviously  inadequate, 
since  it  was  not  shown  to  be  appHcable  to  the  vege- 
table kingdom;  ^  and  other  causes  diverted  scientists 
from  any  serious  consideration  of  its  claims.  Biolog- 
ical science  was  in  its  infancy,  and  no  sufficient  body  of 

1  Prof.  G.  Henslow,  however,  in  The  Heredity  of  Acquired  Charac- 
ters, 1908,  finds  evidence  for  the  transmission  of  acquired  characters 
in  that  direction. 


50  THE    EVOLUTIONARY   THEORY 

evidence  was  yet  available  that  warranted  an  abandon- 
ment of  belief  in  the  fixity  of  species.  Moreover,  so 
long  as  men  continued  to  believe  that  organic  life  was 
of  comparatively  recent  origin  on  this  planet,  the 
amount  of  time  which  was  available  seemed  to  be  quite 
too  brief  for  the  accomphshment  of  a  gradual  evolu- 
tion of  existing  species  from  a  few  protoplasmic  forms 
of  life.  Catastrophism,  or  behef  in  a  series  of  vast 
upheavals  in  the  earth's  surface,  still  occupied  the  field 
in  geological  science,  and  this  doctrine  also  deprived 
the  theory  of  a  gradual  evolution  of  species  of  plaus- 
ibihty. 

The  work  of  Sir  Charles  Lyell,  who  began  to  pub- 
lish his  Principles  of  Geology  in  1830,  had  the  effect  of 
enlarging  men's  conceptions  of  time  and  of  overthrow- 
ing the  catastrophistic  doctrine.  He  helped  the  scien- 
tific world  to  beheve  that  all  the  geological  changes  of 
the  past  have  been  achieved  by  the  slow  working  of 
causes  that  still  operate,  and  that  organic  life  is  far 
more  ancient  than  had  previously  been  acknowledged. 
Thus  he  seemed  to  remove  a  difficulty  which  obviously 
would  have  seriously  hindered  scientists  from  accept- 
ing the  Darwinian  theory  of  evolution.  The  ground 
was  also  broken  for  Darwinism  by  the  theory  of 
Malthus,  first  pubhshed  in  1798,  but  subsequently 
elaborated.^  Malthus  estabhshed  the  fact  that  human 
population  tends  to  increase  in  a  geometrical  ratio, 
whereas  there  can  be  no  such  increase  of  the  means  of 
subsistence.     The  consequence  is  that  sooner  or  later 

1  Principles  of  Population,  revised  in  1803. 


EARLY   VIEWS  51 

the  less  capable  members  of  a  community  must  suffer 
from  poverty;  and  this  is  only  partly  relieved  by  high 
infant  mortahty,  famines,  and  other  abnormal  causes. 
These  facts  suggest  the  conclusion  that  the  weak  must 
go  to  the  wall,  and  the  fittest  alone  can  survive  in  the 
struggle  for  existence. 

Darwin's  view  was  partially  anticipated  in  a  com- 
munication which  was  read  in  18 13  before  the  Royal 
Society  in  England  by  Dr.  W.  C.  Wells,  and  which  was 
an  attempt  to  explain  the  differentiation  and  distribu- 
tion of  human  races.  Calling  attention  to  the  fact  that 
no  two  human  individuals  are  exactly  alike,  he  urged 
that  in  every  particular  region  some  would  be  better 
fitted  to  resist  the  prevailing  diseases  than  their  fel- 
lows, who  would  gradually  perish,  lea\ing  in  possses- 
sion  of  the  field  a  race  suited  to  cHmatic  conditions. 
He  thus  explained  the  existence  of  dark  races  in  warm 
countries. 

In  the  meantime  Lamarck's  explanation  of  evolu- 
tion by  the  inheritance  of  acquired  characters  was 
adopted  with  modifications  by  Herbert  Spencer,  in  his 
Principles  of  Psychology,  which  was  pubHshed  in  1855, 
three  years  before  Mr.  Darwdn  first  published  his  theory 
of  natural  selection.  Mr.  Spencer  came  ultimately  to 
recognize  the  factor  of  natural  selection,  but  continued 
to  maintain  that  primary  importance  must  be  attrib- 
uted to  the  Lamarckian  factor  in  any  adequate  theory 
of  evolution. 


52 


THE    EVOLUTIONARY   THEORY 


III 


The  task  of  giving  the  evolutionary  theory  an  estab- 
lished place  in  biological  science  was  achieved  prin- 
cipally by  Charles  Darwin,  whose  Origin  of  Species  is 
one  of  the  most  epoch-making  books  that  have  ever 
been  written.  It  put  much  of  previous  scientific  litera- 
ture out  of  date,  and  caused  a  revolution  in  thought 
which  has  not  only  extended  its  transforming  influence 
into  every  department  of  natural  science  and  philoso- 
phy, but  has  largely  determined  the  lines  and  methods 
of  subsequent  speculative  and  apologetical  theology. 
The  ancient  catholic  faith  is  still  vahd,  and  must  hold 
its  own  forever.  But  in  1859  a  new  world  was  born, 
thinking  new  thoughts  and  using  new  language.  The 
result  has  been  that  Christian  apologists  have  been 
compelled  either  to  think  the  new  thoughts,  and  use 
the  new  language,  or  to  abandon  hope  of  successfully 
propagating  Christian  doctrine  among  the  intelligent. 
The  need  of  re-translating  its  ancient  terms  is  in  no 
wise  removed  by  the  assumption  that  what  needs  to 
be  translated  is  as  valid  in  its  original  meaning  as  it 
could  be  thought  to  be,  if  Charles  Danvin  had  never 
been  born.  But  the  world  of  to-day  cannot  under- 
stand that  meaning,  until  it  is  exhibited  in  the  terms 
which  now  to  a  large  extent  condition  and  mould 
human  thinking  and  believing. 

As  I  have  already  stated,  Darwin's  view  had  been 
partly  anticipated  by  Dr.  W.  C.  Wells  in  1813.  Credit 
ought  also  to  be  given  to  A.  R.  Wallace,  who  had  inde- 


DARWIN'S    THEORY  53 

pendently  sketched  the  theory  of  natural  selection  before 
Darwin  was  ready  to  publish  his  own  speculations. 
Mr.  Wallace  sent  his  sketch  to  Darwin  for  presenta- 
tion to  the  Linnaean  Society,  not  knowing  that  Darwin 
had  been  giving  many  years  of  labour  to  the  develop- 
ment of  the  same  theory,  and  had  accumulated  a  vast 
amount  of  data  for  its  illustration  and  support.  What 
followed  constitutes  a  pleasing  chapter  in  scientific 
amenities.  Darwin's  first  impulse  was  to  present 
Wallace's  sketch  without  pubHshing  any  account  of 
his  own  work.  He  was  rightly  dissuaded  by  his  friends 
from  such  a  course,  and  the  joint  statements  of  Darwin 
and  Wallace  were  pubHshed  in  1858  in  the  Journal  of 
the  Linnaean  Society.  Mr.  Wallace  promptly  acknowl- 
edged the  priority  of  Darwin,  and  constituted  himself 
thenceforth  a  champion  of  Dar^vinism.^  Mr.  Darwin 
now  undertook  at  the  earnest  persuasion  of  his  friends  to 
prepare  for  pubhcation  what  he  called  an  abstract  of 
the  data  which  he  had  gathered,  and  this  was  published 
November  24,  1859,  i^  ^  closely  written  volume  of 
fifteen  chapters  and  824  sections.  The  book  was 
entitled,  The  Origin  of  Species  by  Means  of  Natural 
Selection.  The  book  is  so  closely  packed  with  detail 
that  it  is  hard  to  read,  but  the  first  edition  was  sold 
before  the  end  of  the  year  and  a  second  edition 
appeared  in  January,  i860.  It  is  the  sixth  edition 
which  embodies   the   author's  final   corrections,   and 

^  This  is  shown  by  the  title  which  he  has  given  to  one  of  his  works 
—  Darwinism.  He  did  not  hesitate  to  confess  his  inability  to  write 
such  a  book  as  The  Origin  of  Species. 


54  THE   EVOLUTIONARY   THEORY 

this  fact  should  be  remembered  in  consuhing  the  work. 
Several  later  works  appeared  containing  further  data, 
and  in  187 1  Darwin  applied  his  theory  to  the  human 
species  in  a  work  entitled,  The  Descent  of  Man. 

The  new  theory  at  first  called  forth  a  most  bitter 
opposition  from  physical  scientists  and  theologians 
alike,  and  the  controversy  which  followed  was  not  edi- 
fying. Yet  the  alarm  which  Darwin's  views  caused 
need  not  surprise  us.  Their  real  bearing  took  time  to 
determine.  Darwin  himself  thought  that  his  theory 
nulHfied  the  alleged  evidences  of  design  in  nature,  and 
it  appeared  at  first  blush  to  contradict  the  doctrine  of 
creation  and  to  be  inconsistent  with  belief  in  the  divine 
inspiration  of  Genesis.  To  this  day  many  thoughtful 
writers  consider  that  Darwinism  cannot  be  reconciled 
with  Christian  doctrine  as  to  man's  primitive  state 
Jf\  rU'  and  subsequent  fall  into  the  condition  which  is  de- 
scribed by  the  phrase  "original  sin."  We  may  think 
that  such  impressions  were  groundless,  but  they  were 
very  real.  Physical  scientists  had  not  yet  abandoned 
belief  in  the  fixity  of  species,  nor  had  they  fully  assim- 
ilated the  somewhat  revolutionary  views  of  Sir  Charles 
Lyell  as  to  the  amount  of  time  available  for  such  a 
process  of  organic  evolution  as  Darwin  hypothecated. 
Many  of  them,  therefore,  regarded  Darwinism  as  a 
step  backward,  and  as  throwing  scientific  thought  into 
confusion.  The  immense  array  of  evidence  which 
Darwin  had  accumulated  had  its  effect,  however,  and 
the  new  theory  rapidly  won  a  recognized  place  among 
the  working  hypotheses  of  natural  science.     The  late 


DARWIN'S   THEORY  55 

Thomas  Huxley,  who  called  himself  "Darwin's  bull- 
dog," had  much  to  do  with  giving  it  that  place. 

Darwinism  still  retains  strong  support  among  scien- 
tists. I  do  not  mean  that  it  has  undergone  no  modi- 
fication. Pure  Darwinism  has  been  abandoned  by  a 
majority  of  leading  scientists,  who  acknowledge  that 
natural  selection  was  given  too  large  a  place  among 
the  factors  of  natural  evolution  by  Darwin,  and  that 
the  positive  causation  of  variation  and  of  the  origin  of 
species  must  be  elsewhere  discovered.  The  work  of 
natural  selection  is  acknowledged  to  be  the  elimina- 
tion of  species  unfit  to  survive,  rather  than  the  causa- 
tion of  species.  There  is  no  warrant,  however,  for  the 
contention  embodied  in  the  title  of  a  recent  work  by 
Dr.  E.  Dinnert — At  the  Death-bed  of  Darwinism.  And 
it  should  be  remembered  that  the  general  theory  of 
evolution  of  species  by  natural  descent  does  not  depend 
for  its  truth  upon  the  correctness  of  Darwin's  explana- 
tion of  it.  That  explanation  by  its  plausibiHty  did 
indeed  gain  for  the  theory  of  natural  evolution  its  first 
general  acceptance  by  physical  scientists;  but  the  inves- 
tigations which  have  followed  have  had  the  result  of 
confirming  such  acceptance  independently  of  their 
effect  upon  pure  Darwinism. 

What  precisely  is  the  Darwinian  theory  ?  Its  author 
describes  it  briefly  in  the  following  terms.  After  stating 
his  belief  in  the  general  theory  of  evolution,  "that 
species  have  been  modified,  during  a  long  course  of 
descent,"  he  adds,  "This  has  been  effected  chiefly 
through  the  natural  selection  of  numerous  successive, 


56  THE   EVOLUTIONARY   THEORY 

slight,  favourable  variations;  aided  in  an  important 
manner,  that  is,  in  relation  to  adaptive  structures, 
whether  past  or  present,  by  the  direct  action  of  external 
conditions,  and  by  variations  which  seem  to  us  in  our 
ignorance  to  arise  spontaneously."  ^ 

In  this  description,  the  phrase  "natural  selection" 
is  of  leading  importance,  and  to  understand  Darwin's 
use  of  it  is  to  understand  the  essence  of  Darwinism. 
It  was  suggested  by  the  phenomena  of  artificial  selec- 
tion, in  which  desirable  variations  in  the  animal  and 
vegetable  world  are  perpetuated  and  improved  by  select- 
ing for  breeding  and  culture  those  animals  and  vege- 
tables only  that  possess  the  variations  which  are 
desired.  Many  choice  varieties  of  stock  and  of  edible 
fruits  and  vegetables  owe  their  existence  to  artificial 
selection.  Now  Darwin  was  led  to  believe  that  what 
man  thus  assists  nature  to  achieve  within  a  brief  period 
of  time  is  accomplished  more  slowly,  but  in  an  anal- 
ogous manner,  by  unassisted  nature.  He  therefore 
called  the  process  ''natural  selection."  The  word 
"selection"    imphes    intelhgent    choice,    but    Darwin 

1  Origin  of  Species  (6th  American  ed.),  Vol.  II.  p.  293.  His  gen- 
eral argument  is  summarized  in  ch.  xv.  Expositions  of  Darwin's 
theory  can  be  found  in  A.  R.  Wallace's  Darwinism;  R.  H.  Lock's 
Recent  Progress,  ch.  iii;  V.  L.  Kellogg's  Darwinism  To-day,  pp. 
12-17;  A.  Weismann's  Evolution  Theory,  Lees,  ii,  iii;  V.  F.  Storr's 
Development,  ch.  iii;  M.  M.  Metcalf,  Outline  of  the  Theory  of  Organic 
Evolution,  pp.  3-31.  Life  and  Letters  of  Chas.  Darwin,  by  his  son,  F. 
Darwin,  3  vols.,  is  most  valuable.  A  short  life  is  given  by  Thos.  Huxley, 
in  Darwiniana,  pp.  254-302.  See  also  on  Darwin's  theory,  Bald- 
win, Die.  of  Philos.,  s.  w.  "Existence  (Struggle  for)";  "Selection"; 
"Variation";  and  Encyc.  Brit.,  9th  ed.,  s.  v.  "Evolution." 


DARWIN'S   THEORY  57 

declined  to  acknowledge  any  evidence  of  design  in  na- 
ture's working,  so  that  his  use  of  the  word  was  in  this 
respect  metaphorical.  The  principle  by  which  natural 
selection  is  guided  is  indeed  adaptation  to  environment, 
and  the  utihty  of  variations  in  what  has  been  termed 
"struggle  for  existence."  This  adaptation,  however, 
is  not  due  in  Darwin's  opinion  to  design,  but  to  the 
fact  that  among  the  multitude  of  variations  which  con- 
stantly occur  none,  from  the  nature  of  things,  can 
hold  their  own  which  are  not  in  harmony  with  environ- 
ment and  useful,  whether  directly  or  indirectly,  for 
the  preservation  of  existence.  Natural  selection  means 
that  Dame  Nature  destroys  whatever  is  incapable  of 
adjusting  itself  to  the  requirements  of  existence;  and 
the  prevalence  of  adaptation  in  nature  is  due,  accord- 
ing to  Darwin,  to  this  elimination  of  the  unfit,  or,  to 
use  Herbert  Spencer's  phrase,  to  an  inevitable  and 
exclusive  "survival  of  the  fittest."  ^ 

Darwin's  theory  is  based  upon  the  facts  of  varia- 
tion, heredity,  and  excessive  multiplication  of  organ- 
isms. The  fact  of  variation  is  a  matter  of  common 
observation.  No  two  organisms  are  alike  in  all  par- 
ticulars, and  this  variation  appears  between  parents 
and  offspring,  and  between  the  offspring  of  the  same 
parents.  Among  these  variations  there  occasionally 
appear  large  and  abnormal  mutations  or  sports,  and 
such  changes,  by  reason  of  their  exceptional  occur- 
rence,   are    called    "discontinuous"    variations.     But 

1  Origin  of  Species,  chh.  iii,  iv.  On  the  effect  of  Darwin's  theory 
on  the  argument  for  design,  see  pp.  112-116,  below. 


58  THE   EVOLUTIONARY    THEORY 

Darwin  based  his  theory  upon  the  accumulation  of  the 
sHght  variations  that  are  constantly  occurring  through- 
out the  organic  world,  and  are  called  "normal"  and 
''continuous."  ^  These  are  often  very  sHght  indeed, 
but  Darwin  beheved  that  they  afford  a  sufficient  basis 
for  the  operation  of  the  principle  of  natural  selection. 
The  slightest  difference  between  organisms,  he  main- 
tained, is  often  sufficient  to  determine  a  survival  of  one 
variety  and  an  extinction  of  another. 

The  fact  of  heredity  comes  in  at  this  point.  Favour- 
able variations  are  preserved  in  offspring,  and  become 
gradually  accentuated,  accumulating  from  generation 
to  generation  until  the  divergence  from  parental  forms 
becomes  sufficient  to  constitute  a  new  and  independent 
species.  The  obvious  objection  has  been  made  that, 
under  the  conditions  of  unrestrained  nature,  this  accu- 
mulation of  variations  is  prevented  by  constant  cross- 
breeding between  the  members  of  the  same  species. 
Accordingly  Darwin  hypothecated  the  incidental  factor 
of  isolation,  as  supplementing  natural  selection  by  help- 
ing to  preserve  the  variations  which  afford  the  basis 
of  the  working  of  that  principle.  This  isolation,  or 
segregation  as  it  is  also  called,  is  said  to  be  geographical 
when  caused  by  migration,  and  biologic  when  due  to 
the  deterring  effect  of  variations  upon  miscellaneous 
inter-breeding.2 

1  On  continuous  and  discontinuous  variations,  see  R.  H.  Lock, 
Recent  Progress,  pp.  14-18.  The  mutations  theory  is  based  upon 
discontinuous  variations. 

"^Origin  of  Species,  Vol.  I.  pp.  127-132.  Cf.  M.  M.  Metcalf, 
Organic  Evolution,  pp.  60-67.     Darwin  also  found  it  necessary  to 


DARWIN'S   THEORY  59 

The  Malthusian  doctrine,  that  the  propagation  of 
species  is  excessive  and,  if  unrestrained,  must  result  in 
a  failure  of  food  supply,  was  accepted  by  Darwin.  A 
constant  struggle  for  existence,  he  maintained,  is  going 
on  in  the  organic  world;  and  this  struggle,  through  the 
operation  of  the  principle  of  natural  selection,  inevit- 
ably results  in  the  destruction  of  countless  organisms 
that  are  incapable  of  winning  out  in  the  battle  of  life, 
and  in  the  survival  of  the  fittest. 

Such  in  the  rough  is  the  Darwinian  explanation  of 
natural  evolution  of  the  species  —  summed  up  in  the 
phrases,  continuous  sHght  variations;  inheritance  of 
the  characters  thus  produced;  isolation,  whether  geo- 
graphic or  biologic,  of  evolving  varieties;  gradual 
accumulation  of  variations  until  independent  species 
are  developed;  and,  as  describing  the  whole  process  and 
determining  at  every  stage  its  direction  and  results,  the 
principle  of  natural  selection,  by  which  the  unfit  are 
eliminated  and  the  fittest  alone  are  permitted  to  sur- 
vive. 

supplement  his  hypothesis  by  the  theories  of  sexual  selection  and 
pangenesis,  neither  of  which  commands  undisputed  support  among 
biologists.  He  elaborated  the  former  theory  in  his  Descent  of  Man, 
Pts.  II,  HI  (cf.  Origin  of  Species,  Vol.  I.  pp.  107-110);  on  which 
also  see  Lock,  op.  cit.,  pp.  56-59;  A.  R.  Wallace,  Darwinism,  ch.  x; 
V.  L.  Kellogg,  Darwinism  To-day,  ch.  v;  A.  Weismann,  Evolution 
Theory,  Lee.  xi.  Darwin  introduced  his  pangenesis  theory  in 
Variations  of  Animals  and  Plants,  Vol.  II.  p.  350.  Neither  of 
these  theories  require  attention  here.  The  latter  is  concisely  defined 
in  the  Century  Dictionary,  s.  v.  "Pangenesis." 


6o  THE   EVOLUTIONARY   THEORY 

IV 

In  the  controversies  which  followed  the  publication 
of  The  Origin  of  Species,  the  distinction  between  the 
theory  of  natural  evolution  of  species  and  Darwin's 
explanation  of  it,  or  the  theory  of  natural  selection, 
was  not  clearly  made.  The  attack  on  Darwinism  was 
really  an  attack  on  the  general  theory  of  evolution.  The 
battle  was  fought  out  in  the  sixties,  and  after  a  few 
years  natural  evolution  became  the  generally  accepted 
working  hypothesis  of  scientific  investigation.  There 
is  not  the  slightest  sign  to-day  of  its  ceasing  to  hold  the 
field.  But  as  time  went  by  scientists  came  to  see  that 
Darwdn  had  exaggerated  the  part  of  natural  selection 
in  evolution,  and  that  his  theory  required  supplement- 
ing and  modifying.  This  change  of  attitude  was  purely 
scientific,  and  was  not  caused  by  any  theological  prej- 
udice. Such  prejudice  gradually  disappeared  among 
those  theologians  who  took  pains  calmly  to  consider 
the  real  purport  and  bearing  of  natural  selection,  and 
who  came  to  realize  that  to  anticipate  the  results  of 
scientific  investigation  was  not  involved  in  the  pur- 
pose of  the  divine  inspiration  of  Genesis.  Accordingly, 
the  more  intelligent  thinkers  ceased  to  feel  anxious  as 
to  the  consequences  to  theology  of  biological  study; 
and  scientists  were  left  free  to  pursue  their  investiga- 
tions without  being  influenced  by  confusing  side  issues. 
Under  these  circumstances  many  scientists  came  to 
realize  that  while  Darwin's  arguments  were  very 
effective  to  estabhsh  the  behef  in  a  natural  evolution 


POST-DARWINIAN  VIEWS  6i 

of  species,  they  were  not  so  satisfactory  when  consid- 
dered  as  proofs  of  Darwinism.  Attacks  upon  Dar- 
win's theory  began  to  be  made  from  the  evolutionary 
standpoint  and  the  terms  "Darwinist"  and  "evolu- 
tionist" ceased  to  be  interchangeable.^ 

Even  Thomas  Huxley,  vigorous  champion  as  he 
was  of  Darwinism,  saw  at  the  outset  that  Darwin  put 
too  much  emphasis  upon  the  gradualness  of  evolution, 
and  was  inclined  to  the  view  that  species  might,  in 
cases  at  least,  be  evolved  suddenly  by  large  and  dis- 
continuous variations.^  Many  felt  the  difficulty  of 
regarding  minute  and  fluctuating  variations  as  afford- 
ing a  sufficient  basis  for  the  operation  of  natural  selec- 
tion, and  geology  failed  to  redeem  its  earher  promise 
of  proving  a  sufficient  antiquity  of  the  conditions  of 
organic  life  to  afford  time  for  so  slow  an  evolution  of 
species.  Many  specific  characters,  it  was  also  noted, 
have  no  utility;  and  utility  is  an  essential  condition  of 
natural  selection,  in  which  the  survival  of  species  is 
determined  by  the  value  of  their  specific  characters  for 
the  struggle  for  existence.     It  is  a  branch  of  this  diffi- 

1  The  objections  of  evolutionists  against  Darwin's  emphasis  upon 
the  natural  selection  of  slight  and  continuous  variations  are  very 
fully  summarized  by  V.  L.  Kellogg,  Darwinism  To-day,  chh.  iii-v, 
who  also  indicates  the  answers  made  by  Darwinians,  chh.  vi,  vii. 
He  gives  many  references.  See  also  M.  M.  Metcalf,  Organic  Evo- 
lution, pp.  31-47;  J.  Orr,  God's  Image  in  Man,  pp.  100-107.  Doubts 
about  Darwinism,  by  a  semi-Darwinian,  is  a  calm  discussion  of  the 
inadequacy  of  Darwinism  considered  as  a  complete  explanation  of 
species,  written  in  the  interests  of  superphysical  factors  and  theistic 
teleology. 

^  Darwiniana,  pp.  77,  97. 


62  THE   EVOLUTIONARY   THEORY 

culty  that  the  utiHty  of  many  variations  does  not 
appear  until  they  have  become  somewhat  pronounced, 
so  that  in  their  incipient  and  shghter  beginnings  they 
afford  no  apparent  basis  for  natural  selection. 

Other  difficulties  attend  the  supposition  that  species 
are  evolved  by  the  selection  of  sHght  and  continuous 
variations.  One  has  been  mentioned  in  another 
connection  —  the  swamping  effect  of  inter-breeding 
between  new  forms  and  other  members  of  the  parent 
stock.  Isolation  would  indeed  remove  this  difficulty, 
but  the  chances  of  such  isolation  are  not  sufficiently 
numerous  to  meet  the  requirements  of  natural  evolu- 
tion. Moreover,  continuous  variations  fluctuate,  and 
are  limited  in  range.  They  show  a  tendency  to  slow 
down  at  certain  stages,  and  reversion  to  type  is  a 
frequent  phenomenon.  They  are  also  purely  linear. 
That  is,  they  constitute  quantitative  rather  than  qual- 
itative changes,  and  cannot  produce  a  difference  in 
kind,  such,  for  instance,  as  is  represented  by  the  evo- 
lution of  an  eye  from  a  blind  spot.  At  any  rate  con- 
tinuous variations  can  produce  a  difference  in  kind 
only  by  a  coincidence  and  co-ordination  of  several 
such  variations,  which  can  hardly  be  explained  without 
supposing  directive  forces  to  be  at  work  in  the  organ- 
ism of  which  the  theory  of  natural  selection  takes  no 
account.  To  this  should  be  added  the  necessity  that 
similar  variations,  with  all  their  complexity  of  co-ordi- 
nation, should  appear  at  once  in  a  sufficient  number 
of  individuals,  and  with  sufficient  persistence  for  the 
process  to  be  accomplished  of  propagating  and  estab- 


POST-DARWINIAN  VIEWS  6^ 

lishing  the  new  variety.  Finally  there  is  the  objection 
that  evolution  by  the  selection  of  continuous  variations 
ought  to  result  in  producing  a  continuous  series  of 
organisms;  whereas  it  is  found  to  produce  independent 
species  with  intervening  gaps.  The  missing  links  are 
as  numerous  as  are  the  distinct  species  that  have 
appeared  on  this  planet. 

Objections  have  been  raised  to  the  main  contention 
of  Darwin  that  natural  selection  is  the  chief  factor  of 
the  evolution  of  species.  It  has  become  widely  acknowl- 
edged that  natural  selection  is  not  a  positive  cause  of 
evolution  at  all.  Its  function  is  to  eliminate  unfit 
products  of  evolution,  to  clear  its  pathway  of  obstruc- 
tions, and  to  determine  what  products  shall  persist. 
The  cause  or  causes  of  variation  and  development  are 
elsewhere  to  be  sought.^  The  analogy  alleged  to  exist 
between  artificial  and  natural  selection  has  been  pressed 
too  far.  Intelligent  control  is  an  essential  factor  in 
artificial  selection,  a  factor  which  Darwinists  ignore. 
It  depends  also  upon  a  completeness  of  isolation  which 
nature  does  not  often  afford  when  needed  for  the  opera- 
tion of  natural  selection.  It  does  not  produce  stable 
species,  but  varieties  which  usually  revert  to  ancestral 
type  when  left  uncontrolled,  whereas  the  results  of 
natural  evolution  persist.  Other  differences  might  be 
mentioned,  the  most  important  being  that,  whereas 
artificial  selection  has  never  produced  indubitable 
species,  mutually  non-fertile,  nature  has  done  so  in  a 
multitude  of  instances.     Obviously  determinative  fac- 

J  Darwin  did  not  claim  to  explain  variations,  but  survivals. 


64  THE    EVOLUTIONARY   THEORY 

tors  operate  in  the  natural  evolution  of  species  which 
cannot  rightly  be  described  by  the  term  selection.  Nor 
is  this  all.  It  is  urged  that  selection  actually  retards 
the  development  of  new  species,  its  effect  being  to 
preserve  useful  types  at  the  expense  of  variants  there- 
from. Doubts  have  been  expressed  as  to  the  alleged 
fierceness  of  the  struggle  for  existence ;  and  it  has  been 
maintained  that  new  forms  can  originate  only  when 
the  conditions  are  favourable,  that  is,  when  a  struggle 
for  existence  is  unnecessary. 

I  have  grven  you  only  a  very  rapid  and  incomplete 
summary  of  the  objections  that  have  been  raised  against 
the  Darw^inian  theory,  and  it  would  be  foreign  to  the 
general  purpose  of  these  lectures  either  to  discuss  them 
or  to  estimate  the  value  of  the  repHes  which  have  been 
made  to  them.  They  are  obviously  of  unequal  force, 
and  a  few  of  them  may  perhaps  be  looked  upon  as 
incidental  problems  for  solution  rather  than  as  reasons 
for  rejecting  Darwin's  theory.^  But  the  real  difficulties 
are  sufficiently  numerous  and  formidable  to  account 
for  the  reaction  which  has  occurred  against  pure  Dar- 
winism —  a  reaction  which  has  resulted  from  fuller 
biological  investigation,  and  not  from  any  theological 
influence.  A  close  examination  of  these  difficulties 
shows  that  they  do  not  militate  against  belief  in  a 
natural  evolution  of  species;  and  they  have  not  caused 
any  weakening  of  that  belief.     Nor  have  they  brought 

1  In  his  Origin  of  Species,  especially  the  later  editions,  Darwin 
discussed  them,  and  his  candour  in  acknowledging  the  force  of 
some  of  them  is  admirable. 


POST-DARWINIAN  VIEWS  65 

about  an  entire  rejection  of  natural  selection  as  a 
factor  in  evolution.  The  tendency  has  been  to  modify 
rather  than  to  abandon  Darwin's  theory. 

Important  advances  have  been  made  in  cytology,  or 
the  study  of  minute  organic  parts  and  cells  by  means 
of  the  microscope,  and  in  biometry,  or  the  statistics  of 
organic  changes.  Many  problems  have  been  wholly  or 
partly  solved;  and,  while  new  problems  have  emerged, 
much  progress  has  been  achieved  in  accumulating  data 
for  a  more  adequate  theory  of  natural  evolution.^ 

Darwin  did  not  wholly  reject  the  Lamarckian  fac- 
tor, or  the  inheritance  of  characters  acquired  by  the 
use  and  disuse  of  particular  organs.  But  he  gave  it 
a  minor  place  and  influence.^  Herbert  Spencer,  how- 
ever, gave  it  the  leading  place ,^  although  acknowledging 
that  natural  selection  also  has  a  part  to  perform;  and 
those  who  have  followed  him  in  doing  belated  justice 
to  Lamarck's  theory  are  called  neo-Lamarckians. 
The  Lamarckian  theory  is  certainly  very  plausible; 
and  in  spite  of  the  lack  of  adequate  evidence  of  the 
transmission  of  acquired  characters,  many  have  beHeved 
in  the  Lamarckian  factor,  which  of  course  depends 
for  its  vahdity  upon  the  fact  of  such  transmission. 

August  Weismann  gave  a  new  turn  to  the  course 
of  speculation  by  a  series  of  essays  begun  in  1881,^  in 

1  Useful  accounts  of  post-Darwinian  studies  can  be  found  in  R.  H. 
Lock's  Recent  Progress;  and  V.  L.  Kellogg's  Darwinism  To-day, 
chh.  viii-xii.  2  Origin  of  Species,  Vol.  I.  pp.  167-173. 

3  In  First  Principles;  and  Prins.  of  Biology. 

4  Subsequently  translated  and  published  by  Ewd.  B.  Poulton  and 
others  —  Essays  upon  Heredity,  etc.,   Oxford.     His  arguments  are 

6 


66  THE    EVOLUTIONARY   THEORY 

which  he  assailed  the  doctrine  of  transmission  of 
acquired  characters,  and  gave  carefully  developed 
reasons  for  a  new  theory,  that  heredity  depends  upon 
the  transmission  of  germ-plasm,  originally  derived 
from  the  remotest  ancestry,  and  unaffected  by  the  char- 
acters acquired  by  organisms  during  their  individual 
lives.  Organisms  are  made  up  of  minute  units  called 
cells,  and  are  developed  from  transmitted  germ-cells 
by  means  of  assimilation  of  food,  subdivision  and 
differentiation  in  function  of  the  multiplying  cells  and 
organs  which  they  combine  to  produce.  Professor 
Weismann  maintained  that  the  original  germ-plasm 
develops  into  two  kinds  of  cells  —  the  somatic  cells 
and  the  germ-cells  —  and  these  are  mutually  isolated. 
The  somatic  cells  build  up  the  individual  organism, 
and  are  subject  to  modification  by  the  influence  of 
environment  and  by  use  and  disuse  of  organs.  But 
as  these  cells  are  not  transmitted  to  offspring,  the 
characters  which  are  thus  acquired  cannot  be  trans- 
mitted or  inherited.  The  germ-cells  alone  constitute 
the  material  source  of  new  organisms,  and  they  are 
unaffected,  because  of  their  isolation,  by  the  influences 
which  modify  the  somatic  cells  and  the  individual 
organism  during  its  lifetime.  The  arguments  by 
which  this  theory  was  supported  are  too  complicated 
to   present   adequately   in   these   lectures,^   but   their 

repeated  in  his  Evolution  Theory,  2  vols.,  translated  by  J.  A.  Thom- 
son,   1904,  Lees,  xxiii-xxv.     Cf.  R.  H.  Lock,  Recent   Progress,  pp. 
59-72;   Baldwin,  Die.  of  Philos.,  s.  v.  "Acquired  Characters";  H. 
Calderwood,  Evolution,  pp.  40-42. 
1  Cf.,  however,  pp.  204-207,  below. 


POST-DARWINIAN  VIEWS  67 

underlying  premise  is  that  the  process  of  evolution  and 
of  propagation  is  purely  mechanical,  and  can  only  be 
correctly  explained  in  mechanical  terms.  The  varia- 
tions which  appear  in  offspring  are  not  due  to  the  trans- 
mission of  acquired  characters,  but  to  the  diverse 
combinations  and  workings  of  the  characters  contained 
in  the  germ-cells  of  the  male  and  female  parents. 

The  new  theory  gained  wide  acceptance,  and  was 
thought  to  strengthen  the  Darwinian  hypothesis  and 
to  estabhsh  the  practically  exclusive  value  of  natural 
selection  in  evolution.  Those  who  have  taken  this 
position  are  called  neo-Darwinians.  The  controversy 
which  followed  was  a  vigorous  one,  and  you  will  find 
it  worth  while  to  read  the  debate  between  Weismann 
and  Spencer,  which  is  found  in  several  articles  contrib- 
uted by  them  to  the  Contemporary  Review  in  1893  and 
1894.  The  result  has  been  that,  while  beHef  in  the 
inheritance  of  acquired  characters  has  been  much 
weakened,  the  correctness  of  the  neo-Darwinian  posi- 
tion has  not  been  generally  acknowledged.  On  the 
contrary,  its  supporters  have  been  obliged  to  make 
compromising  concessions.  Professor  Weismann  felt 
forced  to  acknowledge  that  natural  selection  as  pre- 
viously set  forth  does  not  explain  the  earlier  stages 
of  development  of  useful  variations;  and  in  1892  he 
broached  the  germ-plasm  theory.^  This  theory  treats 
the  cells  as  made  up  of  a  multitude  of  smaller  particles, 

^  Exhibited  in  his  Evolution  Theory,  Lees,  xvii-xix,  xxii.  Cf. 
R.  H.  Lock,  op.  cit.,  pp.  259-263;  V.  L.  Kellogg,  Darwinism 
To-day,  pp.  193-201. 


68  THE    EVOLUTIONARY   THEORY 

which  he  called  biophors  and  which  are  combined  into 
groups,  named  determinants  because  they  are  sup- 
posed to  determine  the  characters  of  any  cell  in  which 
they  are  found.  Weismann  contended  that  these 
biophors  assimilate  food,  grow,  and  reproduce  them- 
selves by  division ;  and  that  the  determinants  into  which 
they  are  grouped  are  engaged  in  a  competitive  struggle 
for  food.  This  struggle  eliminates  the  weaker  deter- 
minants from  having  part  in  determining  the  charac- 
ters to  be  transmitted  by  the  germ-cells  to  offspring. 
Thus  the  principle  of  selection  is  conceived  to  operate 
upon  variations  within  the  cell  —  variations  too  sHght 
for  observation  even  by  means  of  a  microscope.  The 
fact  that  this  theory  represents  an  effort  to  solve  the 
important  and  pressing  problem  as  to  how  determi- 
nate variations  originate  has  secured  for  it  more  seri- 
ous attention  than  its  evidence,  or  lack  of  evidence, 
warrants.  It  is  purely  conjectural,  for  it  is  based  upon 
a  description  of  the  internal  structure  of  cells  which 
cannot  be  verified.  If  biophors  exist,  they  escape 
detection  by  the  most  powerful  microscope. 

The  experiments  in  cross-breeding  of  an  Augustin- 
ian  monk,  Gregor  Mendel,  the  results  of  which  were 
pubhshcd  in  1865,  but  which  attracted  no  particular 
notice  until  his  facts  were  rediscovered  by  de  Vries 
and  others  in  1899,  have  thrown  important  light  upon 
the  laws  of  transmission  of  characters  to  offspring. 
Mendel's  law,  as  it  is  called,  is  that  the  sexual  or  germ- 
cells  of  an  organism  produced  by  cross-breeding  bear 
the  parental  characters  thus  brought  into  one  organ- 


POST-DARWINIAN  VIEWS  69 

ism  in  complete  mutual  separation,  and  these  sepa- 
rate characters,  called  "allelomorphs,"  are  distributed 
in  the  germ-cells  in  such  wise  that  all  possible  combi- 
nations of  them  are  present  in  approximately  equal 
numbers.  To  restate  this  in  other  terms,  the  germ- 
cells  of  opposite  parents  which  are  found  in  hybrid 
plants  each  contain  one  or  other  only  of  any  pair  of 
differentiating  characters  possessed  by  the  parents; 
and  each  member  of  such  a  pair  of  characters  is  con- 
tained in  an  equal  number  of  germ-cells  of  both  sexes. 
By  a  pair  of  characters  is  meant  two  characters  that 
can  only  be  described  by  their  mutual  differences:  — 
for  instance,  smooth  seeds  and  wrinkled  seeds.  It 
should  be  added  that  the  separate  pairs  of  differentiat- 
ing characters  or  allelomorphs  obey  Mendel's  law  in 
complete  and  mutual  independence.  This  mutual 
separation,  along  with  the  numerical  law  of  their  com- 
binations in  germ-cells,  determines  the  results  of  cross- 
breeding; and  the  practical  application  of  Mendel's 
discovery  enables  cross-breeders  to  select  desirable 
variations  in  such  a  manner  as  to  produce  varieties 
which  breed  true  and  hold  their  own.^ 

The  facts  upon  which  Mendel's  law  is  based  consti- 
tute an  important  part  of  the  data  by  which  Hugo  de 
Vries  was  led  to  maintain  the  evolutionary  theory  of 
heterogenesis,  commonly  called  the  mutations  theory. 
This  theory  had  been  enunciated  by  several  earher 

*  On  Mendel's  law,  see  R.  H.  Lock,  op.  cit.,  chh.  vii,  viii;  Bateson, 
Mendel's  Prins.  of  Heredity  (which  gives  translations  of  Mendel's 
own  papers);  Baldwin's  Die.  of  Philos.,  s.  v.  "Evolution  (Mendel)." 


70  THE    EVOLUTIONARY   THEORY 

writers,  but  his  elaborate  experiments  and  careful 
arguments  have  for  the  first  time  given  it  a  recognized 
place  among  scientific  theories  —  one  that  threatens 
to  destroy  the  influence  of  neo-Darwinism.  You  will 
remember  that  Darwin  and  the  neo-Dar^vinians  make 
slight,  fluctuating,  and  continuous  variations  the  basis 
of  the  process  of  natural  selection,  and  maintain  that 
a  new  species  is  formed  by  means  of  such  selection,  and 
by  a  gradual  accentuation  and  accumulation  of  the 
variations  selected.  The  new  theory  excludes  natural 
selection  from  any  part  in  species-forming.  Accord- 
ing to  it  a  new  species  is  produced  by  sudden  and  dis- 
continuous variations.  These  variations  may  be  slight 
in  degree  when  severally  considered,  but  a  sufficient 
number  of  them  coincide  to  produce  immediately  by 
their  cumulative  effect  an  independent  species,  suffi- 
ciently differentiated  to  escape  the  swamping  effects 
of  inter-breeding,  and  capable  of  perpetuating  itself. 
Biologic  isolation  is  complete,  and  the  number  of 
members  of  the  new  species  which  are  thus  produced 
is  also  sufficient  for  their  self-propagation. 

The  new  theory  is  thus  directly  opposed  to  Darwin- 
ism in  its  explanation  of  the  formation  of  new  species. 
But  it  leaves  a  place  for  natural  selection  in  determin- 
ing the  general  course  of  natural  evolution.  DeVries 
says:  *' Darwin  discovered  the  great  principle  which 
rules  the  evolution  of  organisms.  It  is  the  principle 
of  natural  selection.  It  is  the  sifting  out  of  all  organ- 
isms of  minor  worth  through  the  struggle  for  life.  It 
is  only  a  sieve,  and  not  a  force  of  nature,  no  direct 


POST-DARWINIAN  VIEWS  71 

cause  of  improvement.  ...  It  is  only  a  sieve,  which 
decides  which  is  to  Hve,  and  what  is  to  die.  ...  It  is 
the  sieve  that  keeps  evolution  on  the  main  line,  kilHng 
all  or  nearly  all  that  try  to  go  in  other  directions.  By 
this  means  natural  selection  is  the  one  directing  cause 
of  the  broad  hues  of  evolution."  ^  In  brief,  the  muta- 
tions theory  makes  natural  selection  begin  its  work 
with  species  already  formed,  and  restricts  its  opera- 
tion to  an  ehmination  of  unfit  species  and  an  exclusive 
preservation  of  such  as  are  fitted  to  survive. 

The  mutations  theory  is  free  from  some  of  the  most 
troublesome  difficulties  attendant  upon  the  view  of 
Darwin,  that  new  species  arise  from  natural  selection 
and  an  accumulation  of  continuous  variations.  More- 
over, de  Vries  has  been  able  to  furnish  direct  evidence, 
for  he  has  observed  actual  instances  of  sudden  origin 
of  new  species  by  mutation  of  the  discontinuous  kind. 
It  has  been  objected  that  these  instances,  while  they 
estabHsh  the  fact  that  species  do  at  times  thus  origi- 
nate, are  altogether  too  few  to  warrant  such  a  general- 
ization as  is  represented  by  the  mutations  theory.  It 
has  been  answered  that,  as  the  origin  of  new  species 
is  not  an  every-day  event,  the  instances  observed  must 
necessarily  be  somewhat  Hmited  in  number,  and  that 
further  observation  will  probably  afford  additional 
evidence,  now  that  investigators  are  looking  in  the 
right  direction.     Furthermore,  it  is  urged  that,  if  the 

1  Species  and  Varieties,  Their  Origin  by  Mutation  (ed.  by  Mac- 
Dougal,  1905),  p.  6.  On  the  mutations  theory,  see  R.  H.  Lock,  op. 
cit.,  ch.  v;  V.  L.  Kellogg,  op.  cit.,  ch.  xi.  The  facts  upon  which  the 
theory  is  chiefly  based  are  given  below,  pp.  87-88. 


72  THE    EVOLUTIONARY   THEORY 

number  of  instances  of  mutation  which  have  been 
observed  is  small,  no  indisputable  instances  whatever 
have  been  perceived  of  the  origin  of  new  species  by 
the  selection  of  accumulating  continuous  variations. 
The  evidence  by  which  Darwin's  theory  is  thought  to 
be  estabHshed  is  wholly  indirect  —  being  either  con- 
jectural or,  at  least,  circumstantial.  The  battle  has 
not  been  entirely  fought  through,  and  it  is  too  early 
at  present  to  come  to  final  conclusions  as  to  the  out- 
come. But  the  new  theory  has  brought  the  difficulties 
which  attend  neo-Darwinism  into  bold  rehef,  and  we 
are  not  Hkely  to  see  any  permanent  return  to  pure 
Darwinism. 

I  have  ignored  other  theories  of  species  forming,  of 
which  several  have  appeared  during  the  past  two  or 
three  decades,^  because  none  of  them  have  seemed  to 
gain  the  attention  of  scientists  that  has  been  paid 
to  Weismannism  and  the  mutations  theory.  But  I 
ought  not  to  omit  mention  of  the  fact  that  there  is  an 
increasing  reahzation  among  scientists  of  the  part  played 
in  evolution  by  what  are  called  "unknown  factors." 
The  problem  as  to  the  causes  of  variation,  and  as  to 
the  laws  which  determine  their  direction  and  Hmits, 
has  become  more  and  more  pressing.  The  fact  that 
natural  selection  does  not  positively  cause  variation, 
but  merely  eliminates  unsuitable  results  thereof,  is 
now  well  established.  IVIany  scientists  have  escaped 
the  hampering  influence  of  naturahsm,  and  perceive 

1  A  general  account  of  them,  with  numerous  references,  is  given 
by  V.  L.  Kellogg,  op.  cit.,  chh.  viii-x. 


POST-DARWINIAN  VIEWS  73 

that  the  unknown  factors  which  cause  and  limit  the 
variations  of  organic  Hfe  transcend  mechanical  explana- 
tion, and  operate  in  a  manner  that  suggests  intelhgent 
direction.^  Others  reject  such  views  as  unscientific,^ 
by  which  they  mean  that  teleology  cannot  be  de- 
scribed in  mechanical  terms.  That  is,  they  forget 
the  Hmitations  of  the  mechanical  method  of  interpre- 
tation, and  refuse  to  be  influenced  in  their  views  by 
evidence  of  the  presence  in  nature  of  superphysical 
causation.  Such  an  attitude  is  not  really  scientific, 
but  is  the  result  of  mistaking  a  section  of  the  model 
of  nature  for  the  whole  model,  and  of  the  one-sided 
and  defective  philosophy  called  naturalism. 

I  believe  that  the  scientific  outlook  is  most  encour- 
aging to  those  who  believe  in  the  unity  of  all  things,  in 
the  reahty  of  the  superphysical  and  supernatural,  and 
in  the  possibility  of  acquiring  such  knowledge  of  the 
universe  as  will  forever  vindicate  our  assurance  that  a 
beneficent  divine  ordering  and  purpose  explains  and 
controls  natural  evolution. 

I  hope  in  these  lectures  to  show  also  that  neither  the 
evolutionary  theory  in  general  nor  any  explanation  of 
evolution  that  can  rightly  be  called  scientific  mihtates 
against  the  truth  of  genuinely  catholic  doctrine,  —  in 
particular  against  the  doctrine  of  man's  primitive  state 
and  fall.  But  before  undertaking  this  task  it  is  desir- 
able to  exhibit  the  evidence  which  has  been  advanced 

1  For  example,  Nageli,  Korschinsky,  and  R.  Otto. 

2  V.  L.  Kellogg  rejects  them,  op.  cit.,  p.  278,  as  do  all  believers  in 
naturalism. 


74  THE   EVOLUTIONARY   THEORY 

in  support  of  the  general  theory  of  a  natural  evolu- 
tion of  species,  and  to  consider  whether,  and  how  far, 
that  theory  explains  man's  origin  and  distinctive 
mental  and  moral  characteristics.  To  do  so  will  be 
the  aim  of  my  next  lecture. 


LECTURE    III 

EVroENCES   AND   LIMITATIONS 

The  purpose  of  this  lecture  is  to  exhibit  within  brief 
compass  the  evidences  which  are  thought  to  support 
the  theory  of  a  natural  evolution  of  species,  and  to  con- 
sider whether,  and  to  what  extent,  we  can  rightly  regard 
the  human  species  as  a  product  of  such  evolution.  At 
the  outset  permit  me  to  remind  you  again  of  the  dis- 
tinction between  the  general  theory  that  existing  species 
have  somehow  been  naturally  developed  from  earlier 
and  simpler  ones  and  the  various  explanations  of  this 
development  which  Darwin  and  others  have  advanced. 
One  may  become  con\dnced  of  the  futihty  of  any  one, 
or  of  all,  of  these  explanations,  and  yet  regard  the  evi- 
dence for  natural  evolution  as  conclusive.  It  is  this 
evidence  for  natural  evolution  that  I  now  ask  you  to 
consider. 

In  estimating  the  evidence  of  a  scientific  hypothesis 
we  ought  not  to  expect  mathematical  demonstration. 
From  the  nature  of  things  no  demonstrative  e\ddence 
can  be  had,  and  its  absence  will  not  deter  an  intelli- 
gent thinker  from  accepting  a  scientific  hypothesis  which 
appears  to  be  the  best  available  explanation  of  the 
observed  facts,  and  works  well.  He  may  indeed  accept 
it  provisionally  only,  while  waiting  for  the  results  of 

75 


76  EVIDENCES    AND    LIMITATIONS 

wider  investigation;  but  to  accept  the  best  available 
working  hypothesis  because  of  its  present  working  value 
is  a  truly  scientific  procedure,  and  upon  such  acceptance 
depends  to  a  large  degree  the  possibility  of  scientific 
progress.^ 

The  method  by  which  a  scientific  hypothesis  is  arrived 
at  and  established  is  inductive.  That  is,  facts  are  in- 
dustriously collected  and  co-ordinated  in  their  apparent 
relations,  and  speculative  imagination  is  exercised  to 
devise  a  theory  which  will  fit  in  with  and,  to  some 
extent  at  least,  explain  the  facts  that  have  been  accu- 
mulated. The  process  involves  an  element  of  con- 
jecture and  guesswork,  followed,  to  borrow  a  figure 
from  the  tailor's  work,  by  trying  the  new  garment  on 
to  nature's  model  in  order  to  discover  how  it  fits.  If 
it  fits  well,  it  is  accepted;  if  imperfectly,  it  is  modi- 
fied; if  not  at  all,  it  is  rejected  and  another  theory  is 
devised.  We  must  accept  this  method,  and  be  con- 
trolled in  our  views  of  nature  by  its  results,  or  else  aban- 
don hope  of  acquiring  a  scientific  knowledge  of  nature. 


The  evolutionary  hypothesis  has  been  arrived  at  by 
induction.  A  very  great  mass  of  biological  data  has 
been  gradually  accumulated  by  the  labours  of  succes- 
sive generations  of  scientific  investigators;  and  the 
thought  that  the  origin  of  species  can  best  be  explained 
in  its  physical  aspects  by  the  supposition  that  existing 

^  Cf.  pp.  33-34,  above. 


SUMMARY   OF  EVIDENCE  77 

species  of  life  have  originated  by  natural  evolution  from 
one  or  more  primitive  types  has  come  to  be  accepted 
by  the  scientific  world  as  best  agreeing  with  and  ex- 
plaining the  known  facts  of  biology  and  of  related 
spheres  of  investigation.  The  e^ddence  by  which  the 
evolutionary  hypothesis  is  supported  consists,  there- 
fore, of  innumerable  facts,  which,  when  considered 
together,  suggest  such  a  theory,  and  do  not  appear  to 
be  susceptible  of  any  other  physical  explanation  that 
is  so  satisfactory  and  so  free  from  difficulties.  These 
facts  are  gathered  from  a  wide  variety  of  sources,  but 
especially  from  results  of  investigations  in  morphology, 
embryology,  the  geological  succession  of  organisms, 
their  geographical  distribution,  and  the  observed  pro- 
duction of  new  varieties  and  species  by  artificial  selec- 
tion and  by  natural  mutation.^ 

I.  The  universal  occurrence  in  the  organic  world 
of  variation,  and  of  the  perpetuation  of  its  results  by 
inheritance,  has  led  scientific  observers  to  abandon 
behef  in  the  fixity  of  species,  and  to  look  for  some  other 
explanation  of  their  origin  than  the  ancient  behef  in  a 
separate  creation  of  each  by  divine  fiat.  Moreover,  so 
far  as  we  can  imagine,  there  are  but  two  alternatives 
to  this  view  —  their  spontaneous  but  separate  origin, 
one  by  one,  out  of  lifeless  matter,  and  their  natural 
evolution  by  means  of  variation  and  inheritance.     Of 

1  The  evidences  of  natural  evolution  are  given  in  most  all  the 
works  mentioned  on  p.  37,  note  2,  above.  But  note  especially  A.  R. 
Wallace,  Darwinism;  Chas.  Darwin,  Origin  of  Species,  ch.  xv; 
A.  Weismann,  Evolution  Theory,  Lees,  ii,  iii;  Thos.  Huxley,  Darwin- 
iana,  pp.  205-225;  M.  M.  Metcalf,  Organic  Evolution,  pp.  87-163. 


78  EVIDENCES   AND    LIMITATIONS 

spontaneous  generation  there  is  no  trace  in  nature; 
and  carefully  conducted  experiments  have  compelled 
scientists  to  reject  that  theory, — commonly  called  abio- 
genesis/  The  theory  of  natural  evolution  is  the  only 
remaining  alternative  that  has  thus  far  been  discovered ; 
and  if  it  agrees  with  the  facts,  it  ought  to  be  accepted 
until  a  better  explanation  is  forthcoming.  It  should 
be  remembered  that  our  acceptance  of  it  neither  mili- 
tates against  belief  in  creation  by  the  will  of  God  nor 
commits  us  to  a  mechanical  explanation  of  the  origin 
of  Hfe,  mind,  and  moral  sense.  The  theory  of  evolu- 
tion merely  describes  the  physical  history  of  organic 
life,  and  in  its  scientific  form  does  not  profess  to  account 
for  what  is  superphysical. 

2.  From  the  facts  of  variation  and  heredity  we  turn 
to  the  similarity  of  structure  and  organic  functioning 
which  is  found  to  characterize  the  species  in  each 
general  group  of  species  in  the  organic  world.  These 
groups  are  not  numerous,  and  if  there  has  been  a  natural 
evolution  of  species  this  fact  seems  to  indicate  that 
such  evolution  originated  in  a  very  few  primitive  types, 
each   corresponding   to  one  of   the   larger  groups  of 

1  See  F.  R.  Tennant,  in  Expository  Times,  May,  1908,  pp.  352- 
355,  for  an  account  of  attempts  to  prove  abiogenesis.  Also  O.  Lodge, 
Life  and  Matter,  esp.  ch.  x;  the  author's  Being  and  Attributes  of  God, 
pp.  267,  268,  where  other  references  are  given.  If  abiogenesis  were 
proved,  this  would  not  disprove  a  divine  creation  of  life,  but  would 
show  a  different  method  of  the  creation  than  the  existing  state  of 
evidence  establishes.  A.  Weismann,  Evolution  Theory,  Lee.  xxxvi, 
urges  that  abiogenesis  cannot  be  disproved  because,  if  it  does  occur, 
the  minuteness  of  its  results  makes  them  lie  beyond  observation  by 
the  most  powerful  microscope. 


SUMMARY   OF   EVIDENCE  79 

existing  species.  This  similarity  of  structure  appears 
the  more  remarkable  the  more  closely  morphological 
study  of  organisms  is  conducted.  To  use  an  obvious 
illustration  given  by  R.  H.  Lock,  it  is  found  that  "in 
the  hand  of  a  man,  the  paw  of  a  dog,  the  wing  of  a  bat, 
and  the  paddle  of  a  whale,  almost  identically  the  same 
series  of  bones  can  be  traced."  The  uses  to  which  these 
several  members  are  put  differ  widely,  but,  as  Lock 
adds,  "An  obvious  explanation  is  to  be  found  in  the 
supposition  that  these  parts  have  arisen  by  a  divergent 
modification  of  parts  which  were  originally  identical."  ^ 
Throughout  each  group  of  species  certain  correspond- 
ing organs  have  been  discovered  which  appear  to  be 
biiilt  in  accordance  with  one  general  plan.  Nor  is  this 
all.  Amid  much  divergence  of  organic  functioning  the 
general  laws  of  assimilation  of  food,  of  propagation, 
and  even  of  disease,  are  essentially  the  same;  as  is 
illustrated  by  the  success  with  which  experiments  upon 
lower  animals  are  employed  as  the  basis  of  medical  and 
surgical  treatment  of  human  disorders. 

3.  A  third  group  of  facts  which  suggests  and  con- 
firms the  evolutionary  theory  is  found  in  the  gradation  of 
organisms  which  appears  within  the  several  chief  groups 
of  species.  In  each  case  a  hierarchy  of  organic  forms 
appears,  stretching  all  the  way  from  seemingly  undif- 
ferentiated organisms  up  to  the  most  highly  organized 
species.  It  is  a  reasonable  inference  from  this  that  the 
higher  forms  are  most  recent  in  origin,  and  have  been 
produced  by  a  progressive  differentiation  of  earher  and 

^  Recent  Progress,  p.  31. 


8o  EVIDENCES   AND    LIMITATIONS 

simpler  organisms.  This  supposition  is  confirmed  by 
the  evidence  bearing  upon  the  comparative  antiquity 
of  species  which  has  been  obtained  by  other  Hnes  of 
investigation. 

4.  Another  argument  for  the  natural  evolution  of 
species  is  derived  from  embryology,  or  the  study  of 
immature  and  unborn  offspring.  A  remarkable  sim- 
ilarity is  found  in  their  manner  of  development  in 
different  species  of  the  same  general  group.  The 
similarity  is  most  complete  in  the  earliest  stages,  so 
complete  indeed  that,  prior  to  a  certain  stage  of  devel- 
opment, the  embryos  of  the  different  species  are  indis- 
tinguishable from  each  other.  It  is  also  noticed  that 
the  higher  organisms  to  an  observable  extent  recapitu- 
late in  their  embryonic  growth  the  phases  of  develop- 
ment of  their  several  species  which  the  evolutionary 
theory  hypothecates.  These  phenomena  are  most 
readily  interpreted  and  accounted  for  from  the  evolu- 
tionary standpoint.  The  parallehsm  between  the 
growth  of  individual  organisms  and  the  development 
of  species  is  not  indeed  complete,  but  this  is  easily 
accounted  for  by  the  supposition  that  the  variations 
which  result  in  the  divergence  of  species  may  to  some 
extent  modify  the  embryonic  stage  of  growth.  The 
more  or  less  defective  but  recognizable  resume  of  earlier 
natural  history  which  is  still  discoverable  seems  to  declare 
an  ancient  pedigree,  and  a  common  ancestry  for  the 
species  which  are  thus  shown  to  be  mutually  related. 

5.  Somewhat  connected  with  this  argument  is  the 
inference  made  from  the  presence  of  rudimentary  and 


SUMMARY    OF    EVIDENCE  8i 

useless  organs  in  members  of  higher  species.  The 
vermiform  appendix  of  our  own  bodies  affords  a  criti- 
cal instance,  one  that  obtrudes  itself  upon  our  attention 
with  painful  insistence  in  the  disease  known  as  appen- 
dicitis. This  and  other  organs  of  the  same  apparently 
useless  nature  bear  the  appearance  of  being  survivals 
of  a  previous  stage  of  evolution,  for  they  are  found  in 
lower  species  and  there  discharge  useful  functions. 
Mr.  A.  R.  Wallace  gives  interesting  examples.^  He 
says,  *'A11  the  higher  animals  present  rudiments  of 
organs  which,  though  useless  to  them,  are  useful  in 
some  allied  group,  and  are  beheved  to  have  descended 
from  a  common  ancester  in  which  they  were  useful."  ^ 
Some  of  these  rudiments  appear  only  in  exceptional 
individuals.  Thus  certain  persons  carry  a  projecting 
point  on  the  outer  fold  of  the  ear,  corresponding  faintly 
to  the  pointed  ear  of  numerous  species  of  lower  ani- 
mals —  an  earmark  of  ancestry. 

6.  We  come  next  to  the  teaching  of  geology  and 
paleontology  as  to  the  comparative  antiquity  of  species, 
and  as  to  the  time-order  of  their  origin.  This  teaching 
is  derived  from  the  distribution  of  ancient  fossils,  found 
in  various  strata  of  the  earth's  crust,  the  relative 
antiquity  of  which  has  been  estimated  by  the  methods 
of  geological  science.  This  testimony  of  the  rocks  is, 
of  course,  far  from  complete.  Many  organisms  are 
too  soft  and  jelly-like  to  be  preserved  in  this  manner, 
unless  petrified  —  a  comparatively  rare  event.  Then 
in  order  that  an  organism  should  be  preserved  after 

1  Darwinism,  ch.  xv.  2  Page  448. 

7 


82  EVIDENCES   AND    LIMITATIONS 

its  life  is  extinct,  it  should  be  buried  in  time  and  in  a 
manner  to  escape  entire  distintegration  either  by  the 
action  of  the  atmosphere  or  by  other  destructive  causes. 
Only  a  small  fraction  of  the  organisms  of  by-gone  ages 
can  have  left  their  traces  in  the  deposits  that  have  since 
accumulated.  Finally,  only  a  very  limited  portion  of 
the  earth's  crust  has  been  sufficiently  examined  to  lay 
bare  the  secrets  which  it  contains.^ 

Yet,  in  spite  of  these  limitations,  the  science  of 
paleontology,  which  is  concerned  with  the  study  of 
fossil  remains  whether  animal  or  vegetable,  has  thrown 
much  light  upon  the  past  history  of  organic  life  on  this 
planet.  The  time  measures  which  here  have  to  be 
employed  are  purely  geological,  and  cannot  be  trans- 
lated accurately  into  such  terms  as  years  and  centuries. 
But  the  strata  of  the  earth's  crust  have  been  distributed 
with  approximate  accuracy  into  a  series  of  successive 
periods;  and  paleontologists  by  means  of  this  distri- 
bution have  been  enabled  to  ascertain  the  relative 
antiquity  of  a  large  number  of  existing  species  as  well 
as  of  species  now  extinct,  the  fossil  remains  of  which 
have  been  discovered  in  various  geological  strata.  The 
results  have  been  in  accord  with  the  requirements 
of  the  evolutionary  theory.  The  lower  and  simpler 
species  are  most  ancient,  and  in  certain  instances  long 
series  of  ancestral  forms  have  been  discovered  which 
seem  to  indicate  the  evolution  of  living  species,  through 
many  intervening  stages,  from  remote  and  widely  dif- 
ferent forms  of  life. 

»  Darwin  discusses  this  incompleteness  in  op.  cit.,  ch.  x. 


SUMMARY    OF    EVIDENCE  83 

7.  The  argument  from  the  distribution  of  organisms 
in  time  is  corroborated  by  their  distribution  in  space 
—  their  geographical  distribution.  If  the  evolution- 
ary theory  is  true,  we  may  expect  to  find  that  closely 
related  species  are  frequently  located  near  each  other; 
and  that  when  they  are  widely  separated  —  for  example, 
by  seas  or  oceans  —  facts  are  available  which  point  to 
the  possibility  and  even  the  likelihood  of  their  early 
migration  from  a  common  centre.  We  may  also  ex- 
pect to  find  that  when  the  fauna  and  flora  of  two  terri- 
tories have  always  been  effectually  isolated  from  each 
other,  whether  by  insurmountable  mountain  ranges  or 
by  geologically  permanent  bodies  of  water,  their  species 
differ  widely.  The  facts  agree  with  this  expectation 
to  a  marked  degree.  It  is  true  that  apparent  excep- 
tions exist.  Closely  allied  species  are  found  on  oppo- 
site sides  of  the  globe;  and  the  fauna  and  flora  of 
certain  islands  —  for  example,  Madagascar  and  New 
Zealand  —  differ  widely  from  those  of  neighbouring 
continents  and  islands.  But  these  anomalies  can 
usually  be  accounted  for  by  geological  investigation. 
North  America  and  the  continent  of  Europe  were  in 
former  ages  connected  by  land.  The  comparative 
similarity  which  has  been  discovered  between  the 
species  of  Great  Britain  and  Japan  is  accounted  for 
by  the  absence  of  any  permanent  barriers  between 
them,  whether  of  climate  or  of  geological  nature.  On 
the  other  hand  the  depth  of  water  which  now  separates 
Madagascar  and  New  Zealand  from  the  nearest  land 
seems  to  prove  that  the  present  isolation  of  their  fauna 


84  EVroENCES    AND    LIMITATIONS 

and  flora  has  existed  without  break  from  the  earliest 
geological  period.  Some  apparent  anomalies  remain 
to  be  explained,  but  the  facts  in  general  of  geographical 
distribution  point  to  a  common  origin  of  species  of  the 
same  order,  and  no  other  explanation  appears  to  be 
available.^ 

The  evidence  which  I  have  thus  far  summarized  is 
circumstantial  and  indirect;  although  its  quantity  and 
diversity  is  very  great,  and  it  is  regarded  by  those  who 
are  most  competent  to  estimate  its  value  as  very  con- 
vincing. The  question  remains  to  be  faced,  is  there 
any  direct  evidence?  Has  anyone  ever  observed  the 
origin  of  species  by  means  of  variation  and  descent 
from  older  species  ?  If  so,  have  the  instances  observed 
been  of  sufficient  number  and  diversity  to  justify  such 
an  extensive  generalization  as  the  evolutionary  hypothe- 
sis? That  direct  evidence  ought  to  be  demanded  for 
such  an  important  theory  as  this,  if  the  nature  of  the 
facts  and  processes  involved  permits  their  discovery, 
is  not  to  be  denied.  But  if,  from  the  nature  of  things, 
little  or  no  direct  evidence  can  be  expected  to  be  forth- 
coming, whether  favourable  or  unfavourable  to  the 
doctrine  of  evolution,  and  if  the  available  indirect  evi- 
dence seems  to  be  abundant  and  convincing,  we  ought 
to  be  determined  in  our  views  by  such  evidence.  This 
is  especially  the  case  when  such  an  attitude  of  mind 
is  entirely  consistent  with  loyalty  to  revealed  truth  and 
to  the  fundamental  principles  of  supernatural  religion. 

1  A.  R.  Wallace  treats  clearly  and  adequately  of  this  subject,  in 
Darwinism,  ch.  xii.     See  also  Darwin,  op.  cit.,  chh.  xii,  xiii. 


SUMMARY   OF    EVIDENCE  85 

Now  the  natural  development  of  species  is  either  a 
long-drawn-out  process  or  a  comparatively  rare  event, 
whatever  may  be  the  true  description  of  the  method  of 
evolution.  If  the  Darwinian  description  is  correct,  the 
development  of  one  independent  species  from  another 
must  consume  a  much  longer  period  of  time  than  has 
elapsed  since  men  have  begun  to  investigate  the  process. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  mutations  theory  of  de  Vries 
is  to  be  accepted,  the  origin  of  a  new  species,  sudden 
though  it  be,  must  occur  at  rare  intervals  —  too  rare 
for  the  observance  of  many  instances  within  the  brief 
time  that  has  gone  by  since  men  have  taken  intelligent 
notice  of  biological  phenomena.  The  conclusion  to 
which  we  are  driven  is  that  we  ought  not  to  expect  to 
obtain  much  or  conclusive  direct  evidence  of  the  natural 
evolution  of  species.  This  being  the  case,  we  ought 
not  to  permit  the  comparative  inadequacy  of  such  e\d- 
dence  to  blind  our  minds  to  the  large  amount  and  con- 
vincing quality  of  the  indirect  evidence  which  I  have 
been  briefly  explaining.  With  such  preliminary  cau- 
tions in  mind,  I  now  ask  you  to  consider  what  direct 
evidence  has  in  fact  been  obtained.  Such  as  it  is,  this 
evidence  is  favourable  to  the  evolutionary  hypothesis. 
No  direct  evidence  has  been  advanced  to  the  contrary 
—  at  least  none  which  appears  to  be  incapable  of  being 
answered  and  explained  on  evolutionary  grounds. 

8.  The  alleged  direct  evidences  are  those  of  domesti- 
cation or  artificial  selection  and  of  the  natural  muta- 
tions which  have  been  investigated  by  de  Vries  and 
others.     The    facts    observed    in    domestication    and 


86  EVIDENCES   AND    LIMITATIONS 

artificial  breeding  appear  to  be  numerous  and  signifi- 
cant.^ But  their  number  and  value  is  much  reduced 
by  the  doubts  which  are  felt  as  to  the  independence 
and  permanence  of  the  species  which  are  said  to  be 
originated  by  such  means.  Moreover  it  has  to  be 
remembered  that  many  of  the  mutations  which  are 
attributed  to  domestication  have  been  too  ancient  to 
come  within  scientific  observation.  They  cannot, 
therefore,  be  employed  as  direct  evidence.  The  only 
instances,  if  any,  that  can  thus  be  used,  are  the  varieties 
which  modern  breeders  have  produced  by  careful  selec- 
tion and  cross-breeding.  Whether  any  of  these  vari- 
eties constitute  independent  species  is  still  a  debatable 
question;  and  the  fact  that  artificially  produced  vari- 
eties show  a  tendency  to  revert  to  type  when  aban- 
doned to  the  conditions  of  pure  nature  has  to  be  faced. 
These  limitations,  however,  do  not  deprive  the  phe- 
nomena of  artificial  selection  of  value  as  indirect  evi- 
dence of  natural  evolution.  If  it  is  not  possible  to 
assert  without  fear  of  contradiction  that  the  breeder 
can  produce  new  species,  it  is  at  least  certain  that  his 
new  varieties  appear  like  species  in  the  making  — 
varieties  which  will  become  fixed,  independent,  and 
permanent  species  when  their  culture  has  been  con- 
tinued long  enough.  The  forces  and  laws  which 
account  for  the  possibilities  of  domestic  culture  are,  of 
course,  natural  ones,  for  men  cannot  change  such  forces 
and  laws,  but  can  only  manipulate  them  and  facilitate 
their  working.     If,  therefore,  the  breeder  seems  to  be 

^  On  this  subject,  see  Darwin,  op.  cit.,  chh.  i,  ii. 


SUMMARY   OF   EVIDENCE  87 

producing  new  species  by  a  manipulation  of  nature, 
it  seems  reasonable  to  believe  that  such  results  will 
occur  when  nature  is  left  to  itself,  provided  sufficient 
time  is  given. 

9.  The  most  unmistakable  direct  evidence  of  nat- 
ural evolution  comes  from  observed  instances  of  natural 
mutation  —  from  the  facts,  that  is,  which  have  been 
employed  in  support  of  the  mutations  theory  of  the 
origin  of  species  by  discontinuous  variation.  What- 
ever may  be  their  value  as  evidences  of  this  explanation 
of  species  forming,  they  certainly  constitute  actual 
instances  of  the  origin  of  species  by  natural  evolution. 
These  instances  are  indeed  few,  and  Hugo  de  Vries' 
explanation  of  this  is  that  species  are  not  in  a  mutable 
state  except  for  brief  periods,  recurring  at  rare  inter- 
vals. In  order,  therefore,  to  bring  mutations  under 
scientific  observation,  species  must  be  found  that  have 
reached  a  mutable  stage.  Some  years  since  de  Vries 
discovered  that  certain  plants  of  the  evening  primrose, 
Oenothera  lamarckiana,  growing  in  Holland,  were 
throwing  off  new  varieties.  Taking  these  plants  under 
careful  observation  he  found  that  some  of  them  gave 
birth  to  new  species  which  remained  constant  and  bred 
true  without  the  assistance  of  artificial  selection  or 
cross-breeding.  His  observations  were  verified  by 
T.  H.  Morgan,  and  by  Professor  MacDougal,  and  have 
had  considerable  influence  upon  scientific  opinion. 
De  Vries  maintains  that  the  permanent  new  breeds 
which  are  supposed  to  be  produced  by  artificial  selec- 
tion really  owe  their  origin  to  natural  mutation  or 


88  EVIDENCES   AND    LIMITATIONS 

discontinuous  variation,  taken  advantage  of  by  breeders. 
If  he  is  right,  the  phenomena  of  artificial  selection 
afford  no  support  to  Darwin's  belief  that  natural  selec- 
tion is  the  chief  factor  in  species  forming;  but  they  do 
appear  to  furnish  direct  evidence  of  natural  evolution.^ 
Whether  he  is  right  or  not  remains  for  further  investi- 
gation finally  to  determine;  but  in  any  case  the  fact 
that  new  species  have  been  actually  observed  to  origi- 
nate by  natural  evolution  is  clear.  No  doubt  the  in- 
stances observed  are  too  narrow  in  range  to  afford  a 
basis  for  conclusive  generalization,  but  they  are  in  line 
with  the  evolutionary  hypothesis,  and  are  not  offset 
by  contrary  evidence. 
^  My  summary  of   the  evidence  by  which  the   theory 

of  natural  evolution  is  supported  has  necessarily  been 
brief  and  inadequate.  But  I  trust  that  it  will  enable 
those  among  you  who  have  not  previously  studied  the 
subject  to  perceive  that  the  evolutionary  hypothesis, 
considered  as  a  description  of  the  physical  aspects  of 
species  forming,  holds  the  field.  That  theory  is  in 
harmony  with  the  facts  which  have  hitherto  been  ob- 
served, and  works  well  as  a  means  of  interpreting  phe- 
nomena which  are  otherwise  unintelligible.  It  has  no 
rival  in  scientific  thought.  It  ought,  therefore,  to  be 
accepted  as  the  best  physical  description  of  the  origin 
of  species  that  is  now  available.^ 

1  On  the  observations  of  de  Vries  and  Morgan,  see  T.  H.  Mor- 
gan, Evolution  and  Adaptation;  V.  L.  Kellogg,  Darwinism  To-day, 
pp.  341-348  (cf.  pp.  362-373);  R.  H.  Lock,  Recent  Progress,  pp.  128- 
147.     Cf.  pp.  69-72,  above. 

2  This  does  not  mean  a  dogmatic  assertion  that  natural  evolution 


LIMITATIONS  89 

II 

It  does  not  follow  that,  because  the  theory  of  natural 
evolution  is  to  be  accepted,  it  is  therefore  to  be  regarded 
as  capable  of  accounting  for  all  the  characteristics  of 
organic  life.  The  theory  has  certain  very  definite 
limitations,  and  I  wish  to  draw  your  attention  to  them. 

I  have  called  the  evolutionary  theory  a  "physical 
description."  It  describes  rather  than  accounts  for 
the  process  of  species  forming,  and  is  concerned  with 
its  physical  aspects,  its  evidence  being  drawn  from 
physical  phenomena.  Such  evidence  affords  absolutely 
no  warrant  for  the  inference  that  the  evolutionary  theory 
explains  the  origin  of  anything  superphysical.  If, 
therefore,  a  species  is  found  to  possess  superphysical 
characteristics,  the  development  of  that  species  can  be 
but  partially  explained  by  a  physical  evolution  theory. 

Those  who  accept  the  naturalistic  philosophy  will 
of  course  reject  my  argument,  because  they  assume  that 
all  knowable  realities  are  capable  of  being  interpreted 
in  physical  and  mechanical  terms.  Naturalism,  how- 
ever, is  not  science,  but  an  indefensible  outcome  of 
one-sided  speculation.  Many  leading  natural  scien- 
tists recognize  this,  and  realize  that  certain  phenom- 
ena of  organic  life  are  not  susceptible  of  exclusively 
mechanical    explanation,     but    require    superphysical 

is  the  final  word  of  science.  The  possibility  remains  that  wider 
knowledge  may  hereafter  require  a  modification,  or  even  an  abandon- 
ment, of  the  theory  in  question.  But  natural  evolution  is  the  exist- 
ing scientific  doctrine,  and  as  such  we  have  to  reckon  with  it. 


90  EVIDENCES   AND    LIMITATIONS 

causation  fully  to  account  for  them.  Accordingly  they 
acknowledge  that  physical  evolution  does  not  entirely 
explain  the  origin  of  species,  but  merely  describes  their 
physical  antecedents  and  the  physical  conditions  of 
their  origin.  That  unknown  factors  have  part  in  species 
forming  is  confessed,  and  the  possibility  that  these 
factors  are  partly  at  least  superphysical  may  be,  and 
has  been,  conceded  witliout  doing  violence  to  physical 
science. 

It  is  not  a  postulate  of  physical  science  that  such 
science  should  be  able  to  solve  all  problems  raised  by 
scientific  experience.  Its  theories  are  limited  in  appli- 
cation, and  leave  many  questions  unanswered.  Thus 
the  evolutionary  theory  postulates  the  existence  of  life, 
and  therefore  cannot  rightly  be  understood  to  be  con- 
cerned with  the  problem  of  its  origin.  That  theory 
simply  describes  the  development  of  the  physical 
organisms  in  which  life  is  found.  This  development 
is  attended  by  the  appearance  of  certain  specific 
characters  which  purely  physical  antecedents  and  con- 
ditions do  not  and  cannot  explain :  —  such,  for  instance 
as  instinct,  reason,  and  moral  sense.  The  inference  to 
be  drawn  from  this  is  that  these  characters  are  not 
wholly  accounted  for  by  natural  evolution,  but  require 
for  their  development  what  is  called  involution  —  that 
is,  the  coming  in  of  higher  factors  than  can  be  regarded 
as  belonging  to  the  purely  physical  order. 

No  possible  mechanical  adjustment  or  rearrange- 
ment of  physical  conditions  can  of  itself  produce  a 
superphysical  effect.     Such  an  effect  requires  super- 


LIMITATIONS  91 

physical  causation.  To  convert  a  given  nature  into  a 
higher  nature,  where  the  difference  is  one  of  kind  and 
not  of  mere  degree,  or  linear  variation  as  it  is  called,  is, 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  lower  nature,  a  super- 
natural operation,  requiring  a  supernatural  cause.  An 
ape  cannot  by  its  own  power  evolve  into  a  human  being, 
nor  can  this  limitation  be  overcome  by  lengthening  the 
process  through  a  succession  of  generations.  To  think 
so  is  as  illogical  as  to  suppose  that  a  man  can  lift  him- 
self by  his  bootstraps  if  he  will  only  do  it  gradually. 
The  reply  may  be  made  that  the  evolutionary  hypothe- 
sis does  not  teach  that  a  species  elevates  itself  in  isola- 
tion, or  independently  of  the  forces  and  laws  at  work 
in  nature  at  large.  Such  an  answer  merely  shifts  the 
battle-ground  without  changing  the  issue,  for  the  prin- 
ciple I  have  been  stating  applies  to  a  universe  as  well 
as  to  a  species.  It  is  impossible  for  nature  as  a  whole, 
originally  containing  no  mind,  no  personalities,  and  no 
purposive  elements,  to  produce  these  things  and  oper- 
ate teleologically,  without  a  causation  being  involved 
which  is  distinctly  supernatural  to  the  original  cosmos: 
—  as  impossible  as  it  is  for  a  non-rational  species 
acting  by  itself  to  become  rational.  Nothing  can  be 
evolved  which  has  not  previously  been  involved.  Mere 
nature  cannot  produce  except  "after  its  kind."  Me- 
chanical variation  may  develop  things  after  their  kind, 
but  this  constitutes  the  necessary  limit  of  a  purely 
natural  evolution.^ 

1  Such  variation  is  called  "linear."     Thus  the  brain  may  become 
more  complicated  in  its  convolutions,  and  may  increase  in  size;  but 


92  EVIDENCES   AND    LIMITATIONS 

No  doubt  the  Power  whose  activity  alone  accounts 
for  the  appearance  of  life,  reason,  and  moral  purpose 
in  a  world  previously  lifeless,  non-rational,  and  non- 
moral,  operates  after  the  manner  of  an  immanent  Cause. 

But  to  confuse  such  a  Cause  with  the  nature  in  which 
_\    .  .  .    . 

it  operates  is  pantheistic ;  and  pantheism  is  not  science, 

but  a  speculative  philosophy  which  is  in  conflict  with 
some  of  the  most  vital  elements  of  human  experience.^ 
The  immanent  Cause  of  evolving  life  transcends  the 
natures  which  are  made  to  rise  in  the  scale  of  being  for 
the  obvious  reason  that  every  cause  must  be  adequate 
to  its  effects,  and  the  effects  in  question  transcend 
their  physical  antecedents. 

In  thus  insisting  upon  the  limitations  of  the  evolu- 
tionary hypothesis,  considered  as  an  explanation  of 
the  origin  of  life,  instinct,  reason,  and  moral  sense,  I 
might  rest  the  case  upon  the  ob\dous  principles  of  com- 
mon sense  to  which  I  have  made  reference,  and  pass  on. 
But  it  seems  to  be  worth  while  to  mention  some  recent 
developments  in  scientific  opinion  that  make  for  the  ac- 
ceptance of  the  position  which  I  have  been  defining. 

mere  brain  cannot  evolve  into  mind,  which  requires  an  intelligent 
source  and  cause.  Weismann,  a  champion  of  mechanical  interpre- 
tation of  all  things,  says.  Evolution  Theory,  Vol.  II,  p.  392,  "How 
the  activity  of  certain  brain-elements  can  give  rise  to  a  thought  which 
cannot  be  compared  with  anything  material,  which  is  nevertheless 
able  to  react  upon  the  material  parts  of  our  body,  and,  as  Will,  to 
give  rise  to  movement  —  that  we  attempt  in  vain  to  understand." 
Cf.  the  author's  Being  and  Attributes  of  God,  pp.  172-174;  W.  C.  D. 
Whetham,  Recent  Development  of  Phys.  Science,  pp.  16-20;  V.  F. 
Storr,  Development,  pp.  168-186;  Aubrey  Moore,  Science  and  the 
Faith,  p.  38.  ^  Cf.  pp.  16-21,  above. 


LIMITATIONS  93 

1  have  already  referred  to  the  fact  that  the  operation 
of  what  are  called  ''unknown  factors  in  evolution"  is 
increasingly  reaHzed  by  biological  investigators.  Thus 
V.  L.  Kellogg,  whose  antipathy  to  any  teleological 
interpretation  of  evolution  is  openly  expressed,  says, 
"Let  no  ambitious  student  hesitate  to  take  up  the  search 
for  truth  about  evolution  from  the  notion  that  biology 
is  a  read  book.  The  'Origin  of  Species'  was  the  first 
opening  of  the  book  —  that  the  world  recognized  at 
least;  poor  Lamarck  opened  the  book  but  could  not 
make  the  world  read  in  it  —  and  that  time  when  it 
shall  be  closed  because  read  through  is  too  far  away 
even  to  speculate  about.  With  Osborn  let  us  join  the 
believers  in  the  'unknown  factors  in  evolution.'"  ^  A 
few  pages  further  on  in  the  same  chapter,  he  states  that 
"by  no  means  all  biologists  find  in  natural  selection  a 
sufficient  explanation  of  adaptation";  ^  and  makes  this 
acknowledgment  in  spite  of  his  own  predilection  for 
that  explanation. 

These  unknown  factors  are  apparently  to  be  identi- 
fied with  directive  forces  working  either  within  the 
developing  organisms,  or  in  nature  at  large,  or  in  both. 
It  is  because  they  he  beyond  direct  observation  that 
their  nature  escapes  scientific  description,  and  no  par- 
ticular attempt  to  describe  them  has  gained  general 
acceptance.  Such  attempts  are  represented  in  several 
orthogenetic  theories,  thus  called  because  they  assume 

^Darwinism  To-day,  p.  377  (cf.  note  4,  pp.  390,  391,  where  a 
significant  quotation  from  H.  F.  Osborn  is  given). 

2  Page  380. 


94  EVIDENCES    AND    LIMITATIONS 

that  organic  variations  are  not  wholly  indefinite  or 
uncontrolled,  but  subject  to  organic  law  which  makes 
for  determinate  lines  of  progress.^  The  supporters  of 
orthogenesis  limit  the  range  of  natural  selection,  and 
emphasize  its  purely  eliminative  function,  excluding  it 
from  part  in  positive  species-forming.  Several  of  these 
writers  consider  orthogenesis  to  be  definitely  teleological 
and  to  be  directed  toward  an  ideal  goal. 

Ernst  Haeckel,  whose  materialistic  monism  was  dis- 
cussed in  my  second  lecture,  discovers  the  unknown 
factors  of  evolution  in  primitive  matter.^  Sir  Oliver 
Lodge,  in  his  valuable  book  entitled  Life  and  Matter, 
says,  "Thus,  then,  in  order  to  explain  life  and  mind 
and  consciousness  by  means  of  matter,  all  that  is  done 
is  to  assume  that  matter  possesses  these  unexplained 
attributes."  ^  The  higher  world  of  thought  has  aban- 
doned materialism,  and  a  long  array  of  scientific 
writers  might  be  quoted  in  behalf  of  behef  in  the  dual- 
ism of  matter  and  mind.  As  Sir  Oliver  Lodge  again 
says,  speaking  of  Darwin's  work,  ''It  is  famihar  that 
he  explained  how  variations  once  arisen  would  be 
clinched,  if  favourable  in  the  struggle,  by  the  action  of 
heredity  and  survival;  but  the  source  or  origin  of  the 
variations  themselves  he  did  not  explain."  ^ 

I  do  not  think  that  we  need  to  feel  ashamed,  or  to 
reckon  ourselves  to  be  belated  in  our  ideas,  if  we  con- 
clude that  the  theistic  position  aft'ords  the  best  stand- 

1  Kellogg  describes  some  of  them,  op.  cit.,  pp.  274-290,  319-326. 

2  See  pp.  40-41,  above. 

8  Page  42.  4  Page  46. 


EVOLUTION    OF    MAN  95 

point  from  which  to  regard  the  unknown  factors  in 
evolution.  The  late  Thomas  Huxley's  words  will  not 
frighten  us  when  he  says,  "A  phaenomenon  is  explained 
when  it  is  shown  to  be  a  case  of  some  general  law  of 
Nature;  but  the  supernatural  interposition  of  the 
Creator  can,  by  the  nature  of  the  case,  exemplify  no 
law,  and  if  species  have  really  arisen  in  this  way,  it  is 
absurd  to  attempt  to  discuss  their  origin."  ^  Our  reply 
is  simple.  Belief  in  supernatural  causation  does  not 
in  the  least  interfere  with  beHef  that  the  fact  of  such 
causation  reveals  itself  in  the  working  of  uninterrupted 
natural  law.  Such  causation  need  not  subvert  natural 
law,  but  may  account  for  effects  w^hich  natural  law  is 
employed  to  bring  about,  but  which  none  the  less  trans- 
cend the  powers  of  nature  alone  to  achieve.  The  task 
of  physical  science  is  to  describe  the  physical  laws 
which  the  Creator  employs;  and  the  importance  and 
profitableness  of  this  task  is  in  nowise  reduced  by  the 
discovery  that  facts  and  problems  emerge  which  purely 
physical  theories  do  not  account  for  or  explain.^ 

Ill 

It  is  in  the  light  of  the  necessary  limitations  of  a 
purely  physical  explanation  of  the  developments  of 
organic  life  that  we  ought  to  consider  its  appHcability 
to  the  human  species.  I  believe  that  the  evidence  by 
which  the  evolutionary  theory  is  supported,  in  so  far  as 

^  Darwiniana,  p,  57. 

2  On  the  theistic  aspects  of  natural  evolution,  see  pp.  112-116, 
below. 


96  EVIDENCES   AND   LIMITATIONS 

it  establishes  that  theory,  also  justifies  the  conclusion 
that  man's  physical  organism  is  related  by  unbroken 
descent  to  lower  and  more  primitive  organisms.^  But 
much  scientific  opinion  will  bear  me  out  in  the  further 
con\dction  that  the  human  species  possesses  char- 
acters which  physical  evolution  alone  cannot  explain. 
Human  nature  being  what  we  observe  it  to  be,  super- 
physical  factors  are  required  to  account  for  man's 
origin;  and  the  evolutionary  theory  does  not  fully 
determine  what  we  ought  to  believe  as  to  his  primitive 
state,  and  as  to  the  beginnings  of  human  sinfulness. 
What  I  am  saying  constitutes  a  vital  part  of  the  gen- 
eral argument  of  these  lectures.  Natural  evolution,  in 
the  present  state  of  scientific  knowledge,  must  be  con- 
fessed to  be  a  real  factor  in  bringing  about  man's  past 
and  present  moral  state;  but  it  cannot  be  regarded  as 
the  sole  cause  of  our  sinful  inclinations,  without  dis- 
regarding the  superphysical  aspects  of  human  nature 
and  man's  origin,  and  without  failing  to  do  justice  to 
the  testimony  of  conscience  as  to  the  reality  and  ful- 
ness of  our  responsibility  for  sin.  In  saying  this  I  am 
anticipating  a  stage  in  my  argument  which  I  intend  to 
develop  more  fully  in  subsequent  lectures. 

1  On  the  evolution  of  man,  see  Chas.  Darwin,  Descent  of  Man; 
Thos.  Huxley,  Man's  Place  in  Nature;  A.  R.  Wallace,  Darwinism, 
ch.  xv;  H.  Caldervvood,  Evolution  and  Man's  Place  in  Nature. 
What  can  be  said  against  any  evolutionary  origin  of  man  can  be  found 
in  John  Thein's  Christian  Anthropology.  A  less  radical  position  is 
taken  by  Jas.  Orr,  God's  Image,  pp.  1 21-136.  A  sane  discussion 
of  the  subject  is  given  by  Aubrey  Moore,  Science  and  the  Faith, 
pp.  200  et  seq. 


EVOLUTION    OF    MAN  97 

Darwin  and  many  of  his  supporters,  Herbert  Spencer 
and  his  followers,  and  materialists  like  Haeckel,  have 
with  more  or  less  absoluteness  adopted  the  view  that 
man's  mental  and  moral  characteristics  are  to  be  ac- 
counted for  by  natural  evolution.  They  have  not  been 
able  to  secure  the  acceptance  of  this  view  as  an  estab- 
lished scientific  doctrine.  In  Darwin's  own  argument 
indications  appear  that  he  is  conscious  of  unsolved 
difficulties,  and  that  he  did  not  face  the  materialistic 
implications  of  his  somewhat  tentative  position.  His 
pioneer  co-worker  and  admirer,  A.  R.  Wallace,  definitely 
rejects  his  conclusion  in  this  particular,  and  other  con- 
vinced evolutionists  of  high  scientific  repute  do  the 
same.  Among  the  more  thorough  arguments  in  behalf 
of  the  conclusion  that  man's  mental  and  moral  char- 
acteristics cannot  be  explained  by  physical  evolution 
are  those  of  Mr.  Wallace,  in  the  last  chapter  of  his 
work  on  Darwinism,^  and  of  Henry  Calderwood,  in 
his  volume  entitled,  Evolution  and  Man^s  Place  in 
Nature. 

The  rest  of  this  lecture  will  be  devoted  to  a  brief 
summary  of  the  chief  reasons  which  these  and  other 
writers  have  advanced  for  the  position  which  I  have 
taken,  that  something  more  than  mere  animal  heredity 
and  natural  evolution  is  required  to  explain  man's 
origin  and  nature.  These  reasons  are  to  a  large  extent 
specific  branches  and  appHcations  of  the  general  argu- 
ment which  I  have  been  presenting,  that  superphysical 
products   and    effects   cannot    be    accounted    for   by 

^  Ch.  XV,  3d  ed.  corrected,  1905. 
8 


98  EVIDENCES   AND    LIMITATIONS 

purely  physical  antecedents  and  causes,  but  require  the 
coming  in  of  superphysical  factors  and  of  supernatural 
causation.  If  man  belongs  to  the  superphysical  as  well 
as  to  the  physical  order,  his  physical  evolution  must 
have  been  attended  by  superphysical  involution.  He 
must  have  ov^ed  his  distinctive  and  higher  attributes  to 
other  sources  than  his  animal  ancestry. 

That  human  nature  is  partly  superphysical  is  a 
necessary  premise  of  the  whole  argument.  It  is  a 
premise  that  none  but  materialists  can  consistently 
repudiate.  Even  an  agnostic  naturalist  like  the  late 
Professor  Huxley,  in  the  midst  of  an  assertion  of  his 
belief  that  physical  and  mental  phenomena  are  capable 
of  being  expressed  by  each  other,  honestly  says,  "I 
really  know  nothing  whatever,  and  never  hope  to  know 
anything,  of  the  steps  by  which  the  passage  from 
molecular  movement  to  states  of  consciousness  is 
effected."  ^  His  conviction  that  such  a  passage  actually 
occurs  by  means  of  purely  physical  processes  is  there- 
fore nothing  more  than  a  purely  conjectural  inference 
from  the  correlation  of  brain  action  and  mental  phe- 
nomena, expressed  in  the  form  of  dogmatic  asser- 
tion. This  correlation  is  a  mysterious  result  of  the 
union  of  body  and  soul  in  man.  It  in  no  sense  con- 
stitutes proof  that  these  two  are  the  same,  or  of  the 
same  order  of  being;  nor  does  it  require  us  to  infer 
that  psychical  functions  are  functions  of  man's  physi- 
cal organism,  and  results  of  its  natural  evolution.- 

1  Darwiniana,  p.  162. 

2  See  O.  Lodge,  Life  and  Matter,  pp.  93-101;  J.  Orr,  Christian 


EVOLUTION    OF    MAN  99 

Probably  the  reluctance  of  certain  scientists  to 
acknowledge  the  possibility  of  supernatural  factors  in 
man's  evolution  is  chiefly  due  to  the  assumption  that 
the  operation  of  such  factors  would  constitute  a  breach 
in  the  continuity  of  natural  causation.  But  this  as- 
sumption is  absolutely  unwarranted.  The  working  of 
various  factors  to  produce  a  common  result  does  not 
stultify  or  interrupt  the  working  of  any  of  the  several 
causes  which  are  thus  combined.  If  it  did,  the  law 
of  gravitation,  to  give  an  illustration,  would  be  nulli- 
fied every  time  one  lifted  a  heavy  body  from  the  ground. 
Gravitation  alone  could  not  do  the  lifting,  but  the  fact 
that  one  has  to  lift  at  all  proves  the  unbroken  continuity 
of  the  law  of  gravitation.  The  physical  laws  which 
are  involved  in  natural  evolution  do  not  cease  to  oper- 
ate because  other  and  higher  laws  co-operate.  ''  Order 
is  heaven's  first  law,"  and  all  possible  factors,  whether 
physical  or  superphysical,  operate  and  co-operate  in  "  a 
wonderful  order,"  wherein  no  breach  of  continuity  is 
possible,  but  evolution  and  involution  are  made  to 
fulfil  the  one  plan  of  the  immanent  and  transcendent 
Creator.  The  continuity  of  the  physical  can  be  under- 
stood only  in  the  continuity  and  progress  of  the  larger 
and  higher  drama  to  which  it  is  made  to  afford  a  stage 
and  sensible  factors.  And  if  the  scenery  is  changed 
from  time  to  time  by  invisible  hands,  this  is  not  to 
stultify  the  scenery,  but  is  to  employ  it  for  the  signifi- 

View  of  God,  pp.  146-150;  Cath.  Encyc,  s.  v.  "Energy,  the  Law  of  the 
Conservation  of";  H.  Calderwood,  Evolution,  ch,  x.  Cf.  the  author's 
Being  and  Attributes  of  God,  p.  173,  note  3,  for  further  references. 


lOO  EVIDENCES    AND    LIMITATIONS 

cant  and  orderly  purposes  for  which  it  was  made. 
The  fact  that  the  scenery  of  the  world-drama  is  partly 
organic  show^s  the  vital  immanence  of  its  Maker  and 
transcendent  Stage-manager.  It  does  not  displace 
Him,  but  makes  more  apparent  His  resourcefulness 
and  omnipresent  power.  ^ 

1  must  proceed  to  mention  some  of  the  more  specific 
indications  that  physical  evolution  alone  cannot  explain 
the  origin  of  the  human  species.  IMr.  Wallace,  writing 
from  the  Darwinian  standpoint,  dwells  upon  two  of 
them. 

1.  He  shows  in  the  first  place  that  man  possesses 
certain  faculties  —  he  mentions  the  mathematical, 
musical,  and  artistic  faculties  —  which  are  not  found 
in  the  lower  species,  but  which  appear  to  have  no  utility 
whatever  for  natural  selection  and  survival  of  the 
fittest.  As  he  says,  the  essential  features  of  Darwin's 
theory  are,  ''the  preservation  of  useful  variations  in 
the  struggle  for  life;  that  no  creature  can  be  improved 
beyond  its  necessities  for  the  time  being;  that  the  law 
acts  by  life  and  death,  and  by  the  survival  of  the  fittest." 
But  these  faculties  constitute  variations  in  the  human 
species  which  are  neither  needful  nor  useful  for  the 
struggle  for  life,  and  cannot,  therefore,  have  owed  their 
development  to  natural  selection.^ 

2.  His  second  argument  is  this.  In  its  working  the 
law  of  natural  selection  requires  that  the  specific  char- 

^  The  principle  of  continuity  in  relation  to  supernatural  factors  in 
the  world-drama  is  discussed  at  length  in  Lee.  v.  Pts.  II,  III,  below. 

2  Darwinism,  pp.  264-269. 


EVOLUTION   OF   MAN  loi 

acters  which  it  causes  to  survive  in  the  struggle  for 
existence  shall  be  maintained  at  a  fairly  general  level 
of  efficiency.  This  is  so  because  excessive  variation 
from  the  common  standard  must  result  either  in  de- 
ficiency or  in  disturbance  of  organic  balance;  and 
either  of  these  results  will  cause  non-survival  in  the 
struggle.  This  law  holds  good  in  the  lower  species, 
the  vigorous  members  of  which  do  not  vary  in  their 
characters  more  than  one-sixth  to  one-fifth  from  a 
common  standard.  But  the  case  is  quite  otherwise 
with  human  beings.  Men  are  found  to  vary  to  an 
astonishing  degree,  both  in  the  positive  and  in  the 
negative  direction,  in  their  possession  of  the  higher 
faculties;  and  this  excessive  variation  usually  has  no 
visible  effect  upon  the  persistent  vitality  of  either  the 
individual  members  of  the  species  or  of  the  species  as 
a  whole.  These  higher  faculties,  therefore,  seem  to  be 
independent  of  the  law  of  natural  selection  in  their 
origin  and  development.^  The  force  of  these  two 
arguments  depends  to  some  extent,  of  course,  upon  the 
Darwinian  supposition  that  in  natural  evolution  species 
are  chiefly  formed  by  natural  selection.  The  argu- 
ments which  I  am  about  to  mention  are  valid  in  relation 
to  any  purely  physical  theory  of  evolution. 

In  passing,  however,  permit  me  to  state  Mr.  Wallace's 
general  conclusion.  He  discovers  three  stages  in  evo- 
lution, at  which  variations  occur  that  are  too  great  and 
too  sudden  to  be  accounted  for  by  the  accumulation 
of  slight  and  continuous  variations  and  the  working  of 

^  Op.  cit.,  pp.  269-272. 


I02  EVIDENCES   AND    LIMITATIONS 

natural  selection  upon  them.  These  stages  are  the 
transitions  respectively  from  the  inorganic  to  the  organic, 
from  the  non-intelligent  to  the  sensitive  and  conscious, 
and  from  unreflective  animal  intelligence  to  the  self- 
conscious,  abstract,  moral,  and  religious  reason  and 
aspirations  of  mankind.^  Enlarging  his  conclusion,  we 
maintain  that  the  origin  of  life,  of  animal  intelligence 
and  instinct,  and  of  man's  distinctive  mental,  moral, 
and  religious  faculties,  constitute  superphysical  changes 
which  no  theory  of  purely  physical  evolution  can 
account  for  or  explain. 

3.  In  particular,  the  differences  between  human  and 
brute  intelligence  are  differences  in  kind,  and  consti- 
tute a  gap  which,  from  the  nature  of  things,  cannot  be 
crossed  by  purely  natural  evolution.  There  is  no  need 
to  dwell  at  length  upon  this.  A  bare  list  of  the  chief 
differences  observable  is  sufficient  to  convince  those 
who  are  not  hopelessly  entangled  in  the  mire  of  natural- 
ism. Animals  possess  perceptive  and  concrete  reason, 
sometimes  to  a  high  degree  —  especially  under  domesti- 
cation. But  man  alone  is  able  to  generalize,  to  engage 
in  abstract  thought,  to  acquire  opinions,  to  express  his 
thoughts,  opinions,  and  knowledge  in  conceptual 
terms,  and  to  hand  on  the  results  of  mental  progress  to 
posterity.  Many  animals  possess  consciousness;  but 
man  alone  reflects,  and  attains  to  self -consciousness.^ 

1  Op.  cit.,  pp.  474-476. 

2  H.  Calderwood,  Evolution,  chh.  vii,  viii.  Thos.  Huxley  denied 
that  the  differenee  between  human  and  brute  intelligence  is  one  of 
kind,  Darwiniana,  pp.  152-179.  John  Fiske  acknowledges  that 
the    psychological   divergence   of   man   from   brute   requires   us   to 


EVOLUTION   OF    MAN  103 

If  contrary  to  all  principles  of  likelihood,  and  for  the 
purpose  of  argument,  we  concede  that  these  differences 
might  result  from  the  concurrence  and  accumulation 
of  natural  variations,  we  merely  push  the  difficulty 
further  back.  The  question  remains,  How  did  intelli- 
gence of  any  kind  originate  ?  A  question  which  we  shall 
soon  consider.  The  differences  between  man  and  brute 
which  I  have  mentioned  gain  deeper  significance  when 
it  is  noted  that  man  alone  possesses  a  moral  sense, 
capable  of  distinguishing  between  right  and  wrong. 
He  alone  deliberates,  and  arrives  at  moral  purposes, 
which  he  fulfils  by  a  voluntary  direction  and  control  of 
propensities  that  are  left  unrestrained  in  the  lower 
species.  No  brute  possesses  real  moral  character.^ 
There  is  also  the  rationally  controlled  imagination; 
the  aesthetic  sense;  the  sense  of  humour;  and,  highest 
of  all,  the  religious  instinct,  accompanied  by  capacity  to 
enter  into  communion  with  the  unseej\by  apprehension 
of  the  Infinite  and  the  Eternal,  and  by  behef  in  spiritual 
immortaHty.2  All  these  are  new  effects  for  which  pre- 
vious developments  afford  no  precedents.  Obviously 
they  require  a  new  cause,  an  involution  from  above. 
4.  Another  particular  in  our  argument  brings  us 
back  to  the  question  which  was  raised  a  moment  ago, 

"dichotomise  the  universe,  putting  man  on  one  side  and  all  things 
else  on  the  other."     Through  Nature  to  God,  p.  82. 

1 H.  Calderwood,  op.  cit.,  ch.  xii;  O.  Lodge,  Life  and  Matter, 
pp.  103  et  seq.  Haeckel,  in  Riddle  of  the  Universe,  pp.  1 28-131, 
tries  to  explain  will  on  materialistic  lines. 

2  John  Fiske  brings  out  the  significance  of  the  religious  instinct 
in  the  concluding  chapters  of  Through  Nature  to  God. 


I04  EVIDENCES   AND   LIMITATIONS 

How  did  intelligence  of  any  kind  originate?  The  par- 
ticular referred  to  is  the  impossibility  of  describing 
mental  phenomena  in  physical  or  mechanical  terms. 
If  we  concede  that  human  intelligence  is  but  a  natural 
evolution  of  animal  sense,  we  are  as  far  as  ever  from 
accounting  for  the  origin  of  intelligence  by  physical 
evolution.  If  animal  sense  is  nothing  more  than  a 
selected  variation  of  the  physical,  it  should  be  describ- 
able  in  physical  terms,  which  it  certainly  is  not.  The 
wave  motion  of  ether  could  never  produce  the  sensa- 
tion of  light  upon  a  bhnd  spot,  and  blind  matter  is  not 
made  sensitive  to  light  or  perceptive  by  mere  mechanics. 
Molecular  action  is  one  thing,  sensation  is  another,  and 
the  two  differ  in  kind.  No  identical  proposition  can 
be  constructed  in  which  the  subject  is  sensation  and  the 
predicate  mere  matter  and  motion,  or  vice  versa,  for 
the  two  terms  cannot  be  thought  of  as  equivalent  in 
meaning.  And  if  this  is  true  of  sensation  at  its  lowest 
stage,  it  is  a  fortiori  and  emphatically  true  of  reflective 
reason,  of  moral  intuition,  and  of  religious  aspiration. 
As  I  have  already  stated,  the  late  Professor  Huxley 
was  convinced  that  ''consciousness  and  molecular  action 
are  capable  of  being  expressed  by  one  another."  But 
he  frankly  said,  "Whether  we  shall  ever  be  able  to 
express  consciousness  in  foot-pounds,  or  not,  is  more 
than  I  will  venture  to  say."  ^  A  possibility  which  he 
sees  no  prospect  of  being  realized  need  not  worry  us. 
In  his  later  years  he  came  to  realize  the  utter  unlike- 

^  Darwiniana,  p.  163.     On  this  whole  argument,  see  H.  Calder- 
wood,  Evolution,  ch.  xi. 


EVOLUTION   OF   MAN  105 

ness  of  the  physical  and  the  ethical,  and  asserted  that 
"  social  progress  means  a  checking  of  the  cosmic  process 
at  every  step,  and  the  substitution  for  it  [note  the  word 
substitution]  of  another,  which  may  be  called  the  ethical 
process."  ^  Obviously,  that  which  is  substituted  for 
the  cosmic  process  of  physical  evolution  cannot  be 
regarded  as  its  product. 

5.  The  duahsm  of  mind  and  of  the  physical  organism 
which  conditions  its  external  manifestation,  and  there- 
fore the  impossibility  of  regarding  mind  as  the  product 
of  a  merely  physical  process,  are  also  shown  by  apply- 
ing the  law  of  the  conservation  of  energy  to  the  physical 
action  of  the  human  organism.  This  law  is  defined 
by  Clerk  Maxwell  as  follows:  "The  total  energy  of 
any  body  or  system  of  bodies  is  a  quantity  which  can 
neither  be  increased  nor  diminished  by  any  mutual 
action  of  these  bodies,  though  it  may  be  transformed 
into  any  of  the  forms  of  which  energy  is  susceptible."  ^ 
Now  when  this  law  is  applied  to  the  human  organism, 
it  is  discovered  that  that  organism  constitutes  a  closed 
circle,  a  complete  system  of  acting  and  reacting  ener- 
gies, without  reckoning  at  all  with  either  the  mystery 
of  life  or  man's  mental  and  spiritual  activity.  These 
lie  outside  the  system  of  mechanical  forces  of  the  body. 
As  Sir  Oliver  Lodge  shows, ^  life,  mind,  and  will,  while 

1  Evolution  and  Ethics,  p.  33. 

2  Theory  of  Heat,  p.  93,  as  quoted  by  Michael  Maher,  in  Cath. 
Ency.,  s.  v.  "Energy,  the  Law  of  the  Conservation  of"  — an  article 
worth  reading. 

3  O.  Lodge,  Life  and  Matter,  ch.  ix.  Cf.  J.  Orr,  Christian  View 
of  God,  pp.  146,  147;  S.  Harris,  Phil.  Basis  of  Theism,  pp.  439-442. 


io6  EVIDENCES   AND   LIMITATIONS 

they  direct  and  determine  the  Hnes  of  bodily  activity, 
are  not  to  be  classed  with  mechanical  energies,  and  do 
not  enter  into  their  equation  in  the  human  organism. 
"It  is  intelligence  which  directs;  it  is  physical  energy 
which  is  directed  and  controlled  and  produces  the  result 
in  time  and  space."  The  sequence  of  mechanical 
processes  is  temporal  and  spatial,  whereas  the  sequence 
of  psychical  processes,  conditioned  by  time  though  these 
are,  is  in  its  own  nature  logical,  and  mechanics  cannot 
evolve  logic.  Mechanical  energy  is  to  be  described  in 
terms  of  quantity,  and  of  quantity  of  which  its  guidance 
by  human  thought  and  will  constitutes  no  part. 

6.  Another  particular,  which  appears  to  contradict 
the  supposition  that  man's  higher  faculties  can  be  fully 
accounted  for  by  organic  development,  is  the  fact  that 
the  gap  between  the  human  and  the  brute  intelligence 
is  very  excessive  indeed  when  compared  with  the  varia- 
tions of  nervous  organization  and  of  brain  by  which 
it  has  to  be  explained,  if  man  is  wholly  a  product  of 
physical  evolution.  No  doubt  slight  changes  are  often 
seen  to  precipitate  large  results.  But  in  such  cases 
we  can  usually  discover  an  accumulation  of  conditions 
preparing  the  way.  Not  so  here.  The  brain  did  not 
originate  with  man,  but  the  human  use  of  it  is  some- 
thing new  under  the  sun.  Except  in  size  and  elabora- 
tion there  is  no  difference  of  importance  between  the 
brains  of  apes  and  of  men.  But  the  late  John  Fiske, 
an  ardent  evolutionist,  said,  ''While  for  zoological  man 
you  can  hardly  erect  a  distinct  family  from  that  of  the 
chimpanzee  and  the  orang;    on  the  other  hand,  for 


EVOLUTION    OF    MAN  107 

psychological  man  you  must  erect  a  distinct  kingdom; 
nay  you  must  even  dichotomise  the  universe,  putting 
man  on  one  side  and  all  things  else  on  the  other."  ^ 

Now  it  is  obvious  that  this  disparity,  so  far  from  be- 
ing explainable  by  any  future  discovery  of  missing  links 
between  the  other  primates  and  man,  will  be  accentuated 
thereby;  for  the  closer  the  resemblance  is  between 
man's  physical  organism  and  that  of  his  brute  ancestors, 
the  more  unaccountable  on  purely  evolutionary  grounds 
is  the  innovation  which  is  apparent  in  the  origin  of 
man's  mental  and  spiritual  capacities. 

I  think  that  the  considerations  which  I  have  given 
in  this  lecture,  while  they  forbid  our  rejection,  in  the 
present  state  of  scientific  knowledge,  of  the  hypothesis 
that  man  has  derived  his  physical  organism  from  brute- 
ancestors,  are  fatal  to  the  supposition  that  his  distinc- 
tive mental,  moral,  and  religious  faculties  are  thus 
derived.  The  difficulty  of  explaining  such  derivation 
is  confessed  either  directly  or  impliedly  by  many  evo- 
lutionists. The  famous  originator  of  neo-Darwinism, 
August  Weismann,  says,  "  How  the  activity  of  certain 
brain-elements  can  give  rise  to  a  thought  which  cannot 
be  compared  with  anything  material,  which  is  never- 
theless able  to  react  upon  the  material  parts  of  our 
body,  and,  as  Will,  to  give  rise  to  movement — that  we 
attempt  in  vain  to  understand."^  In  these  words  is 
logically   involved    the   whole   difficulty.     Mechanical 

1  Through  Nature  to  God,  p.  82.  This  argument  is  given  by  H. 
Calderwood,  Evolution,  ch.  xvi,  esp.  pp.  280-293. 

2  Evolution  Theory,  Vol.  II.  p.  392. 


io8  EVIDENCES    AND    LIMITATIONS 

evolution  produces  mechanical  results,  and  if  higher 
results  emerge  we  must  hypothecate  higher  causation. 

The  inference  which  ought  to  be  made  in  relation  to 
the  subject-matter  of  these  lectures  has  already  been 
hinted  at/  but  I  wish  again  to  define  its  nature.  It 
is  this:  If  man's  origin  cannot  be  entirely  accounted 
for  by  a  process  of  purely  natural  evolution,  neither 
can  man's  primitive  state  and  moral  history  be  wholly 
explained  by  considerations  drawn  from  his  animal 
inheritance.  Man  is  more  than  the  highest  brute  be- 
low him,  and  what  that  more  was  when  man  began  to 
be  cannot  be  determined  by  purely  biological  consid- 
erations. Superphysical  factors  —  factors  distinctly 
supernatural  to  his  progenitors — were  at  work  in  origi- 
nating human  nature  and  in  establishing  its  original 
state.  Therefore  other  lines  of  inquiry,  as  well  as  the 
biological,  are  necessary,  if  we  would  deal  intelligently 
with  the  subject  before  us. 

I  trust  that  we  have  reached  a  point  in  our  discussions 
at  which  we  can  intelligently  examine  the  theological 
implications  of  the  evolutionary  hypothesis.  I  expect 
to  devote  my  attention  to  them  in  the  next  lecture. 

1  See  pp.  31-22,  above;  and  p.  156,  below. 


LECTURE    IV 

THEOLOGICAL   IMPLICATIONS 

We  have  come  to  the  chief  turning-point  in  our  dis- 
cussions. During  the  previous  three  lectures  we  have 
been  considering  the  physical  aspects  of  our  subject, 
whereas  in  the  remaining  three  lectures  we  shall  be 
concerned  primarily  with  its  theological  aspects.  Be- 
fore proceeding  further,  therefore,  it  seems  worth  while 
to  enunciate  the  chief  conclusions  which  have  been 
reached,  the  theological  implications  of  which  are  yet 
to  be  reckoned  with.  They  may  be  summarized  in  the 
following  propositions : 

1.  The  concrete  subject-matters  of  theological  and  i 
physical  sciences  intersect  at  certain  points.  Thus 
both  ahke  are  concerned  with  the  origin,  nature,  and 
primitive  state  of  the  human  species.  But,  whereas 
theology  investigates  the  superphysical  and  spiritual 
aspects  of  these  matters,  physical  science  is  concerned  i 
with  their  physical  and  mechanical  aspects. 

2.  It  follows  that  neither  theological  nor  physical 
science  by  itself  is  scientifically  complete,  and  neither  one 
is  in  a  position  to  dictate  terms  to  the  other.  Each 
science  has  its  certainties,  and  in  the  interests  of  truth 
must  maintain  them.  But  theologians  and  physical 
scientists  are  under  a  hke  necessity  of  having  regard 
for  each  other's  established  conclusions,  partial  though 

109 


no  THEOLOGICAL   IMPLICATIONS 

these  be,  if  they  desire  to  arrive  at  a  tenable  philosophy 
of  the  totahty  of  being  and  life.  All  truly  scientific 
conclusions  pertain  to  one  harmonious  realm  of  truth, 
and,  therefore,  in  their  ultimate  explanation,'  they  are 
mutually  related. 

3.  Among  existing  certainties  of  physical  science 
the  present  state  of  knowledge  compels  us  to  reckon 
the  doctrine  that,  so  far  as  physical  antecedents  and 
factors  are  concerned,  the  origin  of  the  human  species 
is  due  to  a  natural  process  of  variation  in  lower  species, 
the  results  of  which  have  been  transmitted,  fixed,  and 
perpetuated  in  offspring.  ^lan  is  declared  to  have  a 
brute  ancestry,  and  to  possess  characters  which  have 
been  inherited  through  such  ancestry.  The  more 
precise  explanations  of  this  physical  evolution  which 
have  been  advanced  by  Lamarck,  Danvin,  Weismann, 
de  Vries,  and  others  stand  on  a  lower  level,  and  are  not 
to  be  regarded  as  scientific  certainties. 

4.  The  course  of  biological  investigation  has  accen- 
tuated rather  than  militated  against  the  conclusion 
that  the  origin  of  fife,  of  inteUigence,  and  of  the  dis- 
tinctive mental,  moral,  and  spiritual  characteristics  of 
mankind,  require  superphysical  causation  to  account 
for  them;  and  the  inference  is  justifiable  that  the  theory 
of  physical  evolution  does  not  wholly  explain  or  deter- 
mine man's  primitive  state  and  moral  history. 

In  every  science  tvvo  kinds  of  conclusions  are  dis- 
coverable, including  on  the  one  hand  those  that  appear 
to  be  well  established  and  are  generally  accepted,  and, 
on  the  other  hand,  those  that  are  of  speculative  nature 


DOGMAS  AND  OPINIONS  iii 

and  are  liable  either  to  be  modified  or  to  be  abandoned. 
This  is  as  true  of  the  science  of  theology  as  of  other 
sciences.  Every  science  has  its  assured  dogmas  and 
its  tentative  hypotheses  as  well.  In  theology  the 
former  derive  their  certainty  from  permanent  catholic 
consent  as  to  what  has  been  supernaturally  revealed. 
The  latter  are  called  dubia  or  pious  opinions,  being 
the  fruits  of  speculation  in  fields  wherein  the  knowl- 
edge which  can  be  acquired  in  this  life  is  too  frag- 
mentary to  warrant  what  is  called  the  certainty  of 
faith,  or  the  assurance  of  spiritual  knowledge.^  But 
a  tendency  always  exists,  especially  when  the  peculiar 
intellectual  conditions  of  the  age  make  particular 
opinions  of  this  kind  appear  highly  credible,  to  confuse 
them  with  really  cathohc  dogmas.  The  consequences 
are  sometimes  deplorable.  All  speculative  views  in 
theology  are  Hable  to  become  untenable  through  the 
increase  of  knowledge  in  other  departments  of  inves- 
tigation. When  this  happens  in  relation  to  opinions 
that  have  become  mixed  up  with  cathohc  certainties, 
a  panic  inevitably  occurs  in  the  rehgious  world;  and, 
until  sufficient  time  has  elapsed  for  a  readjustment  of 
fundamental  perspectives  to  be  achieved,  multitudes 
regard  the  new  knowledge  as  subversive  of  Christian 
doctrine.  Such  was  the  case,  as  I  have  shown  you  in 
my  second  lecture,^  when  Darwin  secured  a  scientific 
place  for  the  evolutionary  h}'pothesis.     The  storm  still 

^  The  writer  has  more  fully  explained  the  distinction  between 
dogma  and  pious  opinion  in  Atithority,  Eccles.  and  Biblical,  ch.  viii. 
§§  7.  S.  2  See  pp.  52,54. 


112  THEOLOGICAL   IMPLICATIONS 

mutters  to  some  extent  upon  the  horizon,  and  occa- 
sional  flashes  of   polemical   lightning   accentuate   the 
importance  of  carefully  distinguishing  in  our  discus- 
sions between  catholic  doctrines  and  purely  scholastic 
opinions  touching  the  subject  with  which  we  are  con- 
•  cerned.     I  am  endeavouring  to  deal  with  the  bearing 
jof  the  evolutionary  theory  upon  certain  catholic  doc- 
/trines.     I    am   not    concerned    to    defend    speculative 
/  views  or  to  vindicate  any  particular  school  in  theology. 


The  chief  doctrines  which  have  been  thought  to  be 
]  affected  by  the  evolutionary  hypothesis  are  those  of 
itheistic  teleology,  creation,   biblical^  infallibihty,   and 
(man's  primitive  state  and  fall.     These  lectures  have 
reference  primarily  to  man's  primitive  state  and  fall;  but 
I  do  not  think  that  I  shall  be  guilty  of  an  unwarranted 
digression  if  I  devote  part  of  this  lecture  to  a  brief  con- 
sideration of  the  bearing  of  the  evolutionary  hypothesis 
upon  the  other  doctrines  which  I  have  mentioned. 

(a)  Christian  theism,  in  fact  every  form  of  belief 
in  a  personal  God,  is  closely  bound  up  with  the  evi- 
dences of  design  which  are  apparent  in  the  visible 
universe.  St.  Paul  declares  the  imphcit  conviction 
of  righteous  men  of  every  age  when  he  says  that  the 
invisible  things  of  God,  "since  the  creation  of  the  world 
are  clearly  seen,  being  perceived  through  the  things 
that  are  made,  even  His  everlasting  power  and  divin- 
ity."^    It  is  true  that  passing  modes  of  thought  often 

1  Rom.  i.  20. 


IMPLICATIONS   AT   LARGE  113 

disturb  the  mental  perspectives  of  sincere  seekers  after 
truth,  and  we  may  not  treat  particular  instances  of 
theistic  doubt  as  proofs  of  unrighteousness.  But  it  is 
clear  that  St.  Paul  truly  describes  a  very  general  cause 
of  unbelief  when  he  says  that  men  "hold  down  the 
truth  in  unrighteousness;  because  that  which  may  be 
known  of  God  is  manifest  in  them,"  ^  As  the  Psalmist 
says,  "The  heavens  declare  the  glory  of  God;  And 
the  firmament  sheweth  His  handiwork.  Day  unto 
day  uttereth  speech.  And  night  unto  night  sheweth 
knowledge."  Of  the  intelHgible  nature  of  this  self- 
manifestation  of  God,  he  further  says,  and  general 
experience  confirms  his  assertion,  that,  although  "There 
is  no  speech  nor  language,"  and  "Their  voice  cannot 
be  heard,"  yet  "Their  line  is  gone  out  through  all  the 
earth,  And  their  words  to  the  end  of  the  world."  ^  As 
has  often  been  noticed,  the  whole  order  of  nature  is 
hieroglyphic,  for  all  its  elements,  arrangements,  and 
movements  signify  something;  and  if  men  were  not 
convinced  of  their  abiHty  to  decipher  to  some  extent 
the  meaning  of  nature,  there  would  be  no  science  and 
no  evolutionary  hypothesis.  That  nature  conveys  a 
meaning  for  minds  to  consider  is  the  fundamental 
postulate  of  scientific  inquiry.  But  meanings  have  no 
existence  except  as  proceeding  from  mind  to  mind. 
To  speak  of  meaning  when  there  is  no  intelligent 
source  of  what  is  signified  is  to  utter  nonsense.^    Tliis 

1  Rom.  i.  18,  19.     Cf.  verses  21,  22.  2  Psa.  xix.  1-4. 

3  See  Fairbairn,  Philos.  of  the  Christ.  Relig.,  pp.  27-38;  S.  Harris, 
Self-Revelation  of  God,  pp.  256-266. 

9 


114  THEOLOGICAL   IMPLICATIONS 

is  the  real  essence  of  the  teleological  argument  for  the 
existence  of  a  divine  intelligence,  of  a  personal  God. 
It  needs,  however,  for  completeness  of  argument,  to 
be  connected  with  other  considerations,  such,  for 
instance,  as  are  formulated  in  the  cosmo logical,  moral 
and  ontological  arguments  of  theistic  treatises;  but  the 
intelligibility  of  nature  cannot  be  explained  except 
by  the  supposition  that  its  Author  is  intelligent. 

The  sign  language  of  nature  is  very  rich  in  its  vocabu- 
lary, and  its  signification  is  exceedingly  manifold  and 
complex.  One  result  of  this  is  that,  although  the 
theistic  implication  of  the  whole  is  very  evident  to 
those  who  do  not  miss  the  woods  in  considering  the 
trees,  the  attempts  to  formulate  this  implication  in  a 
theistic  argument  have  taken  various  hnes;  and  have 
been  determined,  and  limited  in  value  as  well,  by  the 
existing  state  of  scientific  knowledge.  Thus  when 
Darwin  pubHshed  his  theory  of  evolution,  theistic 
writers  were  apt  to  rest  their  argument  for  design 
somewhat  exclusively  upon  particular  instances  of 
adaptation  of  means  to  ends.  These  adaptations  are 
multitudinous  and  are  especially  striking  in  the  organic 
world,  although  discoverable  in  the  other  parts  of  the 
physical  order.  This  form  of  argument  in  Paley's 
hands  was  made  cumulative  by  his  emphasis  upon  the 
vast  number  of  adaptations  which  nature  exhibits; 
but  its  defect  lay  in  a  failure  to  bring  out  the  teleologi- 
cal significance  of  nature  as  a  whole.  Induction  from 
particular  instances  is  open  to  challenge  so  long  as  it  is 
not  universal;  and  the  objection  was  sure  to  be  raised 


IMPLICATIONS   AT   LARGE  115 

that  many  of  nature's  arrangements  do  not  appear 
to  be  useful  or  adapted  to  intelligible  ends.  Nature 
is  more  than  a  mere  collection  of  mechanical  con- 
trivances; and  a  more  adequate  conception  of  its 
general  meaning  and  unity  is  required  before  men  can 
appreciate  the  force  of  the  rejoinder  to  this  objection, 
that  every  part  of  nature  should  be  interpreted  in 
relation  to  the  developing  whole;  and  that,  if  our 
knowledge  were  sufficient,  we  could  perceive  how  even 
the  most  mysterious  arrangements  have  meaning,  and 
either  now  subserve  or  have  subserved  the  master- 
purpose  of  the  whole. 

The  evolutionary  hypothesis  has  done  much  to 
enlarge  and  unify  our  conception  of  nature,  and  as  a 
consequence  has  enabled  Christian  writers  to  formu- 
late a  more  convincing  teleological  argument.  But  Dar- 
win's theory  of  natural  selection  at  first  seemed  to 
nuUify  the  evidences  of  design  by  giving  another 
explanation  of  the  phenomena  of  adaptation.  Darwin 
indeed  emphasized  the  part  which  utiRty  plays  in 
natural  evolution;  but,  whereas  Paley  had  appealed  to 
the  utility  of  organs  to  prove  design,  Darwin  accounted 
for  their  utihty  by  the  law  that  useless  organs  must 
disable  their  possessors  and  cause  them  to  perish  in 
the  struggle  for  existence.  As  only  the  fittest  can  win 
out  in  the  struggle  for  life,  the  existing  organic  forms 
must  be  those  the  organs  of  which  are  highly  adapted 
for  the  preservation  of  life.  Post-Darwinian  investi- 
gation has  tended  to  limit  the  part  of  natural  selection 
in  the  evolution  of  species,  and  thus  to  reduce  its  seem- 


u 


Ii6  THEOLOGICAL   IMPLICATIONS 

ing  sufficiency  to  account  for  organic  adaptations. 
But  riper  thought  has  done  more.  It  has  come  to  be 
reahzed  that,  in  any  case,  natural  selection  does  not 
account  for  adaptation.  Its  function  is  wholly  elimi- 
native.  It  destroys  the  less  fit,  but  does  not  cause  the 
fitness  of  what  it  permits  to  survive.  The  causes  of 
adaptation  are  to  be  looked  for  in  the  positive  factors 
of  variation  and  inheritance;  and,  as  I  endeavoured  to 
show  you  in  my  last  lecture,  these  appear  to  be  under 
direction.  Variations  are  not  purely  fortuitous,  nor 
are  they  indefinite  in  range.  There  is  a  teleological 
trend  in  the  mutations  of  nature,  and  the  argument 
for  design  which  the  Darwinian  hypothesis  appeared 
to  strip  naked  and  to  kick  out  of  doors  has  been  re- 
admitted and  reclothed,  and  is  now  established  at  the 
fireside  more  comfortably  than  ever.  It  would  carry 
me  too  far  afield  to  present  the  argument  for  design 
in  its  improved  form.  It  is  exhibited  in  many  recent 
treatises,  and  I  have  myself  devoted  a  chapter  to  it  in 
my  latest  volume,  on  The  Being  and  Attributes  of  God} 
(b)  The  story  has  often  been  repeated  of  a  certain 
interview  between  M.  Laplace  and  Napoleon  Bona- 
parte.^   The  former  was  presenting  a  copy  of  one  of 

1  Ch.  vi.  Cf.  V.  F.  Storr,  Development  and  Divine  Purpose; 
Fredk.  Temple,  Bampton  Lectures,  Lee.  iii;  A.  Moore,  Science  and 
the  Faith,  pp.  186-200;  F.  B.  Jevons,  Evolution,  chh.  xii,  xiii; 
Profeit,  Creation  of  Matter;  Illingworth,  Personality,  pp.  94-99; 
Semi-Darwinian,  Doubts  about  Darwinism. 

2  For  instance,  by  Jas.  Ward,  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism,  Vol. 
I.  p.  4,  who  refers  to  W.  W.  Rouse  Ball,  Short  Hist,  of  Mathematics, 
p.  388. 


IMPLICATIONS    AT   LARGE  117 

his  scientific  works  to  Napoleon,  who  remarked, 
"M.  Laplace,  they  tell  me  you  have  written  this  large 
book  on  the  system  of  the  universe  and  have  never 
even  mentioned  its  Creator."  Laplace's  terse  reply 
was,  ''Sire,  I  had  no  need  of  any  such  hypothesis.'' 
Such  an  attitude  of  mind  was  then  less  usual  than  it 
has  since  become.  That  it  should  become  a  very 
ordinary  one  was  inevitable,  however,  when  natural 
scientists  began  to  specialize  more  carefully  than  was 
formerly  the  practice,  and  confined  their  attention 
more  exclusively  to  the  task  of  investigating  and  de- 
scribing the  mechanical  and  physical  aspects  of  nature. 
Rigid  specialization  is  one  of  the  conditions  of  success 
in  this  kind  of  labour;  but  it  is  apt  to  bring  the  penalty 
of  narrow-mindedness,  and  of  inability  to  understand 
things  in  their  larger  relations.  We  go  to  the  me- 
chanic when  we  wish  to  acquire  accurate  information 
as  to  the  working  of  a  machine,  but  his  very  expertness 
has  often  been  gained  at  the  cost  of  permanent  failure 
to  acquire  such  larger  knowledge  as  would  enable 
him  to  help  us  in  appreciating  all  that  lies  behind, 
and  accounts  for,  machinery.  Our  dependence  upon 
specialists  for  knowledge  of  the  physical  processes  of 
nature  should  not  blind  us  to  the  truth  that  this  knowl- 
edge pertains  to  the  surface  of  things,  and  does  not 
afford  that  larger  and  truer  view  of  being  and  life 
which  is  both  possible  and  desirable  for  human  en- 
lightenment and  progress.  A  description  of  nature's 
processes  and  physical  sequences  can  never  do  duty 
for  an  adequate  account  of  things,   of  their  deeper 


Ii8  THEOLOGICAL   IMPLICATIONS 

implications,    of   their   ultimate   Cause,    and   of   their 

general  purpose.     And  the  fact  that  man  is  conscious 

of  being  superphysical,  as  well  as  physical,   teaches 

that  he  can  never  rest  content  with  merely  physical 

knowledge,   without  incurring  atrophy  of  his  higher 

faculties  and  failure  of  self-realization. 

I    As  Laplace  rightly  enough  implied,  the  subject  of 

(creation   lies  outside  the   sphere  of  physical   science. 

Such  science  limits  itself  to  describing  the  processes  of 

existing  things.     The  evolutionary  theory,  for  instance, 

is  on  its  own  showing  simply  a  description  of  what  hap- 

'  pens  to  organic  life  when  once  brought  into  being. 

i  The  problem  of  its  origin  remains  exactly  where  it 

j  was  before  the  modern  evolutionist  changed  the  face 

'  of    descriptive    science.^     Yet    to    grapple    with    that 

problem  is  a  task  which  mankind  cannot  evade.     It  will 

not  allow  itself  to  be  ignored.     And  its  solution  must 

be  had  in  one  of  two  contrary  views :  —  either  that  the 

universe  is  its  own  basis  of  existence  and  eternal;,  or 

that  all  things  therein  have  ultimately  originated  by 

creation.     The    former    alternative    is    formulated    in 

pantheism  and  in  materialistic  monism,  —  systems  of 

thought  which  derive  what  plausibility  they  possess 

^  In  a  chapter  contributed  to  F.  Darwin's  Life  and  Letters  of  Chas. 
Darwin,  Vol.  II.  pp.  202,  203,  Thomas  Huxley  says:  "There  is  a 
great  deal  of  talk  and  not  a  little  lamentation  about  the  so-called 
religious  difficulties  which  physical  science  has  created.  In  theolog- 
ical science,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  has  created  none.  Not  a  solitary 
problem  presents  itself  to  the  philosophical  theist  at  the  present  day 
which  has  not  existed  from  the  time  philosophers  began  to  think  out 
the  logical  grounds  and  the  logical  consequences  of  theism." 


IMPLICATIONS   AT    LARGE  119 

]from  a  refusal  to  give  adequate  consideration  to  the 
phenomena  of  life,  mind,  and  moral  responsibility. 
The  other  solution  does  justice  to  these  phenomena, 

land  most  adequately  accounts  for  the  diverse  forms 
of  being  and  life.  It  indeed  raises  a  baffling  problem. 
If  God  created  all  things,  and  this  excludes  the  pan- 
theistic idea  that  they  are  substantial  parts  of  His  own 
essence.  He  must  have  created  them  without  the  use 
of  pre-existing  materials,  or  ex  nihilo,  as  it  is  somewhat 
misleadingly  expressed.  How  can  this  act  have  been 
achieved?  We  cannot  answer;  for  such  an  event  hes 
wholly  outside  of  human  experience  and  is  unique. 
Therefore  it  lies  beyond  the  sphere  of  imagination. 
But  an  eternal  past  for  the  universe  is  equally  un- 
imaginable and  equally  unexperienced.  The  mystery, 
therefore,  since  it  clings  to  either  solution,  leaves 
unimpaired  the  superiority  of  behef  in  creation  over 
an  acceptance  of  pantheistic  or  materialistic  monism. 
The  Christian  doctrine  of  creation  is  to-day  as  valid 
for  higher  thought  as  it  ever  has  been.^ 

(c)  We  come  next  to  the  question  of  biblical  infaUi- 
bility.^  If,  as  historical  Christianity  has  maintained 
from  primitive  days,  the  Bible  is  the  veritable  Word  of 

1  In  saying  this,  I  do  not  concern  myself  with  the  questions  raised 
by  disputable  exegesis,  and  by  the  view  that  the  writer  of  Genesis 
was  inspired  to  give  a  scientific  account  of  the  method  of  creation. 
Cf.  the  author's  Being  and  Attributes  of  God,  ch.  v.  §§7,  10,  and 
the  references  there  given  —  especially  Profeit,  Creation  of  Matter; 
Flint,  Theism,  pp.  101-118. 

2  Cf .  the  writer's  Authority,  Eccles.  and  Biblical,  ch.  vii.  §§  5,  6. 
Also  pp.  13-16,  above. 


I20  THEOLOGICAL    IMPLICATIONS 

God,  there  is,  of  course,  no  escape  from  the  conclusion 
that  it  is  in  that  capacity  infalKble;  and  this  is  catholic 
doctrine.  The  manner  in  which  the  Scriptures  were 
produced,  and  given  their  unique  value  and  authority, 
is  for  men  to  discover,  so  far  as  it  is  discoverable,  by 
critical  study  of  the  Scriptures  themselves;  and  the 
results  of  such  study  are  found  in  theories  of  inspira- 
tion. These  theories,  whether  verbal  or  other,  are 
not  parts  of  catholic  doctrine. 

The  facts  plainly  show,  however,  that  biblical  in- 
spiration left  the  sacred  composers  free  to  write  in 
their  own  manner;  and  the  context  of  divine  teaching 
which  w^as  thus  appropriated  and  employed  by  the 
Holy  Spirit  is  obviously  such  as  was  suited  to  ancient 
times  and  to  the  then  state  of  natural  knowledge. 
The  purpose  of  inspiration  w^as  spiritual  and  religious, 
but  the  literary  vehicle  which  was  manipulated,  so  to 
speak,  for  that  purpose  was  human,  and  such  as  was  in- 
telligible to  its  immediate  recipients.  Their  knowledge, 
even  in  spiritual  matters,  was  corrected  and  enlarged 
only  so  far  as  men's  previous  spiritual  progress  enabled 
them  to  assimilate  and  profit  by  new  lessons  from  God. 
Many  inveterate  errors  and  defective  moral  ideals 
seemed,  in  the  meantime,  to  be  sanctioned  by  the  written 
Word,  at  least  until  later  progress  in  revelation  and 
knowledge  showed  that  they  were  merely  left  untouched 
until  their  correction  had  become  practically  possible.^ 

1  See  the  author's  Authority,  Eccles.  and  Biblical,  ch.  vii.  §  7; 
Mozley,  Ruling  Ideas  of  Early  Ages;  Orr,  Problem  of  the  Old  Test., 
ch.  xii.  Pt.  III.;  Watson,  Inspiration,  ch.  iii.     Cf.  Heb.  ix.  10. 


IMPLICATIONS   AT   LARGE 


121 


The  progressive  nature  of  the  revelations  contained  in 
Holy  Scripture,  and  the  defective  and  erroneous  nature 
of  certain  beliefs  and  ideals  that  gain  uncorrected  ex- 
pression in  the  Old  Testament,  are  very  generally 
acknowledged.  They  are  indeed  too  evident  to  be 
denied  by  inteUigent  students. 

But  if  spiritual  errors  were  left  uncorrected,  we  may 
readily  believe  that  mistaken  views  of  natural  history 
were  also  left  as  they  stood,  and  only  so  far  modified 
as  was  necessary  in  order  that  they  might  be  employed 
as  suitable  vehicles  and  contexts  of  divine  teaching. 
The  authority  of  the  context  in  each  case  lies  in  its 
being  thus  divinely  employed,  and  its  bibhcal  meaning 
lies  in  the  manner  and  connection  of  its  use  by  the  Holy 
Spirit.  I  am  distinguishing  here  between  the  bibhcal 
or  inspired  purpose  and  meaning,  and  the  merely 
human  content  of  the  narratives  in  question,  considered 
apart  from  their  relation  to  divine  revelation.  We 
do  not  need  to  believe  that  the  human  writers  were 
enabled  to  anticipate  in  their  historical  narratives  the 
results  of  modern  discovery  in  order  to  believe  that 
these  narratives  are  divinely  inspired  contexts  of 
spiritual  teaching.^  But  just  as  it  required  the  acquisi- 
tion of  fuller  spiritual  knowledge  to  enable  men  to 
detect  the  spiritual  errors  which  had  been  left  uncor- 
rected in  the  earlier  Scriptures,  so  it  has  taken  modern 
scientific  discovery  to  compel  men  fully  to  realize  that 
the  Bible  was  not  inspired  for  the  purpose  of  affording 
accurate  scientific  information  as  to  the  natural  order. 

1  Cf.  p.  141,  below. 


122  THEOLOGICAL   IMPLICATIONS 

.    Wherein  lies  the  infallibility  of  the  Word  of  God? 
JSurely  in  its  being  suited  in  each  stage  of  its  produc- 
[tion  for  correctly  fulfilling  the  purpose  of  its  inspira- 
/  tion.     An  infallible  marksman  is  called  infallible  by 
reason  of  his  accurate  shooting,  but  this  infallibility 
does  not  of  itself  make  him  a  trustworthy  authority 
in  Zoology.     Nor  is  the  spiritual  value  of  a  sermon  or 
book  necessarily  reduced  by  subsequent  discovery  that 
its  narratives  and  illustrative  descriptions  are  scien- 
Itifically   inaccurate.     The   Bible   is   infallible   for   its 
'inspired  purpose;  but  if  we  insist  upon  connecting  it 
with  other  purposes,  the  error  lies  rather  with  our- 
selves than  with  the  Bible,  properly  employed. 

The  evolutionary  theory  does  not  permit  us  to  sup- 
pose that  man  is  of  such  recent  origin  as  the  narratives 
of  Genesis  seem  to  imply;  and  the  evolutionary  order 
of  the  origin  of  species  differs  from  the  biblical  order. 
These  and  other  deviations  of  the  narratives  of  Genesis 
from  the  accepted  results  of  scientific  investigation 
have  to  be  acknowledged,  if  we  obey  the  requirements 
of  modern  intelligence.  And  why  should  we  fear  to 
obey  them?  The  narratives  which  are  found  to  be 
unsuited  for  certain  non-biblical  purposes  do  not,  for 
this  reason,  cease  to  be  divinely  chosen  vehicles  of 
eternal  truth,  and  unassailable  when  thus  regarded. 
Their  scientific  limitations  are  as  useful  to  modern 
biblical  readers  as  they  were  necessary  when  the  nar- 
ratives in  question  were  first  published  in  Israel. 
This  is  so  because,  apart  from  just  such  an  exhibition 
of  the  general  ideas  of  ancient  peoples,  we  should  be 


MAN'S    PRIMITIVE    STATE  123 

unable  rightly  to  understand  and  interpret  the  inade- 
quacies of  Old  Testament  spiritual  teaching.  The 
context  and  the  text  —  I  mean  the  human  narratives 
and  the  divine  teaching  —  may  not  be  separated.  All 
is  inspired;  but  these  two  elements,  and  their  respec- 
tive relations  to  the  purpose  of  inspiration,  must  be 
distinguished,  if  we  would  understand  either  the  Holy 
Scripture  itself  or  the  real  bearing  of  modern  scientific 
criticism  upon  the  limits  of  its  authority. 

II 

We  have  come  to  the  subject  which  will  consume 
our  attention  during  the  remainder  of  this  course  of 
lectures — the  bearing  of  the  evolutionary  hypothesis  on 
the  catholic  doctrine  of  man's  primitive  state  and  fall. 
The  rest  of  this  lecture  will  be  devoted  to  a  descrip- 
tion of  the  contents  and  evidence  of  its  two  main 
particulars  —  {a)  the  primitive  state^_and  ih)  the  faU. 

In  ascertaining  cathoUc  doctrine  the  rule  of  faith 
has  to  be  observed.^  Stated  briefly,  this  rule  is  that 
we  ought  to  believe  what  is  taught  and  defined  by  the 
Church,  and  confirmed  and  illustrated  by  the  Scrip- 
tures. Such  a  rule  requires  us  to  assume,  and  many 
centuries  of  spiritual  investigation  confirm  the  assump- 
tion, that  the  inspired  teachings  of  Holy  Scripture  and 
the  ecumenical  doctrines  of  the  Spirit-guided  Catholic 
Church  are  in  accord.  But  this  harmony  does  not 
always  appear  on  the  immediate  surface.     The  details 

1  On  the  rule  of  faith  see  the  author's  Authority,  Eccles.  and  Bib- 
lical, ch.  viii. 


124  THEOLOGICAL   IMPLICATIONS 

of  exegesis  by  which  ecclesiastical  writers  seek  to  es- 
tablish catholic  doctrine  may  often  be  mistaken,  and 
the  detection  of  such  errors  is  apt  to  shake  men's 
confidence  in  the  doctrines  which  are  thus  erroneously 
defended.  The  Spirit  which  guides  the  Church  into 
the  fundamental  truths  of  divine  revelation  at  large 
obviously  has  not  endowed  her  writers  with  exegetical 
infallibiHty.  Yet  the  mind  of  the  Church  is  an  author- 
itative indication  of  the  mind  of  the  Spirit  who  inspired 
the  Scriptures;  and  the  prevaihng  might  of  truth  guar- 
antees that  in  the  long  run  scriptural  exegesis  will 
vindicate  ecumenical  ecclesiastical  teaching.  But  we 
shall  not  be  enabled  to  see  this  until  we  reahze  that 
the  mind  of  the  Spirit  in  Holy  Scripture  is  to  be  ascer- 
tained by  general  induction  from  the  varied  phenom- 
ena of  the  centuries  of  progress  in  revelation  which  the 
Bible  records,  rather  than  from  an  exclusive  consider- 
ation, however  careful  it  may  be,  of  detached  "proof- 
texts."  Revealed  doctrines  are  rarely  given  full  or 
systematic  definition  in  single  passages  of  Scripture, 
and  biblical  teaching  must  be  investigated  in  its 
organic  continuity,  if  it  is  to  be  studied  successfully.^ 
A  parallel  principle  is  to  be  observed  in  discovering 
the  mind  of  the  Church.  That  mind  is  indeed  Spirit- 
guided;  and,  in  its  ecumenical  aspects,  has  a  finality 
which  no  other  authority  in  this  world  can  claim.  But 
it  may  easily  be  misunderstood  and  misrepresented  by 
school  theology  and  by  provincial  bodies.  It  is  for 
this  reason  that,  while  the  ecclesiastical  authority  of 

*  I  return  to  this.      See  pp.  139,  140,  below. 


MAN'S    PRIMITIVE    STATE  125 

provincial  formularies  is  very  real,  so  far  as  the  dis- 
cipline of  particular  portions  of  the  Church  is  con- 
cerned, we  need  to  verify  the  catholicity  of  provincial 
doctrine  if  we  would  remove  all  doubt  as  to  its  correctly 
representing  the  mind  of  the  universal  Church.  This 
is,  of  course,  a  task  for  theologians  rather  than  for 
untrained  behevers,  who  must  necessarily  assume  that 
the  provincial  teaching  which  they  receive  is  substan- 
tially sound  and  cathohc,  unless  they  abandon  them- 
selves to  the  confusion  of  unintelhgent  individualism. 
The  method  by  which  theologians  verify  the  cathoHcity 
of  provincial  teaching  is  formulated  in  the  well-known 
Vincentian  rule,  quod  ubique,  quod  semper,  quod  ah 
,omnibus.  This  means  that  the  presumptive  catholicity 
of  local  doctrine  is  estabhshed  when  it  is  sufficiently 
shown  to  be  held  by  all  existing  cathohc  churches, 
to  have  been  held  from  primitive  days,  and  by  the 
generality  of  representative  cathohc  writers.  In  some 
instances  we  may  be  unable  to  apply  this  rule  with 
exhaustive  completeness.  It  is  a  rule  of  induction, 
and  the  data  for  a  universal  induction  may  be  unavail- 
able. But  we  may  be  certain  that  we  can  always 
make  a  sufficient  induction  for  safe  assurance  in  really 
vital  doctrine. 

To  reduce  what  I  have  said  to  a  brief  conclusion: 
The  catholic  doctrines  of  man's  primitive  state  and 
fall  with  which  we  are  concerned  contain  such  truths, 
and  such  only,  as  are  expressly  or  imphedly  contained 
in  the  teaching  of  every  part  of  the  Catholic  Church 
from  the  beginning,  and  have  commanded  the  general 


126  THEOLOGICAL   IMPLICATIONS 

support  of  catholic  doctors  both  East  and  West;  — 
these  truths  depending  for  their  confirmation  and  more 
adequate  understanding  upon  their  inductive  verifica- 
tion by  the  manifold  data  which  become  available 
when  all  the  Sacred  Scriptures  are  searched  and  dis- 
criminatingly compared. 

The  time  which  I  can  give  in  these  lectures  to  estab- 
lishing the  catholicity  and  scripturalness  of  the  doc- 
trines which  I  am  seeking  to  test  by  the  evolutionary 
theory  is  necessarily  very  brief.  But  I  trust  that  what 
I  have  said  will  make  it  clear  to  you  that  what  I  am 
concerned  to  defend  is  not  a  new  and  emasculated 
theology,  developed  in  order  to  meet  modern  difficul- 
ties, but  is  what  I  have  by  proper  methods  convinced 
myself  to  be  the  ancient  teaching  of  the  Church  and 
of  Holy  Scripture. 

The  acknowledgment  that  the  present  moral  state 
and  conduct  of  mankind  is  not  what  it  ought  to  be, 
that  no  man  is  able  perfectly  to  conform  his  conduct 
to  the  standard  which  conscience  and  his  sense  of 
responsibihty  places  before  him,  and  that  this  universal 
moral  Hmitation  is  inherited,  is  not  peculiar  to  Chris- 
tian believers,  but  is  very  general  among  those  who 
seriously  concern  themselves  with  moral  problems. 
What  is  distinctive  in  later  Jewish  and  in  Christian 
thought  is  the  behef  that  man  was  originally  free  from 
sin  and  from  the  power  of  sinful  inchnations;  and  that 
his  present  weakness  is  due  to  an  unnecessary  and 
wilful  violation  of  righteousness  by  his  first  human 
parents.     Distinctive   though   this   doctrine   be,    it   is 


MAN'S    PRIMITIVE    STATE  127 

still  held  by  all  who  can  seriously  be  regarded  as 
seeking  to  be  loyal  to  apostohc  doctrine,  whether  they 
are  Catholics  or  Protestants.  This  commonly  received 
doctrine  has,  however,  undergone  development;  and 
certain  accretions,  some  of  them  dating  back  at  least 
to  the  close  of  the  fourth  century,  have  divided  the 
schools  and,  in  the  Calvinistic  system  at  least,  have 
given  the  doctrine  of  man's  primitive  state  and  fall 
a  scholastic  form  which  makes  it  appear  to  the  modern 
mind  and  conscience  peculiarly  repellent  and  incredible. 
Certain  elements  of  Calvinistic  theology  on  this  subject 
can  be  found  in  St.  Augustine's  writings,  and  have 
been  retained  by  particular  catholic  schools  of  later 
centuries.  But  the  fact  that  such  views  are  very 
generally  described  as  Augustinian  bears  witness  that 
they  do  not  inhere  in  catholic  doctrine,  but  are  pro- 
vincial. In  brief,  we  do  not  have  to  maintain  the  dis- 
tinctive elements  of  Augustinianism  in  order  to  retain 
our  hold  upon  catholic  doctrine.  It  is  indispensable 
to  the  purpose  of  these  lectures  that  this  should  be 
borne  in  mind. 

We  are  concerned  with  two  doctrines:  that  of  man's 
primitive  state,  and  that  of  his  fall  and  its  conse- 
quences to  our  race.  Let  me  now  expound  more  par- 
ticularly the  catholic  belief  concerning  man's  primitive 
state.^     The   mind    of   the  Anglican   communion,   so 

1  On  man's  primitive  state,  see  Bishop  Bull,  Discourses,  v;  J.  B. 
Mozley,  Predestination  (8vo  edition),  pp.  90-97,  1 09-1 12,  in  chh. 
iii,  iv.;  Moehler,  Symbolism,  Bk.  I.  §§  i-iii.;  Wilhelm  and  Scannell, 
Manual  of  Cath.  Theol.,  Pt.  II.  ch.  iii;  St.  Thomas,  Summa  TheoL,  I. 
xciii-cii;  A.  P.  Forbes,  XXXIX  Arts.,  ix. 


128  THEOLOGICAL   IMPLICATIONS 

far  as  it  has  been  officially  expressed,  is  to  be  dis- 
covered in  the  Book  of  Common  Prayer  and  in  the 
Articles  of  Religion.  We  shall  not  find  in  these  docu- 
ments any  full  or  separate  description  of  man's  original 
condition;  but  when  it  is  declared  in  the  ninth  Article 
that  ''man  is  far  gone  from  original  righteousness," 
there  is  a  clear  implication  that  righteousness  was 
included  in  that  condition;  and  the  undeveloped  nature 
of  original  righteousness  is  indicated  when,  in  the 
opening  words  of  the  Marriage  Office,  Holy  Matri- 
mony is  said  to  have  been  instituted  "in  the  time  of 
man's  innocency."  For  any  further  knowledge  of 
Anglican  teaching  as  to  man's  primitive  state  we  must 
study  those  authors  who  appear  to  be  in  most  complete 
accord  with  Anglican  doctrine  at  large.  In  such  study 
we  must  remember  that  the  American  Church  declares 
herself  to  be  "far  from  intending  to  depart  from  the 
Church  of  England  in  any  essential  point  of  doctrine;"  ^ 
and  therefore,  as  is  also  implied  in  one  of  the  prayers 
at  the  close  of  the  Office  for  Visitation  of  the  Sick, 
seeks  to  adhere  to  "the  communion  of  the  Catholic 
Church;"  and  to  include  in  her  necessary  doctrine,  as 
required  by  the  canon  adopted  by  Convocation  in 
1 57 1,  what  "the  catholic  fathers  and  ancient  Bishops 
have  collected"  out  of  Holy  Scripture.^ 

^  Preface  of  The  Book  of  Common  Prayer. 

2  "  Imprimis  vero  videbunt,  ne  quid  unquam  doceant  pro  concione, 
quod  a  populo  religiose  teneri  et  credi  velint,  nisi  quod  consentaneum 
fit  doctrinae  Veteris  aut  Novi  Testamenti,  quodque  ex  ilia  ipsa  doc- 
trina  catholici  patres,  et  veteres  episcopi  coUegerini."  Concilia  Mag- 
nae  Brit,  et  Hibern.,  Vol.  IV.  p.  267. 


MAN'S    PRIMITIVE    STATE  129 

The  chief  Anglican  classic  on  the  subject  now  before 
us  is   Bishop   Bull's  discourse   Concerning  the   First 
Covenant,  and  the  State  of  Man  Before  the  Fall}     This 
discourse  undoubtedly  contains  speculative  and  doubt- 
ful propositions.^     But  its  main  contentions  are  inde- 
pendent of  them,  and  are  shown  to  be  both  scriptural 
and  catholic  by  sufficiently  adequate  quotations  and 
references.     The  doctrine  which   he   thus   elaborates 
and  defends  may  be  reduced  to  the  following  particu- 
lars: I.  Before  our  primitive  parents  had  sinned  they 
were  brought  into  conscious  communion  with   God,/ 
and  placed  under  probation,  the  terms  of  which  were 
contained  in  a  divine  covenant.     2.  The  keeping  of 
this  covenant  was  to  insure  immortality,  but  its  viola- 1 
tion  was  to  be  punished  with  reversion  to  the  mortality' 
of  man's  natural  condition.     3.  Previously  to  their  fall, . 
our  first  parents  were  able  to  keep  their  animal  pro- 
pensities in   subjection   to   the  spirit,   and  wholly  to 
avoid  sin.     4.  The  cause  of  this  capacity  for  sinless- 
ness,  and  of  this  prospective  immunity  from  physical 

1  The  Works  of  George  Bull,  D.D.,  Lord  Bishop  of  St.  Davids, 
Collected  and  Revised  by  the  Rev.  Edward  Burton,  M.A.,  Oxford, 
1827,  Vol.  II,  Discourse  V. 

2  For  example,  his  belief,  shared  in  by  other  writers  of  his  day, 
that  Adam  possessed  a  marvellous  degree  of  intelligence.  It  is  well- 
nigh  impossible  to  find  an  adequate  treatment  of  any  doctrine  which 
does  not  incidentally  exhibit  opinions  that  are  supported  neither  by 
accurate  exegesis  nor  by  catholic  consent.  The  presence  of  such 
elements  in  a  theological  treatise  does  not  necessarily  rob  the  treatise 
of  value  in  relation  to  its  maintenance  of  catholic  doctrine.  It  is 
possible  to  distinguish  between  the  speculative  and  the  catholic  ele- 
ments, and  to  ignore  the  former. 

10 


130  THEOLOGICAL   IMPLICATIONS 

death,  was  supernatural.  Our  first  parents  were  en- 
dowed with  gifts  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  in  lack  of  which 
their  unique  privileges,  and  their  ability  to  escape  sin 
and  death,  would  have  been  non-existent. 

That  these  propositions  contain  the  cathoHc  doc- 
trine of  man's  primitive  state,  I  am  con^dnced.  This 
doctrine  contains  an  element  which  has  been  repudiated 
by  protestants;  viz.,  the  assertion  that  man's  primitive 
state  was  one  of  grace,  and  supernatural.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  does  not  contain  certain  very  precise 
views  which  have  been  popularly  confused  with  ecu- 
menical doctrine.  For  instance,  it  is  not  a  catholic 
doctrine  that  Adam  was  possessed  of  such  forms  of 
virtue  and  sanctity  as  are  acquired  by  experience  with, 
and  successful  resistance  of,  manifold  temptations. 
How  long  he  remained  sinless  we  are  not  told,  but  all 
indications  show  that  inupcence  is  the  correct  term  to 


I  describe  his  condition.  /  He  was  potentially  perfect, 
but  actualized  perfection  had  yet  to  be  acquitq^J 
Again,  it  is  not  a  catholic  doctrine  that  Adam  possessed 
a  wide  range  of  physical  and  spiritual  knowledge,  was, 
in  short,  highly  civilized.^  He  seems  rather  to  have 
been  an  undeveloped  child,  possessed  of  capacity  to 
advance,  but  with  much  to  learn.  Finally,  catholic 
doctrine  leaves  the  boundary  line  between  fact  and 
symbol  in  the  narrative  of  Genesis  undetermined.  It 
does  not  require  us  to  decide  whether  the  Garden  of 

1  Bishop  South's  terse  sentence,  "An  Aristotle  was  but  the  rubbish 
of  an  Adam,  and  Athens  but  the  rudiments  of  Paradise,"  has  been 
quoted  as  if  representing  cathoHc  consent,  which  it  certainly  does  not. 


MAN'S    PRIMITIVE   STATE  131 

Eden,  as  therein  described  in  geographical  terms,  ever 
existed;  as  to  whether  the  tree  of  life,  and  the  tree  of 
knowledge  ought  to  be  interpreted  literally;  as  to 
whether  Eve  was  really  built  up  from  one  of  Adam's 
ribs;  and  as  to  whether  the  bringing  of  animals  to 
Adam  to  be  named  by  him  is  genuine  history.  Some 
of  the  ancients  interpreted  the  whole  narrative  as 
historical,  others  as  symbolical,  and  St.  Augustine 
appears  to  have  thought  it  to  be  partly  historical  and 
partly  symbolical.  Perhaps  we  shall  not  be  far  from 
the  truth  if  we  think  —  remembering,  of  course,  that 
the  opinion  binds  no  one  —  that  the  sacred  writer 
described  man's  primitive  state  in  terms  derived  from 
fallible  tradition,  his  narrative,  none  the  less,  being 
made  by  divine  inspiration  to  exhibit  a  true  spiritual 
picture  of  the  state  from  which  mankind  has  fallen. 
Whether  this  opinion  is  correct  or  not,  we  cannot  re- 
ject the  spiritual  impKcations  of  the  narrative  without 
impugning  the  catholic  doctrine  of  biblical  inspiration.* 

1  In  reply  to  the  criticism  that  he  assumes  "that  the  doctrines 
of  the  Fall  and  Original  Sin  are  shown  to  be  invalid  by  a  critical 
examination  of  their  origin  and  growth,"  F.  R.  Tennant  says,  Origin 
of  Sin,  Pref.  to  the  2d  ed.,  p.  xvi.,  that  his  argument  "does  not  make 
'genesis  the  determinant  of  validity,'  but  it  implies  that  proven  valid- 
ity is  not  established  by  genesis  in  fiction."  It  must  be  granted  that 
proven  validity  is  not  established  by  genesis  in  mere  fiction,  but  fic- 
tion that  is  found  in  divinely  inspired  Scripture,  and  obviously  has 
didactic  meaning,  is  more  than  mere  fiction;  moreover,  the  doctrine 
of  man's  primitive  state  and  fall  has  its  genesis,  not  in  the  Eden 
narrative  considered  alone,  but  in  a  progressive  revelation, 
inductively  regarded,  of  which  that  narrative  constitutes  an  early 
stage.  It  is  in  the  light  of  redemption  that  the  story  in  Genesis  is 
perceived  to  embody  a  spiritual  description  of  man's  primitive  state 


132  THEOLOGICAL   DvIPLICATIONS 

The  story  of  Eden,  when  stripped  of  its  non-spiritual 
aspects,  certainly  retains  the  spiritual  teaching  that 
man  was  originally  placed  under  some  kind  of  pro- 
bationary covenant,  under  which  he  was  afforded  the 
opportunity  and  means  of  subjecting  his  animal  pro- 
pensities  and    of   escaping   the   consequences   of   his 
\    natural  mortality.     In  brief,  his  primitive  state  was 
\   one  of  supernatural  privileges  and  possibilities,  secured 
^  by  divine  but  conditional  guarantees?   TTiese  impli- 
cations   constitute    important    data    for    putting    the 
^  ,  catholic  doctrine  to  the  test  of  scriptural  induction. 

H  But  they  cannot  be  regarded  as  sufficient  by  them- 

selves. Certainly  they  did  not  enable  the  Israelites 
before  the  publication  of  the  Gospel  to  deduce  from 
them  the  determinate  doctrine  which  we  are  consider- 
ing.^ 

As  Dr.  J.  A.  Moehler  says  in  his  valuable  treatise 
on  Symbolism,"^  In  determining  man's  original  state, 
"we  must  especially  direct  our  view  to  the  renewal  of 
the  fallen  creature  in  Christ  Jesus;  because,  as  regen- 
eration consists  in  the  re-establishment  of  our  primeval 
condition,  .  .  .  the  insight  into  what  Christ  hath  given 

and  fall.  As  Tennant  shows,  the  Christian  doctrine  on  this  subject 
gains  no  clear  expression  prior  to  St.  Paul's  exposition  of  it;  and  St. 
Paul  wrote  in  the  light  of  Christian  redemption  and  by  divine  in- 
spiration. 

1  This  is  Tennant's  contention.     See  Sources,  pp.  90-96. 

2  Bk.  I.  §  I.  This  work  was  written  by  a  German  Roman  Cath- 
olic of  unusual  breadth  of  view.  There  exists  no  better  aid  for 
studying  the  differences  between  catholic  and  sixteenth-century 
protestant  theology  on  anthropological  subjects.  Abundant  ref- 
erences are  given. 


THE  FALL  OF  MAN  133 

us  back  affords  us  the  desired  knowledge  of  what  in 
the  origin  was  imparted  to  us."  It  is  of  course  true 
that  in  Christ  we  are  enabled  to  reach  a  higher  con- 
dition than  Adam  had  attained  before  his  advance  was 
interrupted  by  sin;  but  the  assertion  that  the  state  of 
grace,  and  its  final  results  in  relation  to  sin  and  death, 
constitute  a  restoration,  as  well  as  a  basis  of  advance 
upon  Adam's  condition,  is  borne  out  by  various  state- 
ments and  hints  in  the  New  Testament.  Inasmuch  as 
all  divine  revelation  is  of  a  piece,  the  teaching  of  the 
New  Testament  makes  clear  the  meaning  which  is 
latent  in  Old  Testament  figures;^  and  when  we  find 
that  the  catholic  doctrine  of  man's  primitive  state 
brings  into  line  Old  Testament  symbolism  and  New 
Testament  teaching,  we  become  convinced  that  such 
doctrine  exhibits  the  meaning  of  both. 

Ill 

We  now  come  to  the  doctrine  of  the  fall  of  our  first 
parents,  and  of  the  inheritance  of  certain  natural 
consequences  of  this  fall  by  their  posterity.^  This 
inheritance  of  consequences  is  the  subject-matter  of 
the  doctrine  of  original  sin.     In  order  to  emancipate 

*  St.  Augustine  says  that  "the  New  Testament  is  latent  in  the  Old, 
and  the  Old  is  patent  in  the  New."  Quaest.  in  Exod.,  73.  Cf.  the 
author's  Authority,  Eccles.  and  Biblical,  pp.  246,  247. 

^  On  the  doctrine  of  the  fall  and  original  sin,  see  A.  P.  Forbes, 
Bishop  Gibson  and  Bishop  Brown  on  the  XXXIX  Arts.,  Art.  ix.; 
Mozley,  Predestination,  pp.  33-37  and  ch.  iv;  Lees,  and  Other  Theol. 
Papers,  ix,  x.;  Moehler,  Symbolism,  Bk.  I,  ch.  ii;  A.  Moore  Essays 
Scientific  and  Phil.,  pp.  60-66. 


134  THEOLOGICAL   IMPLICATIONS 

the  beginnings  of  our  consideration  of  this  doctrine  from 
the  influence  of  a  very  common  misconception,  it  is  de- 
sirable to  notice  at  the  outset  that  the  word  "sin"  in 
i  the  phrase  "original  sin"  does  not  signify  either  actual 
*  sin  or  personal  guilt,  but  is  employed  in  a  secondary 
i  sense  to  describe  an  inherited  defect  of  nature.^ 
Our  formularies  contain  no  separate  description  of 
Adam's  fall;  but  that  he  did  fall,  and  that  he  incurred 
a  loss  of  grace  and  the  fault  and  corruption  of  nature 
with  which  his  descendants  are  said  to  be  born,  is 
made  sufficiently  clear  in  the  ninth  of  our  Articles  of 
Religion.     That   article   contains   the   chief   AngHcan 
definition  of  original  or  birth-sin.     "Original  sin,"  it 

1  Dr.  Tennnant  insists  that  the  word  sin  should  not  be  used  except 
for  acts  of  the  will,  contrary  to  the  individual's  conscience  and  his 
knowledge  of  the  moral  law  or  the  will  of  God.  Pref.  to  2d  ed.  of 
Origin  of  Sin,  pp.  xxiii-xxvii;  and  note  B,  pp.  163-176,  on  "The 
Ambiguous  Use  of  the  Term  'Sin'  and  Its  Derivatives  in  Theology." 
We  sympathize  with  his  wish  that  the  words  in  question  were  free 
from  ambiguity  in  theology,  and  that  the  secondary  use  could  be 
eliminated  from  technical  definitions  of  doctrine.  But  we  cannot 
undo  the  usage  of  ages,  and  our  efforts  should  be  directed  to  ascer- 
taining the  actual  meaning  of  the  phrase  "original  sin"  in  catholic 
doctrine.  The  meaning  which  I  have  given  is  the  only  one  that  is 
borne  out  by  catholic  consent.  If  many  writers  have  imported  more 
meaning,  such  developments  do  not  determine  the  correct  defini- 
tion of  catholic  doctrine  on  the  subject.  The  question  is  not  the  fit- 
ness of  the  terminology  that  has  been  employed,  but  the  truth  of  the 
catholic  doctrine  thereby  signified.  By  failing  to  distinguish  between 
catholic  doctrine  and  Augustinian  developments.  Dr.  Tennant  has 
robbed  his  arguments  of  much  of  their  relevance.  Arguments  which 
have  weight  as  against  Augustinian  views  may  be  —  I  think  they  are 
—  found  to  be  lacking  in  weight  when  catholic  doctrine  alone  is 
considered,  purged  of  provincial  accretions. 


THE  FALL  OF  MAN  135 

declares,  "standeth  not  in  the  following  of  Adam,  .  .  . 
but  it  is  the  fault  and  corruption  of  the  nature  of  every 
man,  that  naturally  is  engendered  of  the  offspring  of 
Adam;  whereby  man  is  very  far  gone  from  original 
righteousness,  and  is  of  his  own  nature  inclined  to 
evil,  so  that  the  flesh  lusteth  always  contrary  to  the 
spirit;  and  therefore  in  every  person  born  into  this 
world,  it  deserveth  God's  wrath  and  damnation." 
This  completes  the  main  substance  of  the  definition. 
The  rest  of  the  article  gives  supplementary  explana- 
tions of  the  effects  of  original  sin.  It  declares  that  the 
"infection  of  nature"  which  we  inherit  is  not  aboHshed 
by  baptismal  regeneration,  but  that  even  in  the  regen- 
erate the  lust  of  the  flesh  "is  not  subject  to  the  law  of 
God.  And  although  there  is  no  condemnation  for 
them  that  believe  and  are  baptized;  yet  the  Apostle 
doth  confess,  that  concupiscence  and  lust  hath  of  itself 
the  nature  of  sin."  In  the  tenth  article  it  is  added  that  \ 
because  of  original  sin  man  "cannot  turn  and  prepare  \ 
himself,  by  his  own  natural  strength  and  good  works,  ) 
to  faith,  and  calling  upon  God.  Wherefore  we  have 
no  power  to  do  good  works  pleasant  and  acceptable 
to  God,  without  the  grace  of  God  by  Christ  preventing 
us,  that  we  may  have  a  good  will,  and  working  with 
us,  when  we  have  that  good  will." 

So    far   as   the   main   definition   is   concerned   the 
language  which  I  have  quoted  is  clear  enough,  and 
expresses  the  consensus  of  both  catholic  and  sixteenth- 
jcentury  protestant   theologians.     Original   sin  is  the  ^ 
natural  moral  disorder  and  handicap  which  Adam's  | 


136  THEOLOGICAL    IMPLICATIONS 

sin  has  engendered  in  all  his  offspring,  by  reason  of 
which  we  are  all  inclined  to  sin  and  unable,  apart 
from  saving  grace,  to  turn  to  God  and  to  please  Him. 
It  is  not  so  easy  to  come  at  the  precise  meaning  of 
certain  incidental  phrases.  But  close  scrutiny  enables 
us  to  see  that  in  the  partly  figurative  phrase,  "in  every 
person  born  into  this  world  it  deserveth  God's  wrath 
and  damnation,"  the  word  "it"  refers  to  the  inherited 
defect  of  nature.  This  is  what  is  said  to  displease 
God.  It  is  not  said  that  new-born  infants  are  treated 
by  God  as  personally  guilty.  That  the  tendency  to 
sin  is  not  abolished  at  once  by  baptismal  regeneration 
is  a  fact  which  universal  Christian  experience  confirms. 
Catholic  doctrine  teaches  that  the  effect  of  Baptism 
is  to  impart  the  grace  of  Christ,  the  operation  of  which 
is  sanctifying  but  gradual,  and  dependent  upon  moral 
conditions  of  hfelong  necessity.  God  receives  the 
regenerate  into  His  favour  because  they  are  in  a  state 
which,  if  persevered  in,  will  finally  remove  lust  and 
concupiscence  and  bring  their  sins  to  an  end.  Con- 
cupiscence and  lust  are  said  to  have  the  nature  of  sin 
simply  because  their  power  in  us  is  caused  by  Adam's 
sin,  and  is  a  cause  of  our  sin.  As  the  Council  of  Trent 
expressed  it,  the  inherited  evil  propensity  of  our  nature 
is  called  sin  because  "it  comes  from  sin  and  inclines 
♦to  sin."  ^  Much  confusing  controversy  has  occurred 
in  relation  to  good  works.     But  so  far  as  the  meaning 

'  "Sancta  Synodus  declarat,  Ecclesiam  Catholicam  nunquam  intel- 
lexisse  peccatum  appellari,  quod  vere  et  proprie  in  renatis  peccatum  sit, 
scd  quia  ex  peccato  est,  et  ad  peccatum  inclinat."     Trid.  Sess.,  V.  §  5. 


THE  FALL  OF  MAN  137 

of  the  tenth  article  is  concerned,  we  need  only  to 
remember  that  the  good  works  referred  to  are  such  as 
pertain  to  everlasting  life.  These  are  made  possible 
for  us  only  by  the  grace  of  Christ,  and  without  them 
we  do  not  fulfil  the  chief  end  for  which  we  are 
made.  That  the  unregenerate  do  works  which  in  their 
motives  and  immediate  results  are  good,  need  not  be 
thought  to  be  denied.  But  these  works  are  defective 
in  being  dissociated  from  the  chief  purpose  and  the 
supernatural  destiny  for  which  God  created  us. 

Such  I  take  to  be  the  teaching  of  our  articles  on 
man's  fall  and  on  original  sin.  It  is  impossible  here 
to  argue  at  length  for  the  correctness  of  my  interpreta- 
tion. The  point  to  be  insisted  on  is  that  our  articles 
omit  certain  very  explicit  and  objectionable  specula- 
tive corollaries  of  the  doctrine  of  the  fall  which  are 
found  in  other  sixteenth-century  documents  ^  and  in 
many  modern  treatises.^  It  is  also  to  be  maintained 
that  what  these  articles  positively  and  unmistakably 
assert  and  define  agrees  with  the  catholic  doctrine 
on  the  subject.  This  doctrine  is  found  in  a  wide 
range  of  patristic  literature,  both  East  and  West  ;^  is 
imbedded  in  the  elaborate  and  partly  speculative 
theology  of  St.  Augustine  and  his  mediaeval  successors;  * 

^  Some  of  them  are  collected  by  Dr.  Tennant,  Origin  of  Sin,  note  A. 

2  Especially  of  the  "evangelical"  type. 

3  Patristic  teaching  is  given  by  J.  B.  Mozley,  Predestination,  ch. 
iv;  and  by  F.  R.  Tennant,  Sources,  chh.  xii,  xiii. 

4  St.  Augustine's  position  is  best  expounded  by  J.  B.  Mozley, 
Predestination;  and  W.  Bright,  Lessons  from  the  Lives  of  Three  Great 
Fathers,  pp.  157-180;  Age  of  the  Fathers,  Vol.  II.,  chh.  xxxiii,  xxxiv. 


138  THEOLOGICAL   IMPLICATIONS 

is  found  even  in  protestant  formularies,  although  there 
obscured  and  practically  caricatured  by  emphasis  upon 
superadded  and  uncatholic  propositions. 

It  is  not  catholic  doctrine  that  fallen  man  is  totally 
depraved,  so  as  to  possess  no  good  in  him  and  no  real 
freedom,  and  that  the  virtues  of  the  unregenerate  are 
splendid  vices.  The  Catholic  Church  does  not  teach 
that  original  sin  is  sin  in  the  literal  sense  of  that  word, 
as  if  the  distinction  between  original  and  actual  had 
no  meaning;  or  that  the  personal  guilt  of  Adam  is  im- 
puted to  his  offspring  by  God  —  previously  to  their 
having  committed  sins  of  their  own;  or  that  God  con- 
signs to  everlasting  punishment  all  who  die  unregen- 
erate, including  unbaptized  infants.  The  five  points 
of  Calvinism,  in  particular  absolute  predestination  of 
certain  to  glory  and  of  the  rest  to  damnation  irre- 
spectively of  foreknowledge  of  their  deservings,  and 
irresistible  grace  —  are  not  catholic  doctrines,  and 
ought  not  to  be  allowed  to  complicate  the  doctrine  of 
the  fall.  The  Church's  dogmatic  teaching  is  confined 
to  what  is  revealed;  and  God  has  not  seen  fit  to  reveal 
more  of  the  consequences  of  the  fall  than  concern 
the  actual  recipients  of  that  revelation  in  working  out 
their  own  salvation.  What  is  revealed  suggests  many 
questions,  and  when  we  are  more  anxious  to  solve 
problems  than  to  assimilate  what  is  revealed  for  our 
salvation,   the   insolubility   of   these   questions   causes 

Cf.  also  J.  F.  Bethune-Baker,  Early  Hist,  of  Christ.  Doctrine,  ch. 
xvii;  and  Hagenbach.  The  position  of  St.  Thomas,  Summa  Theol., 
I.  xciii-cii.,  best  represents  the  mediaeval  period. 


THE  FALL  OF  MAN  139 

difficulties  of  faith.  The  Church  does  not  pretend 
to  solve  such  problems.  She  teaches  what  she  has 
been  taught  by  the  Spirit  of  truth,  and  her  teaching 
on  the  subject  of  man's  fall  cannot  be  shown  to  include 
more  than  the  following  particulars:  i.  Our  first 
parents  by  sin  lost  the  supernatural  state  in  which 
they  had  been  di\dnely  established,  and  its  advan- 
tages; 2.  As  a  result,  their  animal  propensities  gained 
the  upper  hand,  sinful  inclinations  ruled,  divine  favour 
was  forfeited,  and  by  way  of  punishment  they  were 
made  to  revert  to  their  natural  liability  to  physical 
death;  3.  The  supernatural  advantages  which  they 
had  lost  could  not  be  transmitted  to  their  offspring. 
We  have  therefore  inherited  from  them  the  natural 
tendencies  which  are  described  by  the  terms  con- 
cupiscence and  lust,  and  cannot,  except  by  the  saving 
grace  of  Christ,  subject  the  flesh  to  the  spirit  so  as  to 
fulfil  the  supernatural  end  for  which  our  race  was 
created.  Such  in  substance  is  the  catholic  doctrine 
of  the  fall  —  the  doctrine  on  that  subject  with  which 
these  lectures  are  properly  concerned. 

This  doctrine  has  often  been  based  by  theological 
writers  upon  separate  proof-texts;  and  these  texts  have 
had  more  meaning  read  into  them,  and  more  independ- 
ent proving  value  attributed  to  them,  than  exact  and 
critical  exegesis  warrants.  The  impression  has  natu- 
rally gained  ground,  even  among  intelligent  writers, 
that  the  doctrines  in  question  cannot  be  verified  by 
the  Scriptures.  I  believe  that  the  difficulty  is  due  to 
the  exclusive  attention  paid  to  the  proof-text  method. 


I40  THEOLOGICAL   IMPLICATIONS 

The  Bible  was  not  written  under  circumstances,  or  for 
purposes,  which  permit  it  to  be  treated  successfully  in 
that  manner.  It  contains  many  data  by  which  catholic 
doctrines  can  be  illustrated  and  confirmed;  but,  as  I 
have  already  said  in  another  connection,  their  value 
for  proving  purposes  depends  to  a  large  extent  upon 
inductive  treatment  —  that  is,  upon  treating  them  as 
phenomena  which,  in  their  totahty  and  in  their  mutual 
and  historical  connections,  can  best  be  explained  by 
the  hypotheses  which  are  afforded  by  cathohc  doctrine/ 
The  data  in  Scripture  which  are  most  reasonably 
explained  by  the  catholic  doctrine  of  the  fall  may  be 
arranged  in  four  groups:  (a)  the  spiritual  impHcations 
of  the  Eden  narrative;  (b)  the  gradual  revelation  dur- 
ing Old  Testament  times  of  the  several  ideas  which  are 
contained  in  the  doctrine  in  question;  (c)  the  impH- 
cations of  New  Testament  teaching  concerning  the 
effects  of  redemption  and  baptismal  grace;  (d)  the 
inspired  teachings  of  St.  Paul  as  to  the  first  and  second 
Adam.  In  considering  these  data  the  cathohc  doc- 
trine of  bibhcal  inspiration  requires  us  to  assume  that 
the  spiritual  teachings  of  the  Scriptures,  although  very 
unequal  in  maturity  and  definitencss  of  expression, 

1  See  pp.  123,  124,  above.  Cf.  the  author's  Authority,  Eccles.  and 
Biblical,  ch.  vii.  §  9. 

The  appearance  of  strength  in  Dr.  Tennant's  attack  upon  the 
biblical  argument  for  the  doctrine  of  original  sin  is  chiefly  due  to 
his  giving  a  negative  turn  to  the  proof-text  method.  He  rests  his 
case  in  this  direction  upon  what  the  proof-texts  do  not  prove,  that 
is,  when  separately  considered.  He  ought  to  have  reckoned  with  the 
contention  that  catholic  doctrine  affords  an  explanation  of  all  the 
relevant  phenomena  of  revelation,  inductively  considered. 


THE  FALL  OF  MAN  141 

proceed  from  one  divine  mind;  and,  when  correctly 
generalized,  cohere  together  in  an  intelligible  and  sig- 
nificant unity. 

(a)  Remembering  that  the  Eden  narrative  cannot 
be  regarded  as  demonstrably  historical  in  its  details, 
we  ought  not  to  rest  any  argument  upon  the  assump- 
tion that  it  must  be  interpreted  as  history  in  the  strict 
sense  of  that  word.  If,  however,  we  believe  in  its 
inspiration,  we  must  assume  that,  whether  derived, 
humanly  speaking,  from  exact  knowledge  of  facts, 
or  from  inaccurate  traditions,  or  from  pious  fancy, 
or  even  from  mythical  material,  the  narrative  referred 
to  is  an  authoritative  medium  of  divine  teaching,  so 
that  its  spiritual  implications  constitute  trustworthy 
data  for  our  purpose.^  I  believe  it  to  be  clear  that  the 
narrative  implies  the  non-necessity  of  man's  first  trans- 
gression, its  conscious  wilfulness,  and  its  being  followed 
by  loss  of  certain  spiritual  and  supernatural  advantages 
previously  enjoyed  — including  communion  with  God, 
and  divine  favour,  immunity  from  shame  and  sorrow, 
and  the  possibility  of  physical  immortality.  The  nar- 
rative nowhere  indicates  the  effect  of  this  disaster  upon 
posterity.  But  the  subsequent  chapters  of  Genesis 
seem  to  be  intended  to  exhibit  man's  moral  degradation 
as  connected  with  his  being  left  to  battle  unaided  with 
the  natural  imaginations  and  impulses  of  his  heart. 
He  is  described,  in  brief,  as  fallen  from  the  original 
spiritual  state  of  his  first  parents.     The  inference  that 

1  On  the  infallibility  of  Scripture  and  its  relation  to  the  historical 
value  of  biblical  narratives,  see  pp.  11 9-1 23,  above. 


/t^ 


142  THEOLOGICAL   IMPLICATIONS 

his  degradation  is  somehow  connected  with  Adam's 
sin,  if  not  capable  of  demonstration,  is  at  least  natu- 
rally made,  and  cannot  be  shown  to  be  inconsistent 
with  the  sequence  of  ideas  in  Genesis. 
.  (b)  The  Old  Testament  at  large  indicates  that  the 

Israelites  were  slow  in  attaining  definite  conceptions 
of  sin;  and  at  no  time  prior  to  the  publication  of  the 
Gospel  were  they  able  to  combine  their  conceptions 
into  coherent  doctrine.^  But  the  Old  Testament  also 
shows  that  their  growth  in  the  knowledge  of  sin  was 
divinely  guided;  and  the  positive  ideas  which  they 
acquired  are  either  contained  in,  or  harmonize  with, 
the  fuller,  clearer,  and  more  coherent  teaching  of 
Christian  doctrine.  The  elements  of  Christian  teach- 
ing which  are  wanting  in  the  Old  Testament  are  just 
those  particulars  which  could  not  be  understood  prior 
to  the  revelation  of  Jesus  Christ,  and  the  fulfilment  of 
His  redemptive  work  on  earth.^  The  particulars 
which  do  emerge  in  the  Old  Testament  include  the 
following:  (i)  the  universal  prevalence  of  sin  among 
men;^  (2)  the  natural  incapacity  of  men  to  avoid  sin- 
ning;^ (3)  an  association  of  this  incapacity  with  birth 

^  F.  R.  Tennant,  Sources,  ch.  iv;  Canon  Bernard,  in  Hastings, 
Die.  of  the  Bible,  s.  v.  "Sin";  A.  B.  Davidson,  Theol.  of  the  Old 
Test.,  ch.  vii. 

2  What  redemption  was  to  restore  needed  to  be  learned  before  the 
blinded  spiritual  intelligence  of  fallen  man  could  acquire  a  definite 
conception  of  what  had  been  lost 

3  Cf.  Gen.  vi.  5;  viii.  21;  i  Kings  viii.  46;  Job  xxv.  4-6;  Psa.  cxxx. 
3;  cxliii.  2;  Prov.  xx.  9;  Eccles.  vii.  20. 

*  This  is  implied  in  several  of  the  passages  cited  above.  Ten- 
nant seems  to  reckon  this  as  opposed  to  the  doctrine  of  original  sin, 


THE  FALL  OF  MAN  143 

and  inborn  propensities;^  (4)  the  prevalence,  after  the 
time  of  Ezekiel  at  least,  of  the  antithetic  beliefs  in 
human  solidarity  as  to  sin,  and  in  the  exclusive  re- 
sponsibihty  of  individual  sinners  for  their  own  trans- 
gressions —  this  mysterious  antithesis  of  revealed  truths 
also  being  discoverable  in  Christian  doctrine.^ 

(c)  Behevers  in  plenary  inspiration,  whatever  their 
theory  of  its  method  may  be,  have  to  assume  that 
bibhcal  doctrines  harmonize  with  each  other.  Accord-  I 
ingly,  when  the  New  Testament  is  found  to  teach 
clearly  the  need  for  all  the  race  of  redemption  from  sin, 
and  the  necessity  that  all  who  are  born  of  the  flesh 
should  be  re-born  of  the  Spirit,  the  inference  is  inevi- 
table that  our  individual  sins  do  not  constitute  the  sole 
basis  of  our  need  of  redemption.  We  are  led,  there- 
fore, to  emphasize  the  spiritual  implications  of  the 
Eden  narrative,  and  the  teaching  of  the  Old  Testament 

Sources,  pp.  102,  103.  It  certainly  is  not  contrary  to  the  catholic 
doctrine  which  treats  the  fall  as  a  loss  of  grace  and  reversion  to 
unassisted  natural  weakness.  ^  Psa.  li.  5;  Job.  xv.  14,  15. 

2  See  Tennant,  op.  cit.,  pp.  97-105.  On  human  solidarity,  and 
the  solidarity  of  families  and  tribes  in  sin,  cf.  Gen.  ix.  25;  xx.  9; 
Exod.  XX.  5;  xxxiv.  7;  Deut.  v.  9;  2  Sam.  iii.  29;  xxi.  5  et  seq.;  i  Kings 
ii.  ^y,  Isa.  vii.  17;  Jerem.  xiv.  20;  xv.  4;  xxii.  28-30;  xxvi.  15;  xxxii. 
18;  Lam.  V.  4;  Hos.  i.  4.  The  frequency  with  which  the  principle  of 
inherited  liability  for  the  sins  of  previous  generations  is  set  forth  is 
noticeable.  On  the  counter  truth  that  each  soul  is  responsible  for 
its  own  sins,  and  for  those  only,  see  Jerem.  xxxi.  29,  30;  Ezek.  xviii. 
Catholic  doctrine  leaves  place  for  both  of  these  truths,  teaching 
inherited  consequences  of  Adam's  sin,  but  limiting  personal  guilt  to 
those  who  commit  actual  sin.  Cf.  pp.  147,  148,  below,  on  the  readi- 
ness of  ancient  writers  to  emphasize  either  of  these  doctrines,  as  occa- 
sion seemed  to  demand. 


144  THEOLOGICAL   IMPLICATIONS 

as  to  the  solidarity  of  mankind  in  relation  to  sin;  and  we 
find  in  them  incipient  revelations  of  the  Christian 
doctrine  of  original  sin. 

(d)  St.  Paul's  teaching  on  this  subject  appears  most 
prominently,  although  not  exclusively,  in  the  fifth 
chapter  of  his  Epistle  to  the  Romans;^  but  he  nowhere 
attempts  to  give  a  complete  or  formal  definition  of 
revealed  doctrine.  Such  a  definition  cannot  be  found 
in  any  part  of  Scripture.  His  attention  is  given  espe- 
cially to  the  parallel  existing  between  our  relations  to 
the  first  and  to  the  second  Adam.  His  language  shows 
traces  of  his  having  assimilated  Rabbinic  ideas.  For 
a  believer  in  St.  Paul's  inspiration  this  fact  does  not 
deprive  his  teaching  of  authority,  but  affords  one  of 
many  instances  of  the  Holy  Spirit's  method  in  appro- 
priating and  improving  existing  forms  of  thought  and 
language  for  the  revelation  of  divine  truth.^     St.  Paul's 

1  Esp.  ch.  V.  12  et  seq.  This  passage  does  not  stand  by  itself, 
however,  as  seems  to  be  thought  by  modern  writers.  It  follows  logi- 
cally upon  the  previous  chapters,  giving  a  Christian  explanation  of 
the  universal  prevalence  of  sin  which  he  has  been  emphasizing;  and 
it  is  followed  by  an  analysis  of  the  struggle  between  the  inherited 
carnal  propensities  of  our  nature  and  the  higher  law  of  the  regener- 
ate Christian  mind. 

2  Rabbinic  forms  of  thought,  defective  though  they  were,  consti- 
tuted factors  in  the  mental  preparation  of  Israel  for  Christ.  St. 
Paul's  newly  acquired  Christian  standpoint  enabled  him  to  supply 
what  was  needed,  and  it  is  his  Christian  use  of  these  forms  of  thought 
—  based  upon  the  personal  claim  and  redemptive  work  of  the  sec- 
ond Adam  —  that  determines  their  meaning  in  his  treatment  of  the 
doctrine  of  sin.  He  was  an  inspired  prophet  who  transcended  his 
Jewish  training,  and  had  been  emancipated  from  Rabbinic  limita- 
tions.    Dr.   Tennant's  refusal  to  allow  for  his  inspiration  reduces 


THE  FALL  OF  MAN  145 

message  serves  to  complete  the  biblical  data  by  which 
the  catholic  doctrine  can  be  illustrated  and  confirmed. 
He  clearly  teaches  that  Adam's  sin  is  the  cause  of  our 
sinfulness,  although  sin  is  not  imputed  to  us  until 
we  ourselves  transgress  the  divine  law;  and  that  mor- 
tality is  an  inheritance  from  Adam,  and  an  effect  of 
his  sin.  He  uses  the  word  sin  to  describe  the  effect  of 
Adam's  sin  upon  us,  but  this  use  of  the  word  is  plainly 
secondary,  for  if  he  had  meant  that  we  inherit  sin  in 
the  literal  sense  of  that  term,  he  would  not  have  denied 
its  imputation  to  men  prior  to  their  knowledge  of  the 
law  and  their  disobedience.^  If  his  language  in  the 
Epistle  to  the  Ephesians,  describing  the  unregenerate 
as  "by  nature  children  of  wrath,"  is  to  be  understood 
as  referring  to  the  effect  of  Adam's  sin  upon  his  pos- 
terity, it  affords  another  instance  of  the  same  symboli- 
cal use  of  language.^ 

the  value  of  his  own  treatment  of  St.  Paul's  teaching.  Sources, 
ch.  xi. 

^  Sanday  and  Headlam,  in  their  commentary  on  this  Epistle, 
p.  147,  say,  "He  uses  the  only  kind  of  language  available  to  his  own 
intelligence  and  that  of  his  contemporaries.  But  if  the  language 
which  he  uses  is  from  that  point  of  view  abundantly  justified,  then 
the  application  which  St.  Paul  makes  of  it  is  equally  justified.  He, 
too,  expresses  truth  through  symbols,  and  in  the  days  when  men  can 
dispense  with  symbols  his  teaching  may  be  obsolete,  but  not  before." 
This  applies  to  his  implied  dependence  upon  the  Eden  narrative,  the 
value  of  which  does  not  depend  upon  its  all-round  historical  validity. 

2  Ephes.  ii.  3.  It  has  been  taken  to  mean  no  more  than  that  men 
are  by  nature  unable  wholly  to  avoid  sin.  Other  interpretations 
are  also  advanced.  See  Tennant,  Sources,  p.  271;  Origin  of  Sin, 
pp.  227,  228;  and  T.  K.  Abbott  and  J.  A.  Robinson,  in  loc.  The 
teaching  of  i  Cor.  xv.  45-50  should  not  be  overlooked. 
II 


146  THEOLOGICAL   IMPLICATIONS 

No  doubt  it  was  reverence  for  Holy  Scripture  that 
led  St.  Augustine  to  appropriate  St.  Paul's  terminology 
in  technically  defining  the  effect  of  Adam's  fall  upon 
mankind;  and  the  phrase  ''original  sin"  derives  its 
theological  currency  from  him.  But  in  giving  tech- 
nical force  to  terms  which  St.  Paul  employed  sym- 
bolically and  with  untechnical  freedom,  St.  Augustine 
gave  birth  to  one-sided  views  and  to  an  interpretation 
of  St.  Paul  which  has  given  an  unfortunate  twist  to 
much  later  theology.  His  one-sidedness  was  also  due 
to  reaction  from  the  Pelagian  denial  of  inherited 
spiritual  incapacity  and  of  our  dependence  for  salvation 
upon  supernatural  grace.  This  reaction  led  St. 
Augustine  to  deduce  from  the  occasional  references 
of  Holy  Scripture  to  the  mystery  of  divine  predestina- 
tion and  election  a  very  definite  doctrine  of  absolute 
predestination  and  irresistible  grace.  This  doctrine 
isolates,  exaggerates,  and  caricatures  the  biblical  teach- 
ing upon  which  it  is  based,  and  nullifies  the  Scriptural 
counter-truths  of  human  freedom  and  personal  respon- 
sibility.^ St.  Augustine  himself  and  his  catholic  suc- 
cessors were  prevented  from  drifting  into  positive 
heresy  by  their  docile  attitude  towards  the  Church 
and  by  their  belief  in  the  catholic  doctrine  of  sacra- 
mental grace.  But  the  sixteenth-century  protestants 
and  reformers,  who  broke  away  from  the  Church  and 
abandoned  her  sacramental  doctrine,  pressed  the  logic 

1  Cf.  J.  B.  Mozley,  Predestination,  chh.  v-viii.  The  results  of 
St.  Augustine's  influence  upon  scholastic  theology  are  exhibited  by 
the  same  writer,  chh.  ix,  x. 


THE  FALL  OF  MAN  147 

of  St.  Augustine's  inadequate  and  one-sided  premises 
with  thorough-going  consistency.  Thus  Calvinism 
was  born,  and  to  the  popular  identification  of  catholic 
doctrine  concerning  sin  with  Calvinism  is  largely  due 
the  modern  conviction  that  that  doctrine  is  immoral 
and  inconsistent  with  modern  scientific  knowledge. 

Before  dismissing  the  subject  of  St.  Augustine's 
influence  in  provincializing  Western  theology  as  to  sin, 
I  ought  to  call  your  attention  to  the  seeming  connection 
between  his  theory  of  irresistible  grace  and  the  later 
protestant  denial  that  man's  primitive  state  was  super- 
natural. If  divine  grace  is  really  irresistible,  the  fact 
that  Adam  fell  establishes  his  non-possession  of  it. 

The  ancient  fathers,  previously  to  the  time  of  St. 
Augustine,  were  too  much  absorbed  in  vindicating  the 
truths  connected  with  the  doctrines  of  the  Trinity  and 
of  Christ's  Person  to  undertake  the  labour  of  for- 
mulating anthropological  doctrine.  The  consequence 
was  twofold.  In  the  first  place  they  wrote  with  un- 
trammelled freedom  —  a  freedom  which  is  justifiable 
before  the  rise  of  determinate  heresies  causes  technical 
precision  of  language  to  be  necessary.  In  the  exercise 
of  this  freedom  they  asserted  baldly  and  without 
qualification  whichever  of  the  opposite  aspects  of  the 
double  mystery  of  inherited  incapacity  and  personal 
freedom  and  responsibility  that  happened  to  be  under 
consideration.^  Moreover,  historical  study  shows  that, 
in  the  East  at  least,  occasions  for  an  assertion  of  indi- 

1  See  J.  B.  Mozley,  op.  cit.,  ch.  iv,  init.  He  gives  illustrations  in 
note  XV.     Cf.  p.  143,  above. 


148  THEOLOGICAL   IMPLICATIONS 

vidual  freedom  and  responsibility  occurred  more 
frequendy  than  those  which  demanded  emphasis  upon 
man's  inherited  propensity  to  sin/  But,  in  the  second 
place,  these  partial  statements  were  not  developed  into 
theological  systems,  and  both  aspects  of  the  truth  held 
their  own  in  general  patristic  teaching.  In  particular, 
with  all  their  tendency  to  take  an  optimistic  view  of 
human  capacity,  representative  Eastern  writers  were 
as  free  to  acknowledge  and  assert  what  came  to  be 
described  as  the  doctrine  of  original  sin  as  were  their 
Western  contemporaries.^  It  was  only  by  evasion 
that  Pelagius  escaped  condemnation  when  he  appeared 
before  the  Orientals  at  Jerusalem  and  Diospolis;  and 
the  Letter  of  Pope  Zosimus,  asserting  the  catholic 
doctrine  of  original  sin  as  against  Pelagianism,  was 
signed  by  the  Eastern  as  well  as  by  the  Western  epis- 
copate.^ 

The  conclusion  of  the  matter  is  that  the  doctrine 
concerning  man's  primitive  state  and  fall  which  I  have 
endeavoured  to  define  and  to  distinguish  from  Augus- 

1  Examples  are  included  in  Tennant's  survey  of  patristic  teaching 
before  the  time  of  St.  Augustine:  Sources,  pp.  275  et  seq. 

2  Dr.  Tennant  says,  Sources,  p.  328,  "And  we  have  seen  that,  in 
spite  of  the  tendency,  natural  to  the  Eastern  mind,  to  emphasize 
individual  responsibility  and  free-will,  nevertheless  the  belief  in  the 
race's  solidarity  and  unity  with  its  first  parent,  in  the  one  hand,  and 
in  the  heredity  of  moral  taint  derived  from  fallen  Adam,  on  the  other, 
was  discoverable  in  most  of  the  Greek  Fathers  from  Origen  on- 
wards." 

3  An  account  of  these  proceedings  is  given  by  W.  Bright,  Age  of 
the  Fathers,  Vol.  II.,  pp.  182-190,  205-215.  Cf.  J.  F.  Bethune- 
Baker,  Early  Hist,  of  Christian  Doctrine,  pp.  316-320. 


THE  FALL  OF  MAN  149 

tinian  and  Calvinistic  accretions  is  both  catholic  and 
scriptural;  but  it  ceases  to  preserve  its  catholic  and 
scriptural  meaning  when  it  is  isolated  from,  and  pressed 
at  the  expense  of,  the  equally  catholic  and  scriptural 
doctrine  of  man's  individual  freedom  and  respon- 
sibility. 


LECTURE  V 

man's  primitive  state 

At  the  close  of  my  last  lecture  I  referred  to  the 
combination  in  catholic  doctrine  of  the  antithetic 
truths  of  inherited  moral  incapacity,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  of  individual  freedom  and  responsibility  on  the 
other  hand;  also  to  the  fact  that  the  one  is  to  be  held 
without  prejudice  to  the  other,  if  we  would  hold  either 
in  its  catholic  meaning.  This  illustrates  a  principle 
of  vital  importance  —  one  of  which  I  made  use  in  my 
first  lecture,^  but  which  demands  especial  emphasis 
during  the  rest  of  our  discussions.  I  shall  therefore 
make  a  few  remarks  upon  it  before  undertaking  the 
task  of  this  lecture,  which  is  to  compare  the  evolution- 
ary theory  with  the  catholic  doctrine  of  man's  prim- 
itive state. 

The  principle  referred  to  is  this:  that,  owing  to  the 
complexity  of  truth  and  the  multiplicity  of  its  aspects, 
no  single  proposition  concerning  fundamental  rela- 
tions can  be  regarded  as  capable  of  describing  ade- 
quately the  realities  with  which  it  is  concerned.  Every 
such  proposition,  whether  theological  or  physical, 
describes  a  partial  aspect  of  reality,  and  its  inadequacy 
must  be  assumed  in  maintaining  its  truth.     It  may  be 

1  See  pp.  27-33,  above. 
ISO 


INTRODUCTORY  151 

true,  and  even  final,  as  a  description  of  a  partial  aspect; 
but  it  becomes  a  caricature  of  truth,  and  false,  when 
interpreted  as  sufficient  by  itself  for  an  adequate  phil- 
osophy. The  truest  conclusions  of  induction,  whether 
in  physical  or  in  theological  science,  are  what  the  late 
J.  B.  Mozley  called  incipient  truths.^  That  is,  they 
define  a  knowledge  which  is  true  so  far  as  it  goes,  but 
which  ends  in  mystery,  and  is  therefore  true  only  when 
the  larger  mystery  is  tacitly  recognized  as  Kmiting  the 
sufficiency  of  our  conclusions.  This  is  not  to  nullify 
them,  nor  is  it  to  reduce  them  to  a  purely  subjective 
or  relative  value.  The  knowledge  which  they  define  is 
objective  knowledge,  but  it  is  partial  and  incipient.  If 
treated  otherwise,  and  used  as  the  basis  of  absolute 
systems  of  philosophy,  it  becomes  one-sided,  in  the 
invidious  sense  of  that  term,  and  misleading.  The 
best  physical  scientists  recognize  that  their  conclu- 
sions run  into  mystery,  and  that  the  mystery  which 
surrounds  the  very  fragmentary  propositions  of  nat- 
ural science  is  fully  as  great  as  that  which  envelops  the 
doctrines  of  Christianity.^ 

Now  the  unknown  is  much  more  extensive  than  the 
known.  It  is  so  extensive,  indeed,  that  we  are  often 
quite  baffled  in  our  attempts  to  harmonize  proposi- 

1  Predestination,  ch.  ii.,  init.  Cf.  the  author's  Introd.  to  Dog. 
TheoL,  pp.  170-179,  on  cathoHc  balance. 

'^  "But  beyond  the  bright  search-lights  of  science, 
Out  of  sight  of  the  windows  of  sense, 
Old  riddles  still  bid  us  defiance, 
Old  questions  of  why  and  whence." 
W.  C.  D.  Whetham,  Recent  Devel.  of  Phys.  Science,  p.  10. 


152  MAN'S    PRIMITIVE    STATE 

tions  which  are  separately  seen  to  be  true.  It  is  as  if 
we  stood  in  the  arc  of  an  infinite  circle  —  which  is  by 
definition  a  straight  line  —  and  found  ourselves,  as  we 
certainly  should,  utterly  unable  to  verify  the  fact  that 
the  lines  which  we  see  to  run  straight  away  from  each 
other  really  constitute  an  arc,  and  meet  on  the  other 
side  of  the  infinite  circle  to  which  they  pertain.  The 
fact  is  that  we  are  everywhere  confronted  by  antitheses 
of  truth.  Two  propositions,  severally  established  by 
proper  lines  of  investigation,  become  in  their  formal 
statement  apparently  opposed  to  each  other.  What 
are  we  to  do?  To  reject  either  is  to  stultify  knowl- 
edge, and  also  the  process  by  which  alone  knowledge 
can  be  acquired.  To  discover  the  larger  realm  of 
truth  in  which  their  harmony,  as  fragmentary  aspects 
of  the  whole,  can  be  explained,  exceeds  our  capacity. 
Plainly  we  ought  to  acquiesce  in  the  actual  conditions. 
We  should  confess  the  presence  of  insoluble  mystery; 
and  we  should  hold  each  established  proposition  in 
a  manner  which  leaves  us  free  to  do  justice  to  other 
propositions  which  are  equally  valid,  although  equally 
fragmentary.  This  conclusion  is  not  merely  academic, 
but  describes  a  duty.  I  say  "a  duty,"  because  these 
antithetic  propositions,  separately  inadequate,  have  to 
be  accepted  together,  if  we  are  to  avoid  one-sided  cari- 
cature and  acquire  trustworthy  knowledge;  and  our 
ideals  of  life  and  duty  depend  very  largely  upon  our 
knowledge  of  truth. 

To  apply  this  principle  theologically,  we  are  con- 
fronted on  the  one  hand  by  conclusive  evidence  that 


INTRODUCTORY  153 

we  are  free  agents,  and  individually  and  exclusively 
responsible  for  our  own  conduct.  On  the  other  hand, 
we  have  sufficient  reasons,  both  natural  and  spiritual, 
to  acknowledge  that  mysterious  laws  of  heredity,  and 
an  omnipotent  will,  are  at  work  behind  our  wills,  and 
prior  to  our  birth,  which  to  an  important  degree  deter- 
mine our  personal  characters  and  moral  dispositions. 
This  mystery  stands  over  against  the  mystery  —  and 
it  is  a  mystery  —  of  free  will  and  responsibility.  We 
need  to  realize  that  what  we  call  respectively  freedom 
and  inherited  propensity,  responsibility  and  predes- 
tination, are  incipient  truths.  Their  separate  evidence 
requires  our  acceptance  of  each  as  true.  But  their 
fragmentariness  warns  us  against  making  either  one 
absolute,  as  if  complete  by  itself. 

The  same  principle  needs  to  be  borne  in  mind  when 
we  compare  the  conclusions  —  I  mean,  of  course,  suffi- 
ciently established  conclusions  —  of  theologians  and 
physical  scientists.  Separately  examined,  they  may  be 
seen  to  be  equally  valid;  but  the  lines  of  thought 
which  they  initiate  lead  us  into  insoluble  mystery.  This 
accounts  for  the  fact  that  we  cannot  adequately  ex- 
plain the  antitheses  which  convince  one-sided  thinkers  {^' 
ithat  a  contradiction  exists  between  theological  and 
physical  doctrines.  We  need  to  perceive  that  the 
physical  and  the  superphysical  are  both  real,  and  that 
their  antitheses  are  caused  by  gaps  in  our  knowledge, 
not  by  any  discontinuity  between  the  physical  and  the 
superphysical. 

Breadth  of  view  is  generally  acknowledged  to  be 


154  MAN'S   PRIMITIVE   STATE 

important.  But  we  may  easily  forget  that  genuine 
breadth  requires  us  to  acknowledge,  and  reckon  with, 
all  established  conclusions  which  come  within  our 
intelligence.  And  if  any  two  of  them  defy  our  efforts 
adequately  to  explain  their  unity,  we  should  none  the 
less  hold  to  the  one  without  abandoning  hold  on  the 
other.^  This  is  breadth,  and  it  also  constitutes  an 
essential  qualification  of  a  catholic  temper. 

The  propositions  which  we  are  to  compare  in  this 
lecture  are  contained  in  the  theory  of  the  natural  evo- 
lution of  species  and  in  the  catholic  doctrine  of  man's 
primitive  state.  In  making  this  comparison  I  do  not 
undertake  to  expound  the  hidden  mysteries  which,  if 
we  understood  them,  would  enable  us  to  explain  the 
precise  manner  in  which  physical  evolution  and  man's 
original  state  of  grace  are  made  to  constitute  an  un- 
broken continuity  of  divine  working.  What  I  shall 
endeavour  to  show  is  that  to  accept  both  of  the  prop- 
ositions in  question  is  possible  without  either  stulti- 
fication of  mind  or  provable  violation  of  the  principle 
of  continuity  upon  which  physical  scientists  rightly 
insist. 

The  premise  upon  which  my  argument  depends  is 
that  the  physical  and  the  superphysical  are  equally 
genuine  but  distinct  factors  in  the  history  of  this  uni- 

1  Dr.  Tennant,  in  Origin  of  Sin,  pp.  18-20,  quite  fails  to  do 
justice  to  Dr.  Mozley's  argument  to  this  effect.  It  is  not  meant 
that  we  can  escape  real  contradiction  by  an  appeal  to  mystery;  but 
that  when  two  truths  are  severally  seen  to  he  established,  our  ina- 
bility to  explain  their  harmony  does  not  require  us  to  reject  one  of 
them. 


INTRODUCTORY  155 

verse,  so  that  the  knowledge  of  both  is  required  before 
we  can  dogmatize  as  to  the  fundamental  principles 
which  in  their  working  explain  the  continuity  of  things. 
This  premise,  to  which  I  shall  return  at  a  later  stage 
in  this  lecture,  is  opposed  to  the  philosophy  of  natural- 
ism, but  is  entirely  consistent  with  physical  science, 
properly  so  called.  It  is,  indeed,  frankly  accepted 
by  some  of  the  most  eminent  physical  scientists  of  our 
day. 

Before  proceeding  further,  let  me  define  side  by  side 
the  two  propositions  with  which  we  are  concerned. 
They  are  in  substance  as  follows: 

1.  Cathohc  doctrine  teaches  that  man's  primitive 
state  was  such  that  he  was  able  to  avoid  both  sin  and 
physical  death,  this  abihty  being  due  to  supernatural 
endowments  and  conditions. 

2.  Modern  biological   science   teaches   that   man's 
physical  organism  is  a  product  of  natural  evolution, 
and  that  its  specific  characters  are  determined  by  suchl 
origin.     Among  these  characters  our  purpose  requires] 
us  to  notice  brutish  impulses  and  physical  mortality. 

These  two  propositions  are  thought  by  certain  theo- 
logical writers,  as  well  as  by  many  physical  scientists, 
to  be  irreconcilable;  and  the  view  which  is  taken  by 
those  who  prefer  to  be  guided  by  biological  science 
rather  than  by  theological  doctrine  is  substantially 
as  follows:  We  can  "find  the  ground  of  the  possibiHty 
and  occasion  for  sin  in  our  natural  constitution  regarded 
as  the  perfectly  normal  result  of  a  process  of  develop- 
ment through  which  the  race  has  passed  previously  to 


/ 


L 


156  MAN'S    PRIMITIVE    STATE 

the  acquisition  of  full  moral  responsibility";  and  we 
can  "  assign  the  rise  of  evil  itself  simply  to  the  difficulty 
of  the  task  which  has  been  countered  by  every  individ- 
ual person  alike,  the  task  of  enforcing  his  inherited 
organic  nature  to  obey  a  moral  law  which  he  has  only 
gradually  been  enabled  to  discern."  I  have  stated 
this  view  in  terms  employed  by  Dr.  F.  R.  Tennant,  its 

(^most  important  champion.^  He  rejects  the  doctrine 
of  an  original  righteousness  and  primitive  state  of 
grace,  as  involving  a  breach  of  continuity  in  human 
development. 

It  is  maintained  in  these  lectures  that  scientific  in- 

/  vestigation  confirms  rather  than  disproves  the  presence 
of  superphysical  factors  in  man's  evolution,  so  that 
we  need  not  feel  constrained  to  regard  man's  prim- 
itive state  as  wholly  determined  by  the  physical  factors  ll£j} 
of  his  origin.^  And  when  the  presence  of  superphys- 
ical factors  is  once  acknowledged  it  is  perceived  that 
we  cannot  determine  their  results  by  the  data  which 
are  now  available  for  biological  investigation. 


L 


An  important  question  should  be  faced  at  this  point. 
Assuming  the  truth  of  the  evolutionary  hypothesis, 
what  docs  it  involve  and  prove  in  relation  to  our  sub- 
ject? This  question  ought  to  be  answered  with  due 
regard  for  other  accepted  postulates  and  conclusions 
of  modern  science.     In  fact,  it  may  well  be  enlarged 

^Origin  of  Sin^  p.  81.  ^  Cf.  pp.  31,  32,  108,  above. 


EVOLUTIONARY   SCIENCE  157 

in  its  scope  so  as  to  read,  What,  in  view  of  the  assumed    I 
truth  of  the  evolutionary  hypothesis,  can  modern  sci-     ' 
ence  at  large  be  rightly  said  to  prove  in  relation  to    ^ 
man's  primitive   state?     In  answering  this  question, 
it  is  unnecessary  for  me  to  "go  behind  the  returns"; 
and  I  shall  not  undertake  to  criticise  the  premises  and 
arguments  which  capable  judges  regard  as  sufficient 
to  establish  the  conclusions  to  which  I  refer.     I  shall, 
for  the  purpose  of  my  argument,  accept  them  at  their 
face   value.     On   the   other  hand,   I   shall  somewhat 
ignore  alleged  scientific  results  that  have  failed  to  secure 
general  and  unquahfied  acceptance  by  those  who  are 
competent  to  estimate  their  validity;  for  it  is  obvious 
that,  until  they  secure  such  acceptance,  they  are  rightly 
to  be  regarded  as  doubtful. 

1.  From  the  point  of  view  which  I  have  defined  we^ 
must  consider  it  to  be  estabhshed  that,  so  far  as  natural 
science  throws  light  upon  man's  origin,  primitive  man 
was  produced  by  the  natural  evolution  of  species.  To 
put  this  in  another  way,  man  owes  his  physical  nature 
to  physical  antecedents,  and  to  natural  and  inherited 
variations  of  brute-ancestors.  The  investigations  of 
natural  science  do  not  establish  the  contention  that, 
in  his  primitive  state,  man  possessed  other  and  higher 
advantages  than  could  be  afforded  by  the  natural  evo- 
lution of  species. 

2.  It  must  also  be  regarded  as  established  that  the 
only  human  conditions  wliich  can  have  been  produced 
by  such  evolution  are  such  as  are  found  in  fact  to  be 
natural  to  man.     These  conditions  include  an  inherit- 


1/ 


158  MAN'S    PRIMITIVE    STATE 

ance  of  animal  propensities  which  in  man's  brute-an- 
cestors were  morally  innocent  in  their  gratification, 
but  which  in  men  ought  to  be,  and  yet  never  are,  per- 
fectly regulated  and  restrained  by  moral  considerations 
(and  motives.     The  moral  capacity  of  mankind  is  not 
sufficiently  developed,  in  other  words,  to  enable  any 
\  man   completely   to   control  his  inherited   and   long- 
'  estabhshed  animal  instincts  and  impulses.     In  brief, 
I  the   conditions  in  man  which   his   natural  evolution 
I  appears  to  explain  are   precisely  those  which  theolo- 
/  gians  seek  to  account  for  by  the  doctrine  of  a  fall  from 
'   original  righteousness.     Moreover,   man   is  found   to 
possess  no  natural  capacity  to  escape  physical  death. 
He  is  by  nature  mortal.     If,  therefore,  our  conclu- 
sions with  regard  to  man's  primitive  state  are  to  be 
determined  exclusively  by  the  estabhshed  results  of 
natural  investigation,  —  an  important  if,  —  we  must 
surrender  behef  in  the  catholic  doctrine.     The  pos- 
sibility  remains,    of   course,   that   other   than   purely 
evolutionary  factors  had  to  do  with  man's  original!  \ 
condition;   and  their  presence  can  be  accepted  with-j 
out  stultifying  the  vahdity  of  the  scientific  conclusions'^' 
which  I  have  been  defining.  ^ 

-^      3-    A  third  result  of  scientific  investigation  can  be 
expressed    as    follows.     Broadly  speaking,  the  study ' 
of  prehistoric  remains,  of  archaeology,  of  comparative 
religion  and  of  related  departments  of  inquiry,  estab- 
lishes the  contention  that  the  moral  depravity  ^  of  human 

1  That  is,  as  estimated  by  Christian  standards  and  externally 
considered.     The  subjective  culpability  of  ancient  races  is,  of  course, 


EVOLUTIONARY   SCIENCE  159 

beings  and  the  approximation  of  their  manner  of  life 
to  that  of  their  beastly  ancestors  is  somewhat  propor- 
tionate to  their  antiquity.     In  whatever  part  of  the 
world  man's  early  state  is  investigated,  and  whatever 
race  of  men  is  considered,  this  law  of  development 
from  ancient  savagery  is  said  to  hold  good.     Seeming 
exceptions  have  been  discovered,  and  the  existing  sav- 
age races  are  thought  by  many  to  show  signs  of  degen- 
eration   from    higher   conditions    and    beliefs.     Some 
authorities  in  comparative  rehgion  think  that  evidence 
exists  of  a  primitive  monotheism;  and  many  ancient  / 
peoples  possessed  traditions  of  a  better  age.    Yet  the,' 
general  conclusion  that  the   nearer  we  come  in  our 
study  of  man's  past  to  the  time  when  he  was  evolved  t 
from  a  lower  species,  the  more  closely  do  his  habits 
resemble  those  of  his  beastly  progenitors  —  this  con- 
clusion is  too  widely  accepted  either  to  be  ignored  in  I 
our  inquiry  or  to  be  denied  with  convincing  effect  by  / 
non-experts  in  anthropological  science.     I  certainly  do 
not  class  myself  among  anthropological  experts;  and 
it  is  not  my  intention  in  this  discussion  to  combat  the 
contention  that  natural  investigation,  exclusively  con- 
sidered, appears  to  show  that  man's  moral  depravity, 
broadly  speaking,  is  proportionate  to  his  antiquity.^     \ 

to  be  estimated  from  the  point  of  view  which  these  races  were  capa- 
ble of  taking. 

1  Lest  I  be  misunderstood  at  this  point,  I  ought  to  remind  the 
reader  that  I  am  summarizing  the  prevaihng  view  of  anthropolo- 
gists. That  it  requires  some  modification,  I  believe.  But  the  argu- 
ment of  these  lectures  does  not  require  me  to  show  this,  and  I  am 
seeking  to  meet  the  modern  attack  as  far  as  possible  on  its  own  ground. 


\ 


1 60  MAN'S    PRIMITIVE    STATE 

4.  Finally,  the  doctrine  that  there  is  a  continuity  in 
the  history  of  things  which  cannot  be  broken,  and  that 
any  alleged  event  which  would  necessarily  interfere 
with  this  continuity  is  for  that  reason  incredible,  is 
too  well  estabhshed  to  be  disputed  by  any  one  who 
desires  to  be  thought  intelligent.  The  apphcation  of 
this  doctrine  to  our  inquiry  is  not  difBcult  to  perceive. 
/There  appears  to  be  a  very  obvious  continuity  between 
( the  development  and  habits  of  man's  immediate  brute- 
ancestors  and  the  subsequent  moral  development  of 
mankind.  And  .natural  investigation  brings  to  light 
no  facts  which  can  be  seriously  regarded  as  evidence 
that  this  continuity  has  been  broken  by  such  a 
primitive  state  of  our  race  as  is  described  by  cathoHc 
doctrine. 

The  conclusions  which  I  have  defined  — that  phys- 
ical evolution  accounts  for  the  origin  of  the  physical 
man;  that  the  only  characteristics  of  human  nature 
known  to  modern  science  are  those  which  man  exhibits 
in  what  theologians  call  his  fallen  state;  that  the  domi- 
nance of  animal  propensities  in  man  is  in  proportion 
to  his  antiquity;  and  that  the  habits  of  ancient  races 
seem  to  be  connected  with  those  of  his  brute-ancestors 
by  a  continuity  of  development  which  leaves  no  place 
for  such  a  primitive  state  as  is  taught  by  catholic  doc- 
trine —  these  conclusions  hang  together  and,  when 
viewed  from  a  purely  naturalistic  standpoint,  certainly 
seem  to  prove  that  the  cathoHc  doctrine  which  we 
are  considering  is  absolutely  incredible.  Even  among 
those  who  do  not  accept  pure  naturalism  the  habits 


EVOLUTIONARY   SCIENCE  i6i 

of  thought  which  modern  science  has  caused  to  prevail 
give  these  conclusions  an  impressiveness  that  is  apt 
to  be  lacking  to  the  arguments  by  which  catholic  doc- 
trine is  supported.  The  fact  is  that  theological  argu-  ^ 
ments  have  ceased  to  be  interesting.  The  success 
of  modern  science  in  laying  bare  the  secrets  of  nature, 
and  the  seeming  sufficiency  of  scientific  hypotheses, 
ha^ve  dazzled  the  modern  mind,  and  have  put  theolog- 
ical considerations  out  of  court  —  especially  when 
they  appear  to  go  counter  to  the  cosmological  and 
anthropological  theories  of  experts  in  natural  science. 
Under  such  circumstances  we  ought  not  to  be  sur- 
prised to  find  that  behef  in  the  doctrine  of  man's 
primitive  state  of  righteousness  and  grace  has  been 
seriously  weakened  among  professing  Christians,  and 
that  Christian  apologists  do  not  in  this  direction  always 
succeed  in  avoiding  fatal  compromise.  This  is  partly 
a  result  of  their  commendable  efforts  to  get  into  sym- 
pathetic touch  with  the  modern  mind,  which  bring 
them  more  than  they  reaHze  under  the  insidious  influ- 
ence of  naturalistic  forms  of  thought.  But  it  is  also 
due  in  part,  I  believe,  to  the  embarrassing  effect  of  the 
protestant's  insistence  upon  the  purely  natural  quality 
of  man's  primitive  state,  and  of  repellent  scholastic 
opinions  which  are  still  thought  by  many  apologists 
to  be  involved  in  the  doctrine  of  man's  primitive  state 
.and  fall.  If  man's  primitive  state  was  purely  natural, 
it  is  difficult  to  avoid  the  naturahstic  inferences  which 
j  bring  it  into  Hne  with  the  ancestral  conditions  of  lower 
» species,  on  the  one  hand,  and  ancient  human  sinful- 

12 


1 62  MAN'S    PRIMITIVE    STATE 

ness,  on  the  other  hand.  I  do  not  say  that  it  is  impos- 
sible; but  it  is  certainly  very  difficult.^  I  emphasize 
all  this  because  I  believe  it  to  be  important  that  you 
should  understand  the  great  plausibility  of  the  views 
which  have  caused  a  rejection  of  the  doctrine  which  I 
am  concerned  to  defend;  and  that  you  should  take 
note  of  the  conditions,  both  scientific  and  speculative, 
which  appear  to  account  for  the  fact  that  many  Chris- 
tian writers  consider  the  doctrine  of  man's  primitive 
state  to  be  a  weak  point  in  traditional  theology.  We 
cannot  successfully  meet  attacks  on  Christian  doc- 
trine without  appreciating  the  causes  which  make 
them  dangerous;  and  they  must  be  met,  if  Christian 
doctrine  is  to  retain  its  hold  upon  those  who  have  been 
unsettled  by  them. 

II 

In  reckoning  with  the  scientific  conclusions  which 
I  have  been  formulating  in  this  lecture,  I  shall  devote 
especial  attention  tQ_jhe  principle  of  continuity  —  the 
principal,  that  is,  that  nothing  can  happen  which  is  v 
not  rationally  connected  in  causation  with  what  has  I 
previously  happened,  and  with  what  will  occur  in  the 
future.^  I  shall  consider  this  principle  at  some  length, 
because  upon  the  use  that  is  made  of  it  largely  depends 

1  How  difficult,  is  apparent  in  Jas.  Orr's  God's  Image,  the  ablest 
defence  of  the  protestant  view  as  against  the  attacks  of  evolutionists. 
Dr.  Orr  is  forced  to  minimize  the  scientific  claim  of  the  evolutionary 
theory,  and  does  not  seem  adequately  to  face  the  issues  which  its 
possible  validity  raises. 

2  Some  anticipatory  remarks  have  been  given  in  pp.  99-100,  above. 


PRINCIPLE    OF    CONTINUITY  163 

the  plausibility  of  the  reasons  advanced  in  the  name 
of  science  for  rejecting  the  doctrine  of  man's  primitive 
righteousness  and  grace. 

We  must  believe  that  nothing  happens  capriciously, 
but  that  the  whole  sequence  of  events  is  rationally 
determined  by  laws  which  cannot  be  broken.  There 
are  no  real  violations  of  this  principle.  Every  event 
is  the  result  of  causal  antecedents;  and  if  the  sequence 
of  causation  ever  seems  to  be  broken,  we  feel  compelled 
to  assume  that  the  seeming  is  to  be  disregarded,  and 
that  unknown  factors  have  operated,  rather  than  that 
the  principle  of  continuity  has  been  violated.  This 
principle  is  postulated  in  all  scientific  inquiry;  for,  if 
events  occur  in  a  haphazard  and  disconnected  manner, 
there  is  obviously  no  intelligible  basis  for  scientific 
induction.  Nature,  under  such  circumstances,  would 
consist  of  nothing  but  an  unintelligible  stream  of 
phenomena.  To  reject,  or  even  to  neglect,  the  prin-' 
ciple  of  continuity  in  our  argument  is  to  plead  guilty 
of  unintelligence,  of  irrationality.  The  last  person  in 
the  world  who  can  consistently  make  such  a  blunder  is 
the  Christian  believer  in  God.  If  the  course  of  things 
is  controlled  by  infinite  wisdom,  and  with  reference  to 
one  ultimate  purpose  and  event,  as  Christians  main- 
tain, then  the  principle  of  continuity  is  as  fundamen- 
tal to  theology  as  it  is  to  physical  science.  This 
being  so,  we  are  logically  constrained  to  confess  that, 
whenever  a  theological  proposition  is  proved  to  be 
inconsistent  with  the  continuity  of  events,  it  is  also 
shown  to  be  irrational  and  incredible.     There  is  no 


l64  MAN'S   PRIMITIVE   STATE 

escape  from  this  conclusion  —  at  least  none  for  rational 
thinkers. 

We  need,  however,  feel  no  anxiety  on  this  account 
as  to  the  validity  of  catholic  doctrine.     But  we  do 
need  to  realize  that  no  defence  of  the  doctrine  of  man's 
primitive  state  will  appear ,  adequate  and  convincing 
junder  the  existing  conditions  of  thought  which  does 
I'not  estabHsh  in  men's  minds  a  rational  place  in  the 
'  sequence  of  things  for  original  righteousness.     Can 
this  requirement  be  met  ?     It  certainly  cannot  be  met 
/on  the  philosophical  basis  of  naturalism.     But  natural- 
ism is  not  science;  and  a  failure  to  fulfil  its  demands 
signifies  nothing  to  those  who  attend  to  the  real  teach- 
ings of  science.     Proper  requirements  can  be  met  by 
j  vindicating  a  larger  and  truer  conception  of  continuity 
/than  naturalism  permits  men  to  attain.     This  is  the 
method  that  I  intend  to  pursue. 

I  start  with  the  indisputable  premise  that  the  con- 
tinuity with  which  we  ought  to  be  called  upon  to  reckon 
is  the  continuity  of  all  things  taken  together.  ''  Order 
is  Heaven's  first  law,"  and  that  law  controls  every- 
thing. The  sequences  of  the  universe  constitute 
moments  in  the  working  out  of  one  divine  plan; 
but  the  factors  which  operate  and  co-operate  in  the 
drama  are  more  various  and,  in  determinative  par- 
ticulars, higher  than  those  which  can  either  be  de- 
scribed by  the  terms  or  be  discovered  by  the  methods 
of  physical  science.  What  is  called  the  physical  order  ^ 
does  not  of  itself  constitute  the  whole  order  of  things; 
nor  are  its  developments  and  continuities  so  independ- ' 


PRINCIPLE    OF    CONTINUITY  165 

ent  and  self-sufficient  that  they  can  be  adequately 
rationalized    and    philosophically    explained    without 
resort  to  the  higher  mind  and  superphysical  operations 
and  factors  that  lie  behind  and  determine  their  place 
and  significance  in  the  whole  order.     Nature  is  orderly, 
and  reveals  the  principle  of  continuity,  because  it  is 
part  of  a  larger  order  in  which  that  principle  holds 
sway.     But  when  nature  is  regarded  in  isolation  from.    . 
the  higher  order  which  it  subserves,  and  dealt  with' 
as  if  complete  in  itself,  gaps  appear,   and  the  veryj 
principle  of  continuity  which  it  teaches  is  made  more 
difficult  to  understand. 

Some  of  these  gaps  have  been  noted  in  my  discus- . 
sion  of  the  evolutionary  theory.  The  advance  from! 
the  inorganic  to  the  organic  and  living  constitutes  an 
example,  as  does  also  the  appearance  of  mind  in  a  uni- 
verse previously  non-intelligent.  The  materialistic  Pro- 
fessor Tyndall,  in  an  address  to  the  Physical  Section 
of  the  British  Association  at  Norwich,  in  1868,  said: 
"  Granted  that  a  definite  thought  and  a  definite  molec- 
ular action  in  the  brain  occur  simultaneously;  we  do 
not  possess  the  intelligent  organ,  nor  apparently  any 
rudiment  of  the  organ,  which  would  enable  us  to  pass, 
by  a  process  of  reasoning,  from  the  one  to  the  other." 
It  is  clear  that  physical  scientists  cannot  successfully 
reduce  all  the  phenomena  by  which  they  are  confronted 
in  nature  to  purely  physical  categories.  The  presence 
of  superphysical  factors  is  not  intelligently  to  be 
denied,  and  these  factors  modify  physical  sequences 
in  manners  that  have  very  important  significance  in 


l66  MAN'S   PRIMITIVE   STATE 

relation  to  the  principle  of  continuity.  Let  me  repeat 
an  illustration  previously  employed.  No  physical  law 
,is  more  completely  established  by  science  than  that 
'  of  gravitation,  and  yet  its  effects  are  constantly  reversed 
by  voluntary  agency.  This  happens,  for  instance, 
whenever  a  ball  is  thrown  into  the  air  by  a  human 
hand.  But  such  an  occurrence  is  not  considered  by 
anyone  either  to  violate  the  law  of  gravitation  or  to 
subvert  the  principle  of  continuity.  The  reason  is 
simple.  Men  assume,  whether  they  are  willing  to 
acknowledge  the  fact  in  terms  or  not,  that  the  work- 
ing of  continuity  is  determined  by  a  larger  scheme  than 
can  be  described  by  purely  physical  terms. 

Many  factors  are  working  together  in  nature,  and 
some  of  them  are  superphysical.  The  superphysical 
includes  and  finds  explanation  in  personality,  and  the 
limits  of  personality  cannot  be  determined  by  physical 
science.  But  the  intelligibility  of  the  physical  order 
can  be  explained  only  when  we  assume  that  a  supreme 
Person  exists,  and  that  His  comprehensive  plan  affords 
the  true  and  ultimate  explanation  of  the  continuities 
which  are  discovered  in  the  physical  universe. 

The  question  which  has  to  be  met  in  determining 
the  credibiHty  of  catholic  doctrine  as  to  man's  prim- 
itive state  is  not  whether  the  principle  of  continuity 
can  be  broken,  for  there  is  no  division  of  opinion  on 
that  question.  It  concerns  the  scope  of  the  plan  that 
accounts  for  continuity.  Consequently  the  issue  is 
not  between  continuity  and  discontinuity,  but  between 
rival  cosmical  philosophies  —  the  naturahstic  and  the 


CONTINUITY  APPLIED  167 

theistic.  It  is  between  two  conceptions  of  history,  one 
excluding  the  sovereign  mind,  the  other  asserting  its 
control  of  all  things  in  a  drama  wherein  all  reahties, 
all  spheres,  and  all  the  ages  are  intelligibly  connected 
in  one  orderly  march  of  events.  It  is,  in  brief,  between 
acknowledgment  and  repudiation  of  the  supernatural. 
I  do  not  mean,  in  saying  this,  to  imply  that  all  who 
reject  the  catholic  doctrine  under  discussion  repudiate 
the  supernatural.  I  mean  that  the  plausibility  of  the 
arguments  against  that  doctrine  which  are  advanced  on 
evolutionary  grounds  is  due  to  the  assumption  that  a 
merely  natural  evolution  affords  an  adequate  explana- 
tion of  things  which  are  otherwise  explained  by  those 
who  do  justice  to  the  supernatural. 

Ill 

What  does  the  word  supernatural  mean?  It  is  a  U 
relative  term,  although  it  signifies  objective  factors  in 
history.  It  does  not  mean  the  unnatural,  for  every 
thing  is  natural  from  its  own  standpoint,  and  all  is 
orderly  in  ultimate  meaning  and  effect.  It  means  a 
higher  natural  than  can  be  explained  by  the  particular 
nature  or  natures  which  determine  our  standpoint  in 
using  the  word.  Its  meaning,  therefore,  depends  upon 
what  natures  are  assumed  to  be  transcended  by  what 
we  call  supernatural.  Thus  human  intelhgence  is 
supernatural  to  the  merely  physical,  and  volitional 
action  is  supernatural  to  undirected  force.  In  its 
theological  use  the  point  of  view  is  that  visible  order 
of  natures  which  reaches  its  highest  level  in  man.     It 


1 68  MAN'S   PRIMITIVE    STATE 

includes  human  nature  and  all  inferior  natures,  along 
with  the  forces  and  capacities  that  are  resident  in  them 
and  native  to  them.  The  supernatural  is  superhuman 
as  well  as  superphysical.  Thus  defined,  the  super- 
natural depends  for  its  reality  upon  the  existence  of 
higher  natures,  higher  forces  and  higher  laws  than  are 
discoverable  or  explainable  by  physical,  animal,  and 
human  forms  of  being,  life,  and  capacity.  No  doubt 
the  word  supernatural  has  other  uses,  and  such  uses 
are  allowable,  although  they  are  modern,  and  ought 
carefully  to  be  distinguished  from  this  the  historical 
and  theological  use  of  the  term.^ 

You  can  perceive  that  the  reality  of  the  supernatural 
is  involved  in  discussing  the  cathohc  doctrine  of  man's 
primitive  state,  because  that  doctrine  implies  the  work- 
ing of  factors  which  transcend  the  resident  forces  and 
capacities  that  go  to  make  human  nature  what  it  is  in 
itself.  In  asserting  the  reality  and  operation  of  these 
higher  factors  we  assume  that  man's  nature  is  not  the 
highest  nature,  and  that  its  resident  capacities  are 
transcended  in  the  divine  ordering  of  human  history. 

Men  can  and  do  repudiate  the  doctrine  that  the 
supernatural,  in  the  sense  I  have  defined,  is  required 
to  account  for  the  miracles  of  sacred  history,  but  not 
on    purely    scientific    grounds.       Physical    science    is 

1  The  author  has  treated  more  fully  of  the  supernatural  in  his 
Introd.  to  Dog.  Theol.,  ch.  ii,  where  numerous  references  are  given. 
Among  suggestive  treatments  of  the  subject  may  be  mentioned, 
Chas.  Gore,  Incarnation,  Lee.  ii;  Illingworth,  Divine  Immanence, 
pp.  100-145;  Geo.  Fisher,  Supernatural  Origin  of  Christianity,  Ess. 
xi. 


CONTINUITY  APPLIED  169 

driven  by  the  necessities  of  specialization  to  ignore  the 
supernatural  in  its  inductions,  but  when  physical  scien- 
tists deny  the  reality  of  the  supernatural  they  forsake 
their  chosen  specialty,  and  make  speculative  dogma- 
tism do  duty  for  ascertained  facts.  It  is  fully  as 
irrational  for  a  natural  scientist  to  deny  that  the  super- 
natural operates  in  history,  as  it  is  for  the  utilitarian 
to  deny  that  beauty  exists.  The  issue  is  philosophical, 
and  is  joined  between  naturalism  and  theism.  It  is 
unscience,  not  science,  that  is  opposed  to  behef  in  the 
supernatural. 

Which  is  the  most  rational  view  of  history,  that 
which  discovers  a  sovereign  mind  ordering  all  things 
according  to  a  plan  that  cannot  be  defeated,  or  that 
which  interprets  the  higher  by  the  lower,  and  accounts 
for  the  evolution  of  things  by  a  self-caused  develop- 
ment of  non-intelHgent  things  into  intelHgent  makers 
of  history  ?  That  is  the  question  at  issue.  The  world 
was  viewed  by  ancient  Greek  thought  as  a  mechanical 
cosmos,  but  by  Hebrew  writers  as  a  drama  or  age.  No' 
doubt  an  adequate  philosophy  will  regard  both  views 
as  partial  truths.  There  is  a  vast  mechanism  in  which 
uniformity  is  in  evidence;  but,  as  Professor  Huxley 
frankly  confesses,  the  mechanical  aspect  of  things 
does  not  of  itself  exclude  the  teleological.^  The  world 
is  also  a  drama.  Evolutionary  thought  requires  em- 
phasis upon  this  aspect.  There  is  progress  in  things, 
and  progress  means  innovation.  An  endless  cycle 
continually  returns  upon  itself.    It  reaches  no  goal  and 

1  Darwiniana,  pp.  109-114. 


I70  MAN'S    PRIMITIVE    STATE 

fulfils  no  purpose.  It  reduces  all  things  to  vanity, 
and  this  thought  is  the  explicit  basis  of  the  pessimism 
of  the  writer  of  Ecclesiastes.  But  progress  in  things 
demands  the  presence  of  forces  working  for  progress; 
and  when  the  progress  requires  a  transcending  of  exist- 
ing natures,  these  forces  must  also  transcend.  They 
must  be  supernatural  to  the  things  which  are  made  to 
transcend  their  kind. 

The  Christian  view  of  history  is  in  fuller  accord  with 
these  necessities  of  evolution  and  progress  than  any 
other.  It  also  enables  us  to  do  full  justice  to  the 
physical  and  mechanical  aspects  of  the  cosmos;  and 
to  account  for  the  gaps  which  appear  in  the  conti- 
nuity of  things,  when  they  are  regarded  from  an  exclu- 
sively physical  point  of  view.  But  it  must  be  accepted 
in  its  entirety,  for  its  particulars  hang  together  in  one 
coherent  scheme.  In  this  scheme  physical  evolution 
can  find  a  reasonable  place,  and  by  means  of  its 
mysterious  processes  the  human  organism  may  be 
thought  to  be  created. 

But  this  new  creature  was  designed  for  righteousness, 
and  he  possessed  moral  instincts,  and  a  dawning  sense 
of  responsibility,  of  which  his  animal  progenitors 
knew  nothing.  Every  previous  order  of  life  had  been 
able  to  fulfil  the  law  of  its  being,  and  every  ancestral 
precedent  suggests  that  man  was  also  to  be  enabled 
to  do  this.  But  if  he  had  been  left  to  the  condition  of 
a  merely  moralized  animal,  he  would  have  been  un- 
able to  fulfil  what  had  become  the  most  important  law 
of   his   being.     His   inherited    animal   instincts   were 


CONTINUITY  APPLIED 


171 


strongly  intrenched,  and  called  for  unrestrained  grati- 
fication whenever  occasion  should  arise.  His  dawning 
sense  of  obligation  to  restrain  himself  in  obedience  to  a 
higher  law  and  purpose  was  necessarily  undeveloped, 
and  doomed  to  defeat  by  the  beast  in  him.  To  permit 
this  anomaly,  this  unprecedented  "missing  the  mark"  ^ 
in  the  functioning  of  the  new  species,  would  seem  to 
violate  not  only  the  resourceful  wisdom  of  the  Creator, 
but  also  His  infinite  justice  and  righteousness.^ 

The  problem  of  moral  evil  is  too  great  for  us  to 
explain  adequately,  but  to  suppose  that  God  created 
man  in  such  wise  that  he  unavoidably  became  in  ever 
so  small  a  degree  responsible  for  the  impossible  appears 
to  make  the  problem  absolutely  fatal  to  belief  in  divine 
righteousness.  The  possibility  of  sinning  appears  to 
be  necessary  for  a  development  of  human  righteous- 
ness; and  we  perceive  that  sin,  when  it  takes  place,  is 
likely  to  prove  contagious;  but  to  believe  that  God 
Himself  constituted  what  would  be  in  effect  the  neces- 
sity of  sinning  appears  to  be  the  climax  of  immoral- 
ity in  beHef.  And  the  difficulty  is  not  lessened  by 
describing  the  process  by  which  man  was  made  in 
evolutionary  terms.  Man  is  the  predetermined  goal 
of  the  process  which  built  up  his  organism  and  con- 
stituted his  original  condition;  and  a  process  which 

1  One  of  the  Old  Testament  words  for  sin,  KtSH,  means  literally, 
missing  the  mark.  See  E.  R.  Bernard,  in  Hastings,  Die.  of  the  Bible, 
s.  V.  "Sin,"  i.  5. 

2  It  will  be  necessary  to  recur  to  this  diflSculty,  and  in  some 
measure  to  repeat  myself,  in  discussing  the  doctrine  of  original  sin. 
See  pp.  219-222,  below. 


t-' 


172  MAN'S    PRIMITIVE   STATE 

was  to  produce  a  helpless  sinner  —  held  responsible 
for  being  incapable  of  fulfilling  what  had  become  the 
primary  law  of  his  being,  can  hardly  have  been  left  to 
work  out  its  immoral  logic  by  Him  who  is  the  source 
of  all  justice  and  goodness.^ 

1  See  J.  Orr,  God's  Image,  pp.  187  et  seq.  Dr.  Tennant  says, 
Origin  of  Sin,  p.  122,  "that  responsibility  for  the  possibility  of  moral 
evil  and  for  the  opportunities  for  its  realization  lies  with  God:  that 
responsibility  for  the  actuality  of  moral  evil  lies  with  man."  On 
p.  127  he  adds,  "In  asserting  the  real  independence  of  the  human 
will  we  remove  the  responsibility  for  actual  evil  from  God."  He 
does  not  correctly  state  the  problem,  and  the  proof  that  he  does  not 
is  to  be  found  in  his  own  Preface  to  the  2d  ed.,  p.  xxii,  b  and  c.  He 
there  says,  "6.  .  .  .  There  has  been  a  period  in  the  history  of  both 
race  and  individual  [he  would  probably  be  willing  to  add,  "in  the 
history  of  man's  evolution  from  brute-ancestors."  The  purely  evo- 
lutionary view  of  the  origin  of  sin,  at  least,  so  postulates],  in  which 
even  volitional  conduct  has  been  innocent,  however  far  such  conduct 
differs  from  that  later  prescribed  by  moral  sanctions  and  the  con- 
science. So  far,  sin  has  not  emerged  at  all.  c.  A  period  is  reached 
during  which  moral  sentiment  is  gradually  evoked  and  moral  sanc- 
tions are  gradually  constructed.  Acts  knowing  no  law  now  begin  to 
be  regarded  as  wrong.  The  performance  of  them  henceforth  con- 
stitutes sin." 

This  means  that  when  man  emerged  into  consciousness  of  moral 
responsibility  he  had  already  become  habituated  to  modes  of  action 
which  now  became  sinful  for  him.  Apart  from  the  supernatural 
assistance  hypothecated  in  the  catholic  doctrine  of  man's  primitive 
state,  under  such  a  handicap  sin  was  more  than  possible.  It  was 
inevitable.  His  adoption  of  the  evolutionary  view  of  the  origin  of 
sin  requires,  therefore,  that  he  should  consider  God  to  be  responsible 
for  the  inevitablejiess  of  human  sin. 

On  page  142  of  the  same  work  he  urges  an  argument  of  Dr.  Bruce 
(Providential  Order  pp.  165-167),  saying,  "divine  holiness  has  been 
no  barrier  to  intimate  relations  between  God  and  man  throughout 
our  sinful  history;  why  then  should  we  postulate  either  sinlessness 
or  moral  completeness  to  begin  with?" 


CONTINUITY  APPLIED  173 

It  may  be  urged  by  way  of  reply  that  my  argument 
does  not  allow  for  differences  of  degree  in  human 
guilt  and  responsibility.  The  guilt  of  an  undeveloped 
child  is  not  equal  to  that  of  a  full-grown  man  in  com-  / 
mitting  the  same  sins,  and  we  must  not  estimate  the  V.^ 
moral  quality  of  primitive  savagery  by  the  standards  \ 
of  civilized  life.  If  primitive  man  did  wrong,  he  did  ■ 
so  with  a  very  slight  sense  of  the  wrong  doing,  of  its 
consequences,  and  of  his  moral  responsibihty.^  Such 
a  reply  does  not  meet  the  difficulty  at  all,  but  obscures 
its  real  nature.  The  fact  that  sin  is  something  that 
ought  not  to  be  does  not  depend  upon  the  degree  of 
man's  guilt  in  committing  it.  There  can  be  no  sin 
without  some  degree  of  consciousness  of  wrong-doing 
on  the  part  of  the  sinner,  and  where  such  conscious- 
ness exists  at  all,  there  we  find  what  ought  not  to  be. 
At  some  moment  this  consciousness  of  wrong-doing 
appeared  in  man's  history.  If  sin  is  sin,  this  ought 
not  to  have  happened.  The  ''ought  not"  constitutes 
the  problem  —  not  the  degree  of  guilt  which  was  at 
first  attendant  upon  it.  If  naturalism  is  true,  then 
what  ought  not  to  be  had  to  be.  Man  had  to  sin. 
This  means  to  a  believer  in  God  that  the  almighty 

The  real  difficulty  is  not  met  by  such  an  argument.  God  does 
indeed  enter  into  saving  relations  with  fallen  men,  having  mercy 
upon  those  who  are  morally  helpless;  and  this  is  consistent  with 
divine  holiness,  which  does  not  condone  sin  in  providing  its  remedy. 
But  the  purely  evolutionary  view  of  the  origin  of  sin  requires  us  to 
believe  that  our  moral  helplessness  is  itself  caused  by  God,  instead  of 
being  the  effect  of  creaturely  wilfulness. 

1  See  Tennant,  Origin  of  Sin,  pp.  91  et  seq.  ei  passion. 


174  MAN'S    PRIMITIVE   STATE 

i  Source    of    righteousness    made    unrighteousness    an 
unavoidable   necessity  for   his   creatures/   and   holds 
j  them  responsible  for  their  helplessness. 

Again,  it  may  be  urged  that  our  argument  disre- 
gards the  progressiveness  of  moral  development,  and 
the  law  prevailing  everywhere  that  sin  is  a  necessary 
stage  in  men's  advance  towards  perfect  righteousness. 
Sin,  it  is  said,  constitutes  enlightening  experience  — 
a  missing  the  mark  which  is  inevitable  in  learning  to 
hit   the  mark,   and    a   necessary   condition   of  moral 
progress.     This  is  summed  up  when  the  fall  of  man 
1  is  described  as  a  fall  upward.^    That  earnest  moral- 
I  ists  should  be  deceived  by  such  a  view  of  sin  constitutes 
I  one  of  the  miracles  of  modern  thinking.     Sin  is  some- 
!  thing  more  than  missing  the  mark,  for  it  does  not  exist 

1  Tennant  says,  op.  cit.,  p.  113,  that  if  the  evolutionary  account 
of  sin  "sees  in  it  something  empirically  inevitable  for  every  man,  .  .  . 
it  by  no  means  implies  that  sin  is  theoretically,  or  on  a  priori  grounds, 
an  absolute  necessity."  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  we  reduce  the 
responsibility  of  the  author  of  our  moral  helplessness  by  such  a  de- 
scription of  it.  If  our  sinning  is  "inevitable,"  whoever  caused  its 
inevitableness  becomes  responsible  for  it.  If  Tennant's  view  is 
correct,  God  has  made  us  morally  helpless. 

*Tennant  says,  op.  cit.,  p.  118,  "What  introspection  really  dis- 
covers is  an  internal  conflict  between  nature  and  nurture,  natural 
desire  and  moral  end;  and  this  is  the  inevitable  condition  of  human 
life  and  the  expression  of  God's  purpose."  Canon  Wilson,  address- 
ing the  Church  Congress  of  1896,  said,  "But  this  fall  from  innocence 
was  in  another  sense  a  rise  to  a  higher  grade  of  being.  It  is  in  this 
sense  that  the  theory  of  evolution  teaches  us  to  interpret  the  story  of 
the  fall  "  —  The  Guardian,  Oct.  7,  1896.  Sir  O.  Lodge  says.  Life 
and  Matter,  p.  79,  "A  fall  it  might  seem,  just  as  a  vicious  man  some- 
times seems  degraded  below  the  beasts,  but  in  promise  and  potency, 
a  rise  it  really  was.** 


CONTINUITY  APPLIED  175 

excegtJ^hen^QneJ[&-nicu:aU}^cul^         for  the  missing. 
Sin  is  not  immaturity  of  moral  effort,  but  wilful  viola- 
tion of    conscience.     So   far  from  being  a  phase  of   I 
upward  struggle,  it  is  a  refusal  to  struggle  upward  —  a   | 
turning  back  which  ought  not  to  occur.     The  "ought   \ 
not"  remains  unexplained  and  contrary  to  divine  right- 
eousness, so  long  as  we  describe  it  as  the  unavoidable 
result    of    divine    arrangements.     Christian    doctrine 
accounts  for  the  unavoidableness  of  sin  by  teaching  it 
to  be  a  consequence  of  human  sin,  originally  avoid- 
ble  and  wilful.^    This  explanation  is  indeed  partial 
nly,  and  the  ethical  problems  which  are  involved  in 
the  moral  solidarity  of  mankind  cannot  fully  be  solved. 
But  such  teaching  at  least  relieves  us  of  the  monstrous 
notion  that  God  originated  the  inevitableness  of  sin, 
and  holds  man  responsible  for  the  result  of  His  own 
arrangements. 

If  such  a  notion  subverts  our  belief  in  the  resource- 
ful wisdom  and  righteousness  of  God,  it  also  goes  coun- 
ter to  every  precedent  that  an  evolutionary  view  of 
man's  origin  affords.  As  has  been  eloquently  argued 
by  the  late  John  Fiske,  in  his  Through  Nature  to  Godj^ 
the  course  of  natural  evolution  previous  to  man's 
appearance  has  been  by  true  steps,  each  surviving  form 

1  See  Aubrey  Moore,  Essays  Scientific  and  Philosophical,  pp. 
61-66.  He  says  that,  "in  spite  of  all  the  physical  and  intellectual 
advance  which  man  has  made,  he  is  always  and  everywhere  the  worse 
for  the  Fall.  However  great  his  development  has  been,  it  is  still  a 
retarded  development,  a  development  slower  than  it  need  have  been, 
less  regular  and  less  sure  than  God  meant  it  to  be."  See  also  J.  Orr, 
God's  Image,  pp.  201-212.  2  pp,  jjy  gi  j^g. 


/^fe^^ 


176  MAN'S    PRIMITIVE    STATE 

of  life  being  suited  to  its  environment  and  to  its  specific 
functioning.  Now  to  suppose  that  the  latest  and  highest 
product  of  this  hitherto  successful  process  of  adaptation 
to  the  requirements  of  existence  should  prove  to  be  a 
missing  of  the  mark,  a  being  incapable  of  fulfilling  its 
characteristic  function,  is  to  suppose  that  evolution 
became  unsuccessful  when  it  became  most  intelligent 
and  significant.  Yet  it  must  apparently  have  done  so, 
if  no  superadded  endowments  were  imparted  to  man 
to  offset  the  long-intrenched  and  deeply  ingrained 
habits  and  propensities  of  his  brute-inheritance.  Man 
is  constituted  for  righteousness,  and  this  law  of  his 
being  is  not  a  result  of  later  developments,  but  charac- 
terizes his  original  nature  as  human.  Yet  the  history 
of  his  efforts  to  obey  this  law  is  a  history  of  universal 
and  lifelong  failure.  An  evolution  which  we  are  told 
has  for  its  law  the  development  and  survival  of  what  is 
most  useful  is  consummated  by  the  development  of  a 
species  whose  chief  and  distinguishing  mark  is  defeat. 
Unless  the  evolutionary  theory  is  supplemented  by 
the  doctrine  that  man  was  originally  afforded  super- 
natural aid,  and  thus  given  power  to  realize  himself  in 
accordance  with  his  natural  instincts,  and  that  the 
continual  missing  the  mark  which  has  followed  is  due 
to  his  own  avoidable  sin  and  consequent  alienation 
of  grace,  —  unless,  in  brief,  the  superphysical  and 
supernatural  is  taken  into  account,  —  human  history 
exhibits  a  unique  and  baffling  enigma,  the  one  stulti- 
fying exception  to  the  continuity  of  things. 

As  I  have  previously  noted.  Professor  Huxley  main- 


CONTINUITY  APPLIED  177 

tained  that  "Social  progress  means  a  checking  of  the 
cosmic  process  at  every  step,  and  the  substitution  of 
another,  which  may  be  called  the  ethical  process."  ^ 
But  what  is  to  be  thought  of  creatures  whose  progress 
depends  upon  setting  aside  the  laws  of  development 
which  are  said  to  account  for  their  origin  and  nature, 
if  no  higher  powers  are  imparted  to  them  than  those 
which  these  laws  of  development  have  evolved  ?  Does 
not  such  an  outcome  mean  an  utter  subversion  of  con- 
tinuity, unless  the  philosophy  of  history  is  enlarged  by 
allowing  for  supernatural  factors  in  the  drama?  So 
far  from  belief  in  the  supernatural  quality  of  man's 
primitive  state  being  inconsistent  with  an  acceptance 
of  the  principle  of  continuity,  it  is  just  such  belief  that 
enables  the  Christian  philosopher  to  accept  that  prin- 
ciple in  its  most  difficult  appHcation. 

The  method  of  argument  which  I  have  been  employ- 
ing with  regard  to  human  righteousness  applies  to 
the  problem  of  immortality.  Physical  mortality  is 
obviously  a  specific  character  of  man  as  he  is  consti- 
tuted by  natural  evolution.  Yet  both  natural  investi- 
gation and  supernatural  revelation  teach  that  the  desire 
for,  and  behef  in,  his  immortality  is  natural  to  man. 
Is  this  natural  aspiration  another  useless  character 
—  another  product  of  evolution  which  must  miss  the 
mark  obviously  aimed  at?  It  is,  if  human  nature  is 
afforded  no  supernatural  assistance,  for  in  itself  that 
nature  is  mortal.^    The  reply  will  no  doubt  be  made 

1  Evolution  and  Ethics,  p.  t^^)- 

2  In  view  of  the  limited  range  of  the  facts  upon  which  Weismann 

13 


178  MAN'S   PRIMITIVE    STATE 

that  immortality  pertains  exclusively  to  the  soul,  and 
does  not  depend  upon  continuance  of  the  body.  This 
reply  cannot  consistently  be  made  by  those  who,  from 
the  standpoint  of  naturalism,  maintain  that  what  is 
called  the  soul  is  naturally  and  wholly  dependent  upon 
the  physical  organism  to  discharge  its  proper  functions 
and  to  express  itself.  In  any  case,  man  is  not  a  dis- 
embodied soul,  but  is  by  nature  constituted  by  an 
union  of  body  and  soul.  When  they  are  divided,  the 
man  is  dead;  and  the  survival  of  his  soul  after  the  dis- 
solution of  the  body  is  not  human  immortality.  It 
is  rather  the  death  of  the  man,  and  the  survival  of  an 
entity  which  all  natural  investigation  shows  to  be 
insufficient  to  itself,  apart  from  the  human  organism. 
The  aspiration  of  human  beings  after  immortality  must 
be  interpreted  in  a  sense  that  does  not  utterly  disagree 
with  what  we  know  of  human  life  and  death.  It 
means  aspiration  after  immortality  of  the  whole  man 
—  the  only  man  that  can  be  said  to  live.  Whatever 
may  have  been  the  original  words  and  meaning  of  a 
certain  passage  in  the  Book  of  Job,  the  English  ren- 
dering, "In  my  flesh  shall  I  see  God,"  ^  expresses  the 
only  consummation  that  can  adequately  satisfy  man's 
natural  instinct  and  heart-desire. 

bases  his  curious  theory  of  the  immortality  of  the  protozoa  and  the 
germ-plasm  of  higher  species  (see  Evolution  Theory,  pp.  260-263),  I 
cannot  take  seriously  Dr.  Orr's  use  of  that  theory  to  establish  the 
notion  that  man  was  originally  in  possession  of  natural  immortality 
{God's  Image,  ch.  vi).  That  writer's  belief  in  the  protestant  doc- 
trine that  man's  primitive  state  was  a  purely  natural  one  handicaps 
his  apologetic  in  various  ways.  '  Job.  xix.  26. 


CONTINUITY  APPLIED  179 

That  the  immortahty  which  is  naturally  craved  for 
by  man  is  a  physical,  as  well  as  a  spiritual,  immor- 
tality, helps  to  explain  the  fact  that,  whereas  physical 
death  brings  no  shadow  upon  the  Hves  of  lower  crea- 
tures, it  constitutes  the  nightmare  of  humanity  —  a 
nightmare  that  no  natural  philosophy  can  dissipate, 
and  which  is  tolerable  to  the  natural  man  only  as 
an  escape  from  pain  that  seems  otherwise  incurable. 
There  is  indeed  an  instinct  of  self-preservation  from 
violent  death  which  is  possessed  by  all  members  of 
the  animal  kingdom.  But  natural  death  does  not 
reduce  the  happiness  of  the  lower  animals,  nor  does  it 
violate  their  natural  instincts.  Man  alone  shrinks 
from  physical  dissolution  as  from  something  that  stulti- 
fies his  natural  instincts,  until  he  learns  that  it  is  a 
passing  consequence  of  sin,  which  by  redeeming  grace 
can  be  made  to  be  its  own  remedy  and  the  condition 
of  a  restoration  of  the  immortality  for  which  he 
craves. 

Assuming,  as  we  may  reasonably  assume,  that  man 
is  made  for  immortahty,  for  an  immortality  of  his 
actual  and  composite  individuahty,  why  should  his 
acquisition  of  this  immortahty  be  deferred  and  con- 
ditioned by  its  seeming  nullification  through  physical 
dissolution?  Such  a  dissolution  appears  to  mean  a 
step  backward,  an  undoing  which  requires  a  remedy 
and  a  resurrection  from  the  dead.  No  reason  can  be 
discovered  on  natural  grounds  for  such  an  interruption 
and  reversal  of  human  development.  The  only  rea- 
son available  is  that  given  by  Christian  doctrine,  that 


l8o  MAN'S    PRIMITIVE    STATE 

death  is  a  consequence  of  loss  of  divinely  afforded 
means  of  immortality,  a  loss  brought  about  by  the 
avoidable  and  voluntary  sin  of  our  first  parents. 

The  sum  of  the  matter  is  that,  when  the  Christian 
view  of  history  is  once  intelligently  accepted,  the  doc- 
trine that  man  was  originally,  and  by  supernatural 
grace,  made  capable  of  sinless  development  and  unin- 
terrupted life  forever,  is  perceived  to  accentuate  rather 
than  to  violate  the  principle  of  continuity,  and  to  per- 
mit behef  in  an  evolutionary  origin  of  man's  physical 
organism. 

IV 

Having  reckoned  with  the  principle  of  continuity, 
and  having  established  the  agreement  therewith  of  the 
doctrine  that  man's  primitive  state  was  one  of  super- 
natural grace  and  potential  immortahty,  we  shall  find 
no  difficulty  in  reconciling  that  doctrine  with  the  con- 
clusions of  evolutionary  science  which  I  defined  in  an 
earlier  part  of  this  lecture. 

I.  One  does  not  need,  in  the  first  place,  to  abandon 
/the  cathoHc  doctrine  of  man's  primitive  state  in  order 
to  accept  the  conclusion  that  man's  physical  organism 
has  been  produced  by  natural  evolution,  and  owes  its 
specific  characters  to  variations  of  lower  organisms, 
preserved  by  natural  selection.  He  only  needs  to 
supplement  this  theory  by  allowing  for  the  super- 
physical  elements  in  human  nature,  and  by  recog- 
nizing that  physical  antecedents  and  factors  neither 
afford    adequate    explanation    of    human    nature    in 


HARMONIZED  WITH  EVOLUTION  i8i 

its  fulness  nor  fully  determine  man's  primitive  con- 
idition.  What  the  physical  evolved  the  superphys- 
lical  completed,  and  the  supernatural  mysteries  of 
grace  are  obviously  involved  in  man's  unique  posi- 
tion of  conscious  dependence  upon  God,  and  in  his 
superhuman  destiny.  Grace  does  not  stultify  human 
nature,  but  perfects  it,  and  enables  man  to  realize 
himself  in  such  wise  as  to  satisfy  his  God-given  in- 
stincts and  aspirations. 

f  2.  In  the  second  place,  nothing  in  catholic  doctrine 
interferes  with  acknowledging  that,jf  Jhe  supernatural 
factors  in  human  history  could  be  ignored,  the  con- 
flict which  is  found  in  every  man  between  the  lusts  of 
the  flesh  and  the  higher  demands  of  the  spirit  might 
be  explained  by  a  natural  survival  of  propensities 
inherited  from  brute-ancestors.  In  my  next  lecture 
I  hope  to  show  that  we  are  free  to  regard  the  fall  as  a 
reversion  to  the  natural,  and  therefore  to  the  condition 
which  natural  evolution  engenders  when  not  supple- 
mented by  the  mysteries  of  supernatural  grace.  But 
if,  as  I  trust  I  have  sufficiently  proved,  the  natural 
order  is  part  of  a  larger  order,  and  if  an  acceptance  of 
the  supernatural,  as  I  have  also  endeavoured  to  show, 
is  necessary  for  a  rational  view  of  moral  history  as  a 
whole,  we  are  not  justified  in  believing  that  God  did 
nothing  to  enable  primitive  man  to  restrain  his  animal 
impulses,  and  to  give  uninterrupted  obedience  to  his 
I  moral  instincts.  To  beheve  that  primitive  man  was 
given  supernatural  grace,  and  forfeited  that  advantage 
by    voluntary   transgression,    is    consistent    with    an 


i 


182  MAN'S    PRIMITIVE    STATE 

acknowledgment  that  his  existing  condition  is  in  line 
with  unassisted  natural  evolution. 

3.  The  proposition  that  man,  so  far  as  known  to 
anthropological  science,  appears  to  have  started  in 
his  development  at  a  savage  stage  is  entirely  consist- 
ent with  our  doctrine  of  his  primitive  state,  —  that  is, 
if  we  recognize,  as  we  certainly  ought  to  recognize, 
the  limitations  of  natural  investigation  with  regard  to 
that  state.  No  evidence  has  been  or  can  be  found 
which  determines  with  certainty  the  absolute  primi- 
tiveness  of  ancient  savagery.  Confessedly  our  first 
parents  employed  no  tools  and  built  no  structures 
which  could  escape  destruction  and  remain  for  our 
discovery  and  consideration.  If  we  were  to  unearth 
Adam's  bones,  we  should  not  be  able  to  identify  them 
as  his,  nor  could  we  find  in  their  neighbourhood  any 
indications  of  his  moral  condition.  All  that  modern 
investigation  can  be  said  to  establish  is  that,  when 
/men  began  to  use  permanent  tools  and  build  enduring 
structures,  they  were  apparently  emerging  from  sav- 
agery —  from  such  savagery  as  the  Christian  view  of 
history  would  lead  us  to  look  for  during  the  period 
between  man's  fall  from  grace  and  his  development  of 
material  arts.  The  conclusion  to  which  we  are  driven 
is  that  the  evidences  of  a  general  prevalence  of  savagery 
|among  the  most  ancient  races  that  have  left  traces  of 
their  condition  neither  prove  nor  disprove  the  primi- 
^tiveness  of  such  savagery.  If  they  appear  to  prove 
it,  this  is  because  of  what  we  have  seen  to  be  an 
unwarranted  assumption,  that  the  Christian  view  of 


HARMONIZED  WITH  EVOLUTION  183 

history  is  necessarily  subversive  of  the  principle  of 
continuity,  and  therefore  must  give  way  to  the  natu- 
ralistic view/ 

4.  It  is  between  these  two  views  of  history  at  large, 
and  of  the  factors  supposed  to  be  operative  in  deter- 
mining its  course,  that  the  issue  is  joined.  To  one 
who  regards  the  physical  order  as  complete  and  self- 
sufficient,  a  placing  of  man  in  a  supernatural  state  of 
grace  after  his  origin  by  natural  evolution  must  appear 
to  be  subversive  of  rational  continuity  and  hopelessly 
incredible.  And  his  unbelief  will  be  confirmed  when 
he  discovers  that  the  earliest  human  conditions  of 
which  any  trace  remains  are  completely  in  line  with 
natural  evolution.  That  they  are  so  we  are  neither 
justified  by  the  present  conditions  of  knowledge  nor 
interested  in  denying.  But  the  chief  point  in  our  argu- 
Iment  is  that  every  appearance  of  breach  of  continuity 
'in  the  occurrence  of  a  primitive  state  of  grace  disappears 
when  the  larger  and  more  adequate  Christian  view 
of  history  is  intelligently  adopted.  The  naturalistic 
view  does  not  satisfy  all  the  requirements  of  continuity, 
for,  as  we  have  seen,  it  leaves  several  important  gaps 
in  natural  evolution  which  require  superphysical  and 
supernatural   factors    to    fill.     It    also    raises    serious 

1  On  the  impossibility  of  ascertaining  man's  primitive  condition 
by  natural  investigation,  see  Fairbairn,  Philos.  of  the  Christ.  Reli- 
gion^ p.  204;  De  La  Saussaye,  Science  of  Religion,  pp.  28,  29; 
Ladd,  Philos.  of  Religion,  Vol.  L,  pp.  134-138.  Ladd  quotes  Max 
Miiller  {Anthropological  Religion,  p.  150)  as  saying,  "We  knovi^  now 
that  savage  and  primitive  are  very  far  from  meaning  the  same  thing." 
Cf.  Bishop  Gore,  Creed  of  the  Christian,  pp.  43,  44. 


/.^ 


1 84  MAN'S    PRIMITIVE    STATE 

I  problems  of  a  moral  nature,  since  it  requires  us  to 
I  believe  that  the  highest  product  of  natural  evolution  is 
/  a  being  who  has  become  responsible  for  impossibilities, 
and  has  never  been  enabled  to  fulfil  the  characteristic 
law  of  his  being.  The  Christian  view  of  history,  on 
the  other  hand,  explains  the  gaps  in  natural  evolution 
by  hypothecating  a  divine  plan  in  which  higher  than 
physical  factors  find  rational  place.  It  does  not  wholly 
solve  the  moral  problem,  which  is  indeed  too  deep 
and  complex  for  human  solving;  but  it  relieves  that 
problem  of  an  unnecessary  and  peculiarly  stultifying 
element,  and  shows  that  sin  —  the  only  seeming 
exception  to  the  law  of  continuity  —  was  not  made 
by  God  to  be  an  inevitable  event  in  history,  but 
owes  its  origin  to  an  avoidable  and  voluntary  action 
of  creatures.  If  sin  is  really  what  man's  conscience 
declares  it  to  be,  no  other  explanation  of  it  is  morally 
tolerable. 

In  endeavouring  to  maintain  the  truth  of  the  cath- 
olic doctrine  of  man's  primitive  state,  we  shall  often 
be  hampered  by  absolute  lack  of  interest  in  the  subject 
among  those  whom  we  address.  This  indifference  may 
arise  from  an  inveterate,  although  mistaken,  convic- 
tion that  modern  science  has  put  our  doctrine  out  of 
court  among  intelligent  men.  But  there  is  another 
cause  of  indifference.  Men  are  not  likely  to  feel  a 
deep  interest  in  problems  the  solution  of  which  appears 
to  have  no  practical  bearing  or  importance;  and  the 
importance  of  a  correct  view  of  man's  primitive  spiritual 
condition  does  not  appear,  until  we  have  devoted  seri- 


HARMONIZED  WITH  EVOLUTION  185 

ous  attention  to  its  connection  with  other  truths  con- 
fessedly vital.  When  I  say  confessedly  vital,  I  mean 
among  those  who  accept  the  general  truth  of  Chris- 
tianity. 

If  Christianity  is  really  true,  its  primary  doctrines  of 
redeeming  grace  are  the  most  vital  of  all  truths  which 
lie  within  the  apprehension  of  human  beings.  Our 
eternal  welfare  is  bound  up  with,  and  conditioned  by, 
the  atoning  death  of  Christ  and  the  grace  of  regenera- 
tion that  is  secured  to  us  by  union  with  the  second 
Adam.  If  Christ  came  to  seek  and  to  save  those  who 
were  lost,^  then  we  must  either  repudiate  the  necessity 
and  significance  of  His  coming,  or  regard  ourselves  as 
fallen  from  the  state  which  our  Maker  intended  us  to 
enjoy,  and  which,  therefore,  if  He  is  the  God  we 
believe  Him  to  be,  He  must  originally  have  enabled 
man  to  enjoy.  The  doctrines  of  salvation  and  original 
//  I  righteousness  hang  together,  so  that  we  cannot  repudi- 
ate the  latter  and  consistently  retain  the  former.  Sim- 
ilarly, if  the  scriptural  and  catholic  doctrine  of 
baptismal  regeneration  has  any  valid  meaning  at  all, 
it  presupposes  that  the  natural  man  has  fallen  from 
grace,  and  is  not  in  the  state  originally  intended  and 
made  possible  for  him  by  His  Creator.^  If  the  intel- 
lectual conditions  of  our  age  make  it  peculiarly  diffi- 

1  St.  Luke  xix.  10. 

2  Dr.  Tennant  concedes  the  disagreement  of  the  purely  evolution- 
ary view  of  sin  with  baptismal  remission,  so  far  as  it  concerns  original 
sin.  Origin  of  Sin,  2d  ed.,  pp.  xii,  231.  His  concession  is  inade- 
quate but  significant. 


i86  MAN'S   PRIMITIVE    STATE 

cult  for  men  to  be  convinced  of  these  things,  we  may 
not  on  this  account  abandon  the  task  imposed  upon 
us  of  persuading  men  that  in  catholic  doctrine  lies  the 
truth  which  alone  can  enable  our  sinful  race  to  attain 
its  glorious  destiny. 


LECTURE    VI 

ORIGINAL   SIN 

If  the  purpose  of  my  last  lecture  was  successfully 
achieved,  the  task  now  before  us  has  been  much  sim- 
plified— the  task,  I  mean,  of  reckoning  with  the  im- 
plications of  the  evolutionary  hypothesis  which  bear, 
or  are  thought  to  bear,  upon  the  truth  of  the  catholic 
doctrine  of  sin.  If,  as  I  have  been  maintaining,  that 
hypothesis  permits  us  to  believe  that  man's  original 
state  was  one  of  supernatural  grace,  in  which  he  was 
enabled  wholly  to  avoid  sin  and  to  escape  the  physical 
death  to  which  he  was  naturally  liable,  it  would  also 
seem  to  permit  the  supposition  that  some  special  cause, 
in  addition  to  natural  evolution,  has  brought  about 
the  present  moral  condition  of  mankind. 

The  question  requiring  answer  is.  How  did  mankind  \ 
lose  the  advantages  of  that  primitive  state?  Why  is  it 
that  he  has  reverted,  so  to  speak,  to  the  condition  in 
which,  according  to  evolutionary  doctrine,  he  would 
naturally  have  been  from  the  beginning,  if  he  had  not 
been  given  supernatural  privileges  and  endowments? 
The  only  answer  to  this  question  with  which  we  have 
to  reckon  is  that  of  the  doctrine  of  the  fall  and  of  origi- 
nal sin.  The  evidences  which  establish  the  correct- 
ness of  that  answer  have  been  very  briefly  indicated 
in  my  fourth  lecture,  and  their  sufficiency  ought  not 

187 


i88  ORIGINAL   SIN 

to  be  questioned  by  those  who  believe  in  supernatural 
revelation,  in  biblical  inspiration  as  historically  under- 
stood, and  in  the  e\ddential  value  in  spiritual  matters 
of  scriptural  inductions.  In  this  connection  permit  me 
to  remind  you  once  more  that  arguments  based  upon 
the  use  of  isolated  proof-texts,  whether  positive  or 
negative,  constructive  or  critical,  have  little  value.  I 
have  sought  to  avoid  their  use,  and  feel  justified  in  dis- 
regarding critical  arguments  against  catholic  doctrine 
based  upon  the  inadequacy  of  such  proofs.^  Holy 
Scripture  contains  memorials  of  the  stages  of  a  pro- 
gressive revelation,  and  therefore  affords  data  that 
require  to  be  connected  in  a  comprehensive  view  of  the 
whole  process  —  its  earlier  stages  being  interpreted, 
not  by  the  limitations  of  meaning  which  they  exhibited 
at  first,  but  by  the  trend  and  inspired  purpose  which 
the  completed  process  enables  us  to  detect  throughout. 
If  early  revelations  meant  more  than  either  could  at  once 
appear  or  could  be  present  in  the  consciousness  of 
individual  sacred  writers,  the  Gospel  enables  us  to 
apprehend  that  more  without  either  forcing  Sacred 
Writ  into  unnatural  meanings  or  reading  into  it  the 
fancies  of  a  scholastic  imagination. 

But  in  these  lectures  our  primary  concern  is  not  with 

^  the  biblical  and  theological  validity  of  catholic  doctrine. 

'  The  question  before  us  is  this:    Assuming  that  man 
was  originally  in  a  sinless  state  of  grace,  and  that  the 

^  Cf.  pp.  139,  140,  above  —  especially  the  note  on  p.  140,  wherein 
Dr.  Tennant's  dependence  upon  a  negative  use  of  the  proof-text 
method  is  indicated. 


QUESTION  AT  ISSUE  189 

catholic  doctrine  as  to  the  cause  of  his  present  moral 
condition  is  otherwise  credible,  can  this  doctrine  stand 
the  test  of  comparison  with  the  established  results  of 
evolutionary  science?  The  doctrine  referred  to  con- 
tains two  propositions:  —  that  Adam's  sin  caused  his 
loss  of  grace  and  reversion  to  a  state  of  nature,  involving 
concupiscence  and  physical  mortality;  and  that  this 
fallen  condition  has  been  transmitted  to  his  posterity. 
It  is  only  the  second  of  these  propositions  that  can  be 
affected  in  any  way  by  evolutionary  science,  for  obvi- 
ously no  imaginable  result  of  physical  or  biological 
investigation  could  reduce  the  certainty  that  a  state  of 
grace,  and  whatever  supernatural  advantages  are 
afforded  thereby,  must  be  subverted  and  lost  when 
wilful  sin  is  committed.  No  human  being  can  sin 
without  thereby  giving  his  animal  nature  the  whip- 
hand;  and  the  incongruity  between  such  a  result  and 
a  retention  of  his  original  and  supernatural  advantages, 
as  described  in  catholic  doctrine,  hardly  needs  to  be 
argued.^ 

1  Two  objections  of  Dr.  Tennant,  based  upon  other  than  evolu- 
tionary grounds,  and  therefore  not  discussed  in  the  main  text,  ought 
perhaps  to  be  noticed.     See  his  Origin  of  Sin,  pp.  27-31. 

(a)  He  urges  the  diflSculty  of  accounting  for  sin  on  the  part  of 
beings  whose  disposition  had  been  made  righteous.  Such  an  objec- 
tion seems  to  be  based  upon  an  uncatholic  conception  of  original 
righteousness.  All  that  catholic  doctrine  on  this  point  teaches  is 
that  the  natural  propensities  of  the  flesh  in  our  first  parents  were 
counterbalanced  —  not  nullified  —  by  supernatural  grace.  The 
possibility  of  carnal  motives  appealing  to  the  will  and  causing  tempta- 
tion remained.  What  grace  secured  for  Adam  was  sufficient  spiritual 
motive  and  power  invariably  to  resist  temptation  —  in  short,  full 


IQO  ORIGINAL   SIN 

Our  question  then  reduces  itself  to  this:  Does  evo- 
lutionary science  permit  us  to  believe  that  our  first 
parents  transmitted  their  fallen  condition  to  their 
posterity?  It  is  a  question,  you  will  observe,  of 
transmission  of  characters;  ^  and  we  have  to  consider 
what  biological  science   teaches  on  that  subject.    In 

freedom  to  choose  between  sin  and  sinlessness,  and  sufficient  discern- 
ment of  the  wrongfulness  of  sin.  The  disposition  of  our  first  parents, 
in  the  ordinary  sense  of  that  word,  was  not  a  prius  of  temptation, 
but  was  yet  to  be  determined  by  his  conduct.  Originally  he  was  by 
nature  open  to  sinful  inducements  and  by  grace  sufficiently  supplied 
with  inducements  to  avoid  sin.  He  possessed  both  the  motives  and 
the  power  of  either  good  or  evil  choice.  But  when  he  sinned,  grace 
was  alienated,  and  the  natural  predominance  of  his  inherited  animal 
instincts  asserted  itself. 

{h)  The  other  objection  is  that  human  experience  affords  no  anal- 
ogy of  so  serious  a  subversion  of  the  balance  of  man's  faculties  by 
one  act  of  sin  as  is  implied  in  the  doctrine  of  Adam's  fall.  The  want 
of  an  analogy  is  easily  explained.  Our  experience  in  this  regard  is 
concerned  wholly  with  fallen  man.  The  consequences  of  sin  on  the 
part  of  a  previously  sinless  man  —  that  sinlessness  being  made  pos- 
sible by  grace  —  could  be  realized  but  once  in  history;  because  when 
the  first  sin  occurred,  the  conditions  under  which  it  was  committed 
permanently  disappeared.  Moreover,  the  consequences  of  that  sin 
need  not  be  thought  to  be  sudden  in  their  full  actualization.  WTiat 
was  the  immediate  result?  It  was  no  such  subversive  disturbance 
of  man's  natural  faculties  as  is  hypothecated  in  Dr.  Tennant's  objec- 
tion. It  consisted  simply  in  an  alienation  of  grace  and  a  loss  of  all 
moral  resources  that  were  not  afforded  by  his  unassisted  nature. 
But,  Dr.  Tennant  being  witness,  man's  natural  state  involves  a  con- 
flict "between  nature  and  nurture,"  and  all  the  moral  evils  which  are 
in  fact  actualized  in  human  history.  That  they  have  been  actualized 
under  the  laws  of  natural  development,  and  gradually,  does  not 
militate  against  the  catholic  doctrine  of  the  fall.  Cf.  Tennant,  Origin 
of  Sin,  pp.  gi  et  seq. 

^  Whether  of  acquired  characters  remains  to  be  seen. 


SIDE   ISSUES   ELIMINATED  19I 

my  second  lecture  I  explained  to  you  the  rival  the- 
ories of  neo-Lamarckians  and  neo- Darwinians  as  to 
the  transmission  of  acquired  characters.  Lamarck 
had  maintained,  at  the  commencement  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  that  the  natural  evolution  of  species 
is  accomplished  by  the  transmission  of  organic  varia- 
tions originally  produced  by  the  use,  or  non-use,  of 
organs.  This  view  came  to  be  described  technically 
as  the  transmission  of  "acquired  characters."  Pro- 
fessor Weismann  not  very  many  years  ago  assailed 
Lamarck's  doctrine,  and  denied  that  acquired  char- 
|\acters  are,  or  can  be,  transmitted,  basing  his  denial 
/upon  results  of  investigation  into  the  respective  func- 
f  tions  of  germ-cells  and  somatic  cells. ^  It  has  been 
thought  that  if  his  denial  has  been  made  good,  we 
must  surrender  our  belief  in  the  transmission  of 
Adam's  fallen  condition  to  his  posterity.  We  have 
therefore  to  consider  whether  Weismann' s  conclusion 
constitutes  a  scientific  result  with  which  we  must 
reckon;  and  whether,  if  so,  it  is  inconsistent  with  the 
doctrine  of  original  sin. 


Before  undertaking  this  the  chief  remaining  task 
of  these  lectures,  I  wish  to  make  a  digression  —  one, 
however,  which  may  help  us  to  avoid  confusing  side 
issues,  and  thus  more  clearly  to  understand  exactly 
what   is   involved  in   discussing  the  problem  of   the 

1  Germ-cells  discharge  the  function  of  propagating  the  species. 
Somatic  cells  combine  to  build  up  the  soma  or  individual  organism. 


192  ORIGINAL   SIN 

transmission  of  Adam's  carnal  tendencies.  You  may 
remember  that  in  my  fourth  lecture  I  mentioned  cer- 
tain speculative  opinions  connected  with  the  problem 
of  sin,  which  have  come  to  be  mixed  up  in  many  minds 
with  catholic  doctrine,  and  which  ought  not  to  be  per- 
mitted to  embarrass  our  consideration  of  that  doctrine. 
Before  proceeding  further,  I  wish  again  to  call  your 
attention  to  them,  and  to  explain  more  fully  than  was 
practicable  at  that  stage  of  my  argument  their  pre- 
carious nature,  and  the  importance  of  dissociating  them 
from  the  really  catholic  doctrine  of  the  fall  and  of 
original  sin. 

I.  First  of  all  allow  me  to  insist  that  a  catholic  be- 
liever may  safely  refuse  to  be  committed  to  a  defence  of 
any  particular  theory  of  predestination.  I  say  theory, 
for  it  is  impossible  for  a  believer  in  Holy  Scripture  to 
deny  that  divine  predestination  constitutes  a  factor  in 
human  history,  and  in  the  mystery  of  sin.  The  re- 
ality of  this  factor  is  clearly  asserted  by  St.  Paul,^  is 
maintained  by  catholic  writers  of  all  schools,  and  is 
borne  out  by  certain  deductions  from  the  doctrine  of 
divine  power  and  sovereign  providence.  But  revelation 
nowhere  affords  us  sufficient  knowledge  of  the  nature 
and  method  of  this  predestination  to  justify  dogmatism 
in  regard  to  the  definitions  on  the  subject  which  have 
gained  currency,  whether  Augustinian,  Calvin istic, 
Arminian,  or  Jansenist;  and  such  definitions  may  not 
be  permitted  either  to  prejudice  the  counter  truths  con- 
nected with  human  freedom  and  responsibihty,  or  to 

1  Especially  in  Rom.  viii.  28-30. 


SIDE    ISSUES    ELIMINATED  193 

determine  the  content  of  the  doctrine  of  sin.^  The  cau- 
tion and  vagueness  with  which  the  subject  of  predesti-  | 
nation  is  handled  in  one  of  our  Articles  of  Religion  is 
noticeable;  and  that  article  proved  to  be  quite  unsatis- 
fying to  those  who  at  the  time  of  its  publication  were 
agitating  the  question.  The  seventeenth  article  indeed 
acknowledges  that  God  has  chosen  the  subjects  of  His 
saving  grace  from  eternity,  and  it  could  hardly  acknowl- 
edge less  if  the  subject  were  handled  in  any  manner; 
and  it  goes  on  to  speak  of  the  comfort  which  the  sub- 
jects of  grace  feel  in  the  contemplation  of  this  mystery. 
But,  lest  such  acknowledgment  should  seem  to  counte- 
nance the  very  precise  definitions  of  that  age,  the  article 
proceeds  to  point  out  the  baneful  effects  upon  sinners 
of  speculation  concerning  the  subject,  and  reminds  us 

1  The  best  treatment  of  the  subject  is  perhaps  J.  B.  Mozley, 
Augustinian  Doctrine  of  Predestination  —  a  work  to  which  I  have 
frequently  referred  in  these  pages.  The  subject  should  in  the  first 
place  be  studied  historically,  with  the  aid  of  such  histories  of  doc- 
trine as  those  of  Harnack,  Hagenbach,  Neander,  and  Bethune- 
Baker. 

Predestination  may  be  accepted  in  three  forms:  {a)  Of  individuals 
and  races  to  especial  privileges  in  this  world  —  e.g.,  of  Israel,  and  of 
individuals  to  baptismal  grace;  {b)  Of  the  Church,  in  her  corporate 
capacity,  to  glory;  (c)  Of  individuals,  as  such,  to  glory.  Scripture 
is  most  frequently  concerned  with  (a)  and  (&)  and  defines  practically 
nothing  with  reference  to  (c).  The  controversies  of  the  Augustin- 
ian and  subsequent  ages  have  to  do  with  (c).  They  lie  chiefly  (i) 
between  absolute  predestination,  having  no  reference  to  human  merits, 
and  predestination  based  upon  knowledge  of  human  conduct;  (2) 
between  predestination  to  glory  —  no  other  predestination  being 
involved,  —  and  a  double  predestination  of  certain  to  glory  and  of 
the  rest  to  damnation.  No  one  of  these  conflicting  positions  is  sup- 
ported by  catholic  consent. 

14 


194  ORIGINAL   SIN 

that  the  mystery  in  question  may  not  be  defined  and 
maintained  in  terms  that  nulHfy  the  general  vahdity 
for  mankind  of  the  promises  of  God  and  of  our  re- 
sponsibihty  for  obedience  to  the  revealed  will  of  God.^ 

The  conclusions  to  which  we  are  driven  by  every 
consideration  that  can  rightly  determine  our  view  of 
the  matter  are  that  the  mystery  of  predestination  can 
be  apprehended  only  in  an  incipient  form,  and  one 
which  precludes  definition ;  that  it  may  not  be  accepted 
in  a  manner  that  either  alters  or  subverts  other  truths, 
made  known  to  us  by  revelation  and  experience;  and 
that  no  inferences  can  be  made  from  it  which  are  either 
sufficiently  certain  or  comprehensive  enough  in  their 
bearing  to  justify  our  use  of  them  in  determining  and 
defending  catholic  doctrine.  A  critical  example  of 
error  in  this  regard  is  the  theory  of  irresistible  grace, 
which  was  broached  incidentally  by  St.  Augustine, 
was  involved  in  much  scholastic  theology,  and  was 
erected  into  a  dogma  by  modern  Calvinism.  Such  a 
theory  is  logically  subversive  of  human  responsibility, 
and  of  the  cathohc  doctrine  of  sin;  and  is  therefore  to 
be  passed  by  in  our  argument,  as  non-relevant  to  our 
purpose. 

2.  A  second  opinion  which  ought  carefully  to  be 
dissociated  from  biblical  and  cathohc  doctrine  is  the 
view  that  the  guilt  of  Adam,  using  the  word  guilt  in 
its  strict  and  literal  sense,  has  been  transmitted  to  all 
of  his  descendants,  so  that  new-born  infants  are  to 

*  See  Bishop  Forbes,  Bishop  Gibson,  E.  T.  Green,  and  B.  J.  Kidd 
on  The  Thirty-nine  Articles,  Art.  xvii. 


SIDE   ISSUES   ELIMINATED  195 

blame  for  his  sin  before  they  are  capable  of  distin- 
guishing between  right  and  wrong  and  of  wittingly 
choosing  the  wrong.  St.  Paul,  in  the  fifth  chapter  of 
his  Epistle  to  the  Romans^  has  been  understood  by 
many  to  imply  such  doctrine,  when  he  says  that,  "as 
through  one  man  sin  entered  into  the  world,  and  death 
through  sin;  and  so  death  passed  unto  all  men,  for 
that  all  sinned."  ^  The  Greek  of  the  last  phrase  is 
*€</>'  (S  TravTcs  y/mprov,  and  by  mistakenly  rendering 
*e<^' w  as  equivalent  to  in  quo,  "in  whom,"  the  Vul- 
gate and  St.  Augustine  have  helped  to  give  plausi- 
biHty  to  such  exegesis.^  But  the  whole  context  shows 
that  St.  Paul  is  using  the  terminology  of  sin  in  an 
extended  appHcation,  which  requires  us  to  interpret  his 
language  as  to  some  extent  symbolical.  Sin,  strictly 
taken,  means  a  personal  act.  St.  Paul  obviously  could 
not  have  meant  to  say  that  all  committed  sin  in  Adam 
in  the  sense  of  personal  action.  But  if  he  did  not  mean 
that,  he  was  plainly  using  the  verb  "to  sin"  in  an 
extended  and  derivative  sense ;  ^  and  we  must,  in  view 
of  the  context,  take  him  to  be  applying  the  term  sin  to 
describe  —  not  the  act  of  sin  itself,  but  —  the  conse- 
quence for  us  of  Adam's  act.  This  consequence  is 
called  sin  because  it  not  only  comes  from  sin  but  also 

^  Rom.  V.  12. 

2  St  Augustine,  contra  Duas  Epp.  Pelag.,  iv.  7,  c.  4;  c.  Jul.,  vi.  75; 
Cf.  W.  Bright,  Lessons  from  the  Lives  of  Three  Great  Fathers,  p.  174, 
note  i;  J.  F.  Bethune-Baker,  Early  Hist,  of  Christ.  Doctrine,  p.  309- 
note  2. 

3  Cf.  p.  145  (esp.  note  i),  above;  also  F.  R.  Tennant,  Sources,  pp. 
267,  268. 


196  ORIGINAL    SIN 

engenders  sin  on  our  part,  when  the  law  affords  occa- 
sion for  disobedience.  In  short,  the  phenomenon  of 
inherited  Habihty  to  sin  is  described  in  the  terms  of  its 
causation  and  of  its  effects.^  The  sense  in  which  St. 
Paul  could  say  that  all  sinned  in  Adam's  transgression 
must  be,  in  effect,  that  all  are  involved  in  the  effects  of 
Adam's  sin  in  such  wise  that  they  also  sin  when  given 
opportunity.  That  he  is  using  the  word  sin  in  a  deriva- 
tive sense  is  also  shown  by  the  language  which  he  pro- 
ceeds to  employ:  "For  until  the  law,  sin  was  in  the 
world:  but  sin  is  not  imputed  when  there  is  no  law. 
Nevertheless  death  reigned  from  Adam  until  Moses, 
even  over  them  that  had  not  sinned  after  the  hkeness 
of  Adam's  transgression,"  etc.^  It  is  clear  that  if  sin 
is  described  to  be  in  the  world  in  relation  to  those  who 
have  not  literally  sinned  like  Adam,  this  sin  is  not 
actual  sin,  but  the  death,  physical  and  spiritual,  which 
reigned  because  of  sin  and  which  subsequently  engen- 
dered sin.  Moreover,  St.  Paul's  denial  that  sin  is 
imputed  when  there  is  no  law  —  no  occasion  for  actual 
sin  —  shows  that  he  did  not  mean  to  teach  that  God 
holds  those  to  be  "guilty"  who  as  yet  have  "not  sinned 
after  the  likeness  of  Adam's  transgression." 

Such  teaching,  however,  is  to  be  found  in  St,  Augus- 
tine's writings,  and  is  perhaps  involved  in  a  very  few 
passages  of  earlier  patristic  literature;  but  it  is  not 
primitive,  and  has  never  gained  catholic  consent.  It 
comes  from  technicalizing  metaphorical  language,  and 
thus  making  it  to  suggest  a  meaning  which  St.  Paul's 

J  3ee  p.  136,  above.  ^  Rom.  v.  13,  14. 


SIDE    ISSUES   ELIMINATED  197 

actual  teaching  does  not  warrant.  The  phrase  "orig- 
inal sin"  cannot  now  be  banished  from  the  theology  of 
transmitted  tendency  to  sin,  but  its  constant  distinction 
in  theology  from  actual  sin  ought  to  preclude  its  iden- 
tification with  personal  guilt.  If  so,  then  we  ought  to 
treat  all  the  phrases  of  similar  suggestiveness  which 
appear  in  St.  Paul  and  in  theological  documents  with 
the  same  discriminating  allowance  for  rhetorical  sym- 
bolism.^ To  take  a  critical  example,  if  we  are  said 
to  be  "by  nature  children  of  wrath,"  ^  the  analogy  of 
the  use  of  language  which  I  have  been  discussing 
warrants  our  understanding  this  to  mean  that  our 
natural  condition  inclines  us  to  conduct  that  displeases 
God.  It  is  quite  unnecessary  to  read  into  the  phrase 
the  teaching  that  God  is  angry  with  new-born  infants 
for  being  what  they  have  had  no  choice  in  becoming. 
The  free  and  partially  figurative  language  of  St.  Paul 
was  useful  for  accentuating  ideas  that  needed  to  be 
emphasized.  But  it  becomes  misleading  and  perni- 
cious when  in  theology  it  is  employed  to  signify  more 
than  he  can  be  shown  to  have  meant  by  it.^ 

1  Dr.  Tennant  perceives  the  metaphorical  use  to  which  St.  Paul 
puts  the  word  sin;  Origin  of  Sin,  p.  94;  but  betrays  a  tendency  to 
regard  every  acknowledgment  by  catholic  writers  that  we  have 
sinned  in  Adam  as  of  itself  proving  their  belief  in  transmitted  guilt. 

2  The  Church  Catechism.  Cf.  Ephes.  ii.  3,  as  considered  above, 
p.  145,  where  references  are  given. 

3  We  can  fully  sympathize  with  Dr.  Tennant's  regret  that  theol- 
ogy has  technicalized  the  phrase  "original  sin"  and  related  terms, 
without  either  undertaking  to  repudiate  a  terminology  so  long  estab- 
lished or  supposing  its  use  invariably  to  imply  a  literal  imputation 
of  Adam's  sin  to  his  posterity  and  a  transmission  of  his  guilt. 


198  ORIGINAL   SIN 

3.  Equally  pernicious  and  uncatholic,  as  well  as 
unscriptural,  is  the  sixteenth-century  theory  of  total 
depravity.  I  mean  the  theory  that  the  fall  has  made 
human  nature  a  positive  mass  of  unqualified  evil.  No 
doubt  many  writers  have  called  man  totally  depraved 
without  meaning  more  than  that  he  is  utterly  unable 
by  his  unassisted  natural  powers  to  save  himself,  and 
to  attain  to  the  supernatural  destiny  for  which  he  was 
made.  But  the  phrase  is  misleading  when  thus  used, 
as  well  as  modern,  and  has  certainly  meant  in  certain 
Calvinistic  circles  the  horrible  opinion  which  I  have 
defined.  Rhetorical  emphasis  upon  man's  sinfulness 
may  result  in  the  use  of  language  that  implies  an  utter 
lack  of  good  in  human  nature;  but  to  assert  such  total 
depravity  with  literal  meaning  is  to  go  counter  to  much 
Scripture  and  to  common  knowledge.  To  say  that  the 
seeming  virtues  of  the  unregenerate  are  splendid  vices 
is  to  contradict  experience.  Happily  for  us,  believers 
in  catholic  doctrine  are  free  to  acknowledge  thankfully 
that  the  unregenerate  are  not  wholly  given  over  to  evil. 
Abundant  evidence  is  continually  appearing  that,  with 
all  their  tendency  to  sin,  and  their  natural  incapacity 
to  fulfil  the  supernatural  end  for  which  they  were  made, 
the  unregenerate  have  capacity  for  natural  virtues,  — 
for  virtues  which  only  need  rightly  to  be  related,  and 
to  be  completed  by  heavenly  grace  and  virtue,  in  order 
to  become  the  foundation  and  earnest  of  Christian 
perfection.  It  is  their  inability  wholly  to  avoid  sin 
even  as  they  understand  it,  and  their  incapacity  in 
things  that  directly  pertain  to  man's  chief  end,  that 


SIDE    ISSUES   ELIMINATED  199 

constitute  the  moral  state  hypothecated  by  the  cathoHc 
doctrine  of  original  sin. 

4.  Another  uncatholic  opinion,  which  the  technical 
use  of  St.  Paul's  symbolical  language  has  made  to 
appear  scriptural  to  many,  is  the  view  that  original  sin 
deservedly  brings  everlasting  punishment,  even  upon 
those  who  die  before  they  have  committed  sins  of  their 
own.  This  opinion  is  closely  related  to  one  which  I 
have  already  shown  to  be  unwarranted  —  the  view 
that  the  personal  guilt  of  Adam  is  transmitted  to  his 
posterity.  The  most  plausible  scriptural  exegesis  which 
is  thought  to  support  the  notion  that  God  is  angry  with 
fallen  creatures  because  of  their  inborn  condition  is 
a  common  interpretation  of  the  passage  in  the  Epistle 
to  the  Ephesians,  wherein  his  readers  are  declared  to 
have  been,  previously  to  their  regeneration  in  Christ, 
*'by  nature  children  of  wrath."  ^  I  have  already  shown 
that  we  are  not  justified  in  taking  this  phrase  to  mean 
that  God  is  angry  with  the  unregenerate  because  of 
conditions  which  they  have  had  no  part  in  producing.^ 
A  general  induction  of  scriptural  teaching  on  the  sub- 
ject shows  that  the  attitude  of  God  towards  fallen 
mankind  is  one  of  loving  pity  —  the  depth  of  which  is 
demonstrated  by  the  costly  mystery  of  the  death  of  the 
Son  of  God  for  us  while  we  were  yet  sinners.^  Such 
induction  also  shows  that  the  alternative  of  heaven  or 
hell  is  limited  in  its  asserted  application  to  those  who 

*  Ephes.  ii.  3. 

2  See  pp.  145,  197,  above. 

3  Rom.  V.  6-8;  Ephes.  ii.  4-8. 


200  ORIGINAL   SIN 

have  the  opportunity  of  accepting,  or  rejecting,  the 
redemption  of  Christ.  How  God  will  deal  with  those 
who  by  reason  of  the  many  forms  of  invincible  ignorance 
do  not  enjoy  this  opportunity  is  not  the  subject-matter 
of  scriptural  teaching.  We  may  infer  that  the  love 
which  is  shown  in  redemption  will  not  be  lacking  in 
any  dealings  of  God  with  His  creatures,  but  beyond 
this  we  have  no  basis  for  assertion  either  in  Scripture 
or  in  catholic  doctrine.  We  can  only  maintain  with 
St.  James  that  we  have  been  "begotten  by  the  W^ord 
of  truth  that  we  should  be  a  kind  of  firstfruits  of  His 
creatures,"  ^  and  rest  upon  the  scriptural  truth  that 
God  "willeth  that  all  men  should  be  saved."  ^  If  any 
are  finally  lost  it  will  be,  therefore,  because  their  own 
conscious  obstinacy  has  made  salvation  impossible, 
and  omnipotence  has  no  application  to  the  impos- 
sible. 

Our  ninth  Article  of  Religion  says  of  man's  inherited 
moral  state  that,  "in  every  man  born  into  this  world, 
it  deserveth  God's  wrath  and  damnation;  "  and  the 
Church  Catechism  declares  that  we  are  "by  nature 
born  in  sin,  and  the  children  of  wrath."  These  asser- 
tions are  so  closely  modelled  upon  scriptural  language 
that  their  interpretation  ought  to  be  determined  by 
correct  biblical  exegesis.  This  is  obviously  the  case 
with  the  language  of  the  Church  Catechism,  and  a  con- 
sideration of  the  great  ambiguity  of  the  phrase,  "de- 
serveth God's  wrath  and  damnation,"  will  justify 
a  similar  treatment  of  it.     Damnation,  strictly  taken, 

1  St.  James  i.  iS.  '  i  Tim.  ii.  4. 


SIDE    ISSUES   ELIMINATED  201 

means  condemnation/  and  need  not  be  taken  in  its 
acquired  and  popular  meaning  of  everlasting  torment. 
It  is  possible,  so  far  as  we  know,  that  some  of  those  who 
are  technically  among  the  finally  damned  ^  receive 
blessings  suited  to  their  capacity,  and  are  happier  than 
they  would  be  if  forced  into  the  kind  of  contact  with 
God  that  is  promised  to  faithful  Christians.  I  have  in 
mind  the  speculative  view  of  ancient  as  well  as  later 
writers  that  there  is  a  middle  state  for  the  reward  of 
righteous  heathen.^  The  truth  of  this  view  cannot  of 
course  be  known  to  us  in  this  world. 

The  word  "deserve"  has  several  very  distinct  mean- 
ings, and  it  was  a  failure  to  distinguish  between  them 
that  had  much  to  do  with  making  futile  a  large  amount 
of  sixteenth-century  controversy  on  the  subject  of 
human  merit.  Permit  me  to  mention  two  of  the  chief 
meanings  that  might  be  intended  by  the  word  "deserve." 

(a)  In  the  first  place,  in  its  strictest  sense,  it  refers 
to  either  personal  guilt  or  merit  on  account  of  works. 
A  man  deserves  punishment  for  evil  deeds  and  reward 

1  Condemnation,  it  may  be  understood,  as  in  its  present  state 
unfit  for  the  attainment  of  its  appointed  destiny. 

2  The  finally  damned  are,  in  the  technical  use  of  certain  theolo- 
gians, all  those  who  miss  the  beatific  vision,  whether  they  are  con- 
signed to  a  state  of  misery  or  not. 

3  Patristic  views  are  given  by  J.  B.  Mozley,  Predestination,  ch.  iv. 
pp.  1 1 7-1 23.  St.  Thomas  in  Sum.  Theol.,  III.  Suppl.  Ixxi.,  main- 
tains for  unbaptized  infants  a  natural  beatification,  in  which  there 
is  no  sense  of  loss  of  the  beatific  vision.  Cf.  A.  P.  Forbes,  Nicene 
Creed,  p.  305;  E.  B.  Pusey,  What  is  of  Faith  as  to  Everlasting  Pun- 
ishment, p.  II.  A  valuable  history  of  opinion  as  to  the  "Lot  of 
Those  Dying  in  Original  Sin  "  is  given  by  Dr.  P.  J.  Toner  in  The 
Irish  Theol.  Quarterly  for  July,  1909,  pp.  313-326. 


202  ORIGINAL   SIN 

for  meritorious  ones.  Scripture  threatens  sinners  — 
I  mean  actual  sinners  —  with  divine  penalties  and 
promises  the  reward  of  eternal  life  to  the  righteous.* 
When  it  is  said  that  we  cannot  deserve  heaven  by  our 
good  works,  two  things  are  meant:  that  they  are  re- 
duced in  value  by  the  sins  which  we  continue  to  com- 
mit; and  that  in  any  case  they  are  inadequate  to  deserve, 
as  a  wage,  so  great  a  blessing  as  that  of  eternal  life 
with  God.  It  is  only  by  reason  of  their  being  done  in 
Christ  that  they  are  effectual,  and  it  is  by  reason  of 
His  merit  that  they  are  so  superabundantly  rewarded.^ 
(b)  Obviously,  to  speak  of  a  state  as  deserving  wrath, 
where  no  actions  of  the  person  involved  are  referred  to, 
is  to  use  the  word  in  a  derivative  sense,  and  this  deriva- 
tive sense  is  found  in  common  speech  as  well  as  in 
theology.  It  is  practically  equivalent  to  ''fit  for"  and 
"entitled  to,"  by  reason  of  such  fitness.  Thus  a  brute 
is  said  to  deserve  such  treatment  as  its  nature  fits  it 
to  receive,  and  not  to  deserve  either  inferior  or  superior 
treatment.  The  same  language  is  employed  with 
reference  to  man.  "A  man  is  a  man  for  a'  that,"  and 
deserves  humane  treatment.  His  created  nature  is 
entitled,  in  brief,  to  be  satisfied  within  the  hmits  of  its 
existing  physical  and  moral  capacities.  He  deserves 
that  much.  But  he  does  not  deserve  more;  and  this 
negation  may  be  expressed  in  positive  form  by  saying 

1  St.  Matt.  vi.  4,  6,  i8;  xvi.  27.  The  word  fucrdbs,  wage,  is  often 
employed  to  describe  the  reward  of  the  righteous;  e.g.,  St.  Matt.  v. 
12;  I  Cor.  iii.  14;  2  St.  John  8. 

2  St.  Luke  xvii.  10;  Rom.  vi.  23;  Ephes.  ii.  8. 


SIDE   ISSUES   ELIMINATED  203 

he  deserves  to  be  excluded  from  receiving  more  — not 
because  guilty  of  wrong-doing,  but  because,  in  his 
existing  condition,  he  is  unfit  for  more. 

Now  it  is  this  secondary  sense  that  must  be  given  to 
our  ninth  article,  if  we  are  to  avoid  making  it  teach 
something  abhorrent  to  our  sense  of  justice,  as  well  as 
foreign  to  cathoHc  doctrine.  Because  in  his  fallen 
state  every  man  is  unfit  for  his  supernatural  destiny, 
he  deserveth  exclusion  from  that  destiny  so  long  as 
such  unfitness  continues.^  Official  language,  in  any 
case,  cannot  be  imposed  in  an  indefensible  meaning, 
when  its  terms  are  ambiguous  and  susceptible  of  a 
more  tolerable  construction.  What  the  sixteenth-cen- 
tury framers  of  the  ninth  article  beheved  on  the  subject 
has  official  weight  only  so  far  as  they  succeeded  in  secur- 
ing its  unambiguous  expression  by  the  Church.  But 
even  could  it  be  shown  that  our  Articles  teach  that  God 
is  angry  with  all  the  unregenerate  because  of  their 
inherited  natural  impulses,  and  that  He  will  everlast- 
ingly punish  all  who  die  unregenerate,  whether  they 
commit  personal  sins  or  not,  such  teaching  would  have 
no  ecumenical  authority.  It  would  be  provincial  only. 
We  can  accept  the  cathoHc  doctrine  of  original  sin 
without  being  committed  to  it. 

^  The  fact  that  this  unfitness  ought  not  to  be  gives  a  moral  sense  to 
the  negative  deserving,  and  a  penal  quality  to  the  result  —  that  is, 
in  the  abstract  and  in  relation  to  the  sin  of  Adam  by  which  it  is  caused. 
But  inasmuch  as  the  new-born  child  has  no  part  in  producing  his 
unfitness,  we  may  not  regard  it  either  as  involving  personal  guilt, 
or  as  imparting  to  its  results  the  quality  of  personal  punishment, 
which  has  no  meaning  except  in  relation  to  personal  guilt 


^^ 


y 


204  ORIGINAL    SIN 

II 

It  is  now  time  to  return  to  the  main  course  of  our 
argument,  and  to  discuss  the  problem  of  the  transmis- 
sion of  our  first  parents'  fallen  state  to  their  posterity. 
In  considering  this  problem  we  have  chiefly  to  reckon 
with  Professor  Weismann's  denial  of  the  transmission 
of  acquired  characters. 

Weismann's  argument^  is  substantially  this:  Indi- 
vidual organisms  contain  two  kinds  of  cells  —  germ- 
cells  and  somatic  cells.  The  latter  are  the  ones  which, 
by  their  multipHcation,  differentiation,  and  growth, 
build  up  the  body  or  soma;  and  they  alone  are  affected 
by  the  use  and  non-use  of  organs,  or  become  modified 
by  the  characters  acquired  during  the  lifetime  of  the 
individual  organism.  But  they  have  no  part  in  the 
propagation  of  species,  so  that  their  acquired  charac- 
ters perish  when  the  individual  dies.  The  process  of 
propagation  takes  place  wholly  within  the  germ-cells, 
and  no  variations  or  characters  can  be  transmitted  to 
offspring  unless  they  have  affected  these  germ-cells. 
But  the  germ-cells,  it  is  maintained,  are  isolated  from 
the  other  cells  of  the  soma  or  organism  at  large, and  can- 
not be  affected  by  the  ordinary  causes  which  modify  the 
organism  during  an  individual  lifetime.  The  acquired 
characters  of  the  organism  cannot  therefore  be  trans- 
mitted —  at  least,  not  unless  they  are  of  a  very  radical 
nature,  and  such  as  affect  the  organism  at  its  root. 

1  Already  summarized  in  pp.  65-67,  above,  where  references  are 
given. 


ACQUIRED    CHARACTERS  205 

It  will  be  observed  that  Weismann's  view  is  based 
upon  a  rigidly  mechanical  conception  of  organisms  and 
of  their  propagation.  The  plausibility  of  his  argument 
lies  to  some  extent  in  our  inability  to  imagine  any  me- 
chanical process  by  which  a  change  in  a  functional 
part  of  the  organism  can  so  affect  the  germ-cells  as  to 
cause  them  to  reproduce  that  change  in  the  same  part 
of  the  organisms  of  offspring.  In  the  absence  of  com- 
plete knowledge  of  the  process  of  propagation,  and  of 
the  laws  that  determine  heredity,  the  basis  of  his  argu- 
ment is  not  free  from  elements  of  insecurity,  and  his 
exclusion  of  non-mechanical  or  superphysical  factors 
cannot  be  proved  to  be  warranted.  In  short,  his  posi- 
tion is  to  a  considerable  extent  based  upon  speculative 
premises,  and  is  largely  supported  by  an  appeal  to  our 
inability  to  furnish  an  exact  and  demonstrable  descrip- 
tion of  the  process  of  transmitting  acquired  characters. 

Over  against  his  contentions  must  be  placed  the  cir- 
cumstance that  many  modern  biologists,  in  spite  of 
their  acquaintance  with  Weismann's  arguments,  are 
led  by  observed  facts  —  especially  in  the  fields  of 
paleontology,  domestic  breeding,  and  medical  science 
—  to  the  conclusion  that  acquired  characters  are  in 
many  instances  certainly  transmitted.  The  issue  is 
one  between  a  partially  speculative  theory  of  cellular 
processes  and  the  inferences  ordinarily  drawn  by 
paleontologists,  professional  breeders,  and  physicians 
from  the  facts  which  come  within  their  observation.^ 

1  See  V.  L.  Kellogg,  Darwinism  To-day,  pp.  271,  272.  He  gives 
a  bibliography  of  the  subject  on  p.  305.     Herbert  Spencer's  argu- 


2o6  ORIGINAL   SIN 

Among  these  facts  the  ones  which  are  most  open  to 
general  observation  are  connected  with  the  hereditary 
nature  of  certain  diseases,  such  as  tuberculosis  and 
syphihs.  Dr.  Brown-Sequard  performed  some  notable 
experiments  upon  guinea-pigs  which  seem  to  prove 
that  an  artificially  induced  epilepsy  can  be  transmitted.^ 
There  seems  to  be  something  desperate  in  Professor 
Weismann's  comment  on  these  experiments  when  he 
says,  "Clearly  formulated  problems,  Uke  that  of  the 
inheritance  of  acquired  characters,  should  not  be  con- 
fused by  bringing  into  them  phenomena  whose  causes 
are  quite  unknown.  What  do  we  know  of  the  real 
causes  of  those  central  brain  irritations  which  give 
rise  to  the  phenomena  of  epilepsy  ?  It  is  certain  enough 
that  there  are  diseases  which  are  acquired  and  yet 
are  'inherited,'  but  that  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
Lamarckian  principle,  because  it  is  a  question  of  in- 
fection of  the  germ,  not  of  a  definite  variation  in  the 
constitution  of  the  germ."  ^  What  does  such  a  reply 
amount  to?  The  question  at  issue  is  not  whether  the 
effect  of  disease  on  the  germ  is  to  be  called  ''infection," 
instead  of  a  "definite  variation,"  nor  whether  we  know 
the  real  causes  of  the  irritations  which  produce  epilepsy. 
The  question  is.  Are  acquired  diseases  inherited?  He 
confesses  that  in  certain  instances  they  are,  and  thus 
concedes  the  real  point  at  issue;  for  no  one  now  main- 

ments  in  behalf  of  the  Lamarckian  view  are  summarized  by  R.  H. 
Lock,  Recent  Progress,  pp.  59-65. 

^  Described  by  V.  L.  Kellogg,  op.  cii.,  pp.  290-295. 

2  Evolution  Theory,  Vol.  II.  p.  68. 


ACQUIRED    CHARACTERS  207 

tains  either  that  all  acquired  characters  are  transmitted, 
or  that  the  Lamarckian  factor  is  of  universal  validity 
in  the  organic  world,  and  capable  of  displacing  natural 
selection. 

Weismann's  position  cannot  be  regarded  as  constitut- 
ing an  estabhshed  result  of  biological  investigation,  for 
it  is  rejected  by  many  of  those  to  whom  we  look  for 
expert  judgment  in  biological  problems.  We  could 
not  reasonably  be  blamed,  therefore,  if  we  refused  to 
reckon  with  it  in  putting  catholic  doctrine  to  the  test 
of  evolutionary  science.  But  I  think  that  we  shall  be 
better  advised  if  we  take  Weismann's  position  more 
seriously;  for,  in  spite  of  its  disputatious  nature,  a 
wide-spread  conviction  exists  that  it  has  a  good  deal  to 
say  for  itself.  Until  more  is  known  of  the  laws  of  hered- 
ity, Weismann's  argument  will  have  to  be  reckoned 
with,  notwithstanding  its  lack  of  corroboration  by 
experimental  proof.  But  the  chief  reason  for  taking 
rWeismannism  seriously  is  the  fact  that  belief  in  its 
possible  validity  has  caused  some  of  the  most  thought- 
ful writers  of  our  day  to  feel  grave  doubts  as  to  the  possi- 
bility of  a  transmission  of  the  effects  of  Adam's  sin  to 
his  offspring.* 

As  I  shall  endeavour  to  show,  good  reason  exists  for 
denying  that  the  impossibility  of  a  transmission  of 
acquired  characters,  if  proved,  has  anything  to  do  with 
the  question  as  to  whether  Adam's  fallen  condition 
could  be  transmitted.^    But   assuming  that  Adam's 

1  See  F.  R.  Tennant,  Origin  of  Sin,  pp.  35-38,  for  a  careful  ex- 
pression of  these  doubts.  2  See  pp.  211-213,  below. 


2o8  ORIGIX.AX   SIN 

state  after  his  fall  has  the  nature  of  an  acquired  charac- 
ter, it  is  to  be  noticed  that,  as  we  have  proved  by  his 
own  language.  Professor  Weismann  himself  does  not 
venture  to  assert  the  absolute  impossibiHty  of  trans- 
mission of  any  functional  modifications  acquired  dur- 
ing the  lifetime  of  parents.  Certain  acquired  diseases 
are  admitted  by  him  to  be  inherited,  and  we  only  need 
to  remember  how  naturally  man's  present  moral  state 
is  described  in  terms  of  disease  to  perceive  the  reason- 
ableness of  belief  that  it  was  ''acquired"  by  our  first 
parents  and  "transmitted"  to  their  offspring. 

This  point  may  well  be  enlarged  upon.  The  fallen 
state  of  mankind  is  conventionally  described  by  theo- 
logians as  a  corruption  of  nature,^  and  its  several  efi'ects 
are  usuallv  called  ''woimds."  ^  Accordins;  to  the  ordi- 
nary  di\ision  these  wounds  are  four.  The  wound  of 
bhndness,  or  ignorance,  has  reduced  man's  capacity 
to  discern  spiritual  things;  the  wounds  of  concupiscence 
and  mahce  have  disturbed  human  affections  in  their 
passive  and  active  aspects;  and  the  wound  of  weakness 
has  disabled  thewiU  in  relation  to  the  fulfilment  of  man's 
chief  end.  The  word  "wound"  is  not,  of  course,  here 
used  in  its  strict  and  physical  sense,  for  it  describes 
moral  conditions.  But  the  mutual  interaction  of  mind 
and  body  is  too  well  estabhshed  intelligently  to  be 
denied;  and  a  disturbance  of  our  moral  nature  must 

*  In  the  ninth  of  our  Articles  of  Religion,  it  is  described  as  "the 
fault  and  corruption  of  the  Nature  of  every  man." 

2  See  St.  Thomas  Aq.,  Sum.  Theol.,  I.,  II.  xxxv.  3;  A.  P.  Forbes, 
Thirty  Nine  Articles,  pp.  145-150. 


ACQUIRED    CIL\R.\CTERS  209 

involve  in  its  corrupting  effect  the  whole  man.^  In 
acknowledging  the  inheritance  by  offspring  of  certain 
acquired  diseases,  Professor  Weismann  prefers  to  de- 
scribe the  first  stage  of  the  process  as  an  ^'infection  of 
the  germ,"  rather  than  as  ''a  definite  variation"  in  its 
constitution.^  Now  the  very  word  "infection"  is  fre- 
quently employed  by  theologians  to  describe  the  effect 
of  Adam's  sin  upon  human  nature.^ 

If  a  failure  of  the  various  bodily  functions  to  work 
in  mutual  harmony  constitutes  physical  disease,  surely 
a  state  of  conflict  between  the  animal  and  spiritual 
propensities  of  our  moral  nature  may  be  called  moral 
disease.  It  is,  conscience  being  witness,  a  condition 
that  ought  not  to  be  —  a  condition  which  hinders  the 
man  from  fulfilling  the  proper  function  of  his  moral 
nature.  Moreover,  it  is  a  deeply  seated  disease,  so 
deeply  seated  that  could  we  describe  it  as  "a  definite 
variation,"  w^e  should  still  have  reason  to  beheve  its 
production  of  some  effect  upon  the  germ-cell  to  be 
possible,  even  if  we  accepted  the  general  vahdity  of 

^  In  describing  our  present  condition  as  a  "corruption  of  nature" 
we  do  not  commit  ourselves  to  a  denial  that  the  nature  wherewith  we 
sin  is  the  nature  that  was  evolved  in  its  physical  aspects  from  the 
lower  species.  The  point  is  that  the  conflict  "between  nature  and 
nurture,"  as  Tennant  describes  it,  —  which  he  refers  exclusively 
to  natural  causes  and  we  refer  to  a  loss  of  the  grace  which  was  super- 
added in  order  to  prevent  an  evil  result  of  such  conflict  —  must, 
whether  by  a  leap  or  gradually,  produce  a  condition  within  our  na- 
ture that  may  rightly  be  called  "corruption." 

2  As  quoted  above. 

3  Our  ninth  article  says,  "And  this  infection  of  nature  doth  re- 
main," etc. 

15 


Z^ 


2IO  ORIGINAL   SIN 

Weismann's  view.  If  we  concede  for  argument's  sake 
that  ordinary  acquired  characters  cannot  be  trans- 
mitted, extreme  instances  of  radical  modification  might 
well  be  regarded  as  exceptions  that  prove  the  rule, 
their  effect  being  sufficiently  penetrative  to  overpass  the 
barriers  that  normally  isolate  the  germ-cell  from  the 
rest  of  the  organism.  A  modification  of  moral  dis- 
position affects  personality  at  its  root,  and  personality 
is  the  determinative  characteristic  of  human  nature, 
than  which  there  is  none  more  central.  Sin  thus  affects 
human  nature  at  its  innermost  point;  and,  if  any  modi- 
fication acquired  by  parents  can  be  inherited,  surely 
this  one  can.^  Once  acquired  and  inherited,  nothing 
short  of  absolute  sinlessness  could  bring  about  a 
recessive  modification  capable  of  transmission  in  an 
offspring  possessed  of  man's  original  righteousness. 
Human  experience  teaches  that  sinlessness  is  not  a 
character  which  man  in  his  existing  condition  can 
naturally  acquire. 

What  I  have  been  saying  presupposes  not  only  a 
vital  connection  and  mutual  interaction  between  mind 
and  body  —  between  moral  and  physical  functioning,  — 
but  also  a  difference  in  kind  between  them.  A  denial 
of  this  difference  is  not  scientific,  but  wholly  depends 
for  its  truth  upon  the  validity  of  the  naturalistic  philoso- 
phy, and  of  its  description  of  all  realities  in  mechanical 
terms.  We  need  not  again  point  out  the  fallacies  of 
that  philosophy.     No  other  philosophy,  however,  can 

*  Such  a  method  of  argument  is  adopted  by  J.  Orr,  God's  Image, 
pp.  237-243. 


ACQUIRED    CHARACTERS  211 

give  plausibility  to  the  objection  that  we  know  of  no 
mechanical  means  by  which  a  moral  change  could 
affect  the  germ-cell.  We  certainly  have  no  evidence 
that  the  means  must  be  mechanical,  and  no  knowledge 
is  available  which  warrants  a  dogmatic  denial  of  any 
effect  of  acquired  moral  change  upon  offspring. 

Our  reckoning  with  Weismann's  position  has  thus 
far  been  based  upon  the  assumption  that  the  doctrine 
of  original  sin  involves  the  transmission  of  an  acquired 
character,  and  upon  the  necessity  of  such  an  assump- 
tion depends  the  pertinence  of  Weismann's  position  to 
that  doctrine.  Inasmuch  as  protestant  writers  regard 
man's  primitive  state  as  wholly  natural,  they  are  com- 
pelled to  regard  the  truth  of  Weismannism  as  throwing 
them  on  the  defensive.  Catholic  theologians  are  not 
under  the  same  necessity.  According  to  their  doctrine, 
man's  primitive  righteousness  was  due  to  supernat- 
ural causes,  and  his  fall  was  not  the  acquisition  of  a 
new  natural  character, — not  a  modification  of  human 
nature,  — but  the  loss  of  special  endowments  of  grace. 

It  is  quite  true  that  the  results  of  this  loss  of  grace  can 
be  described  by  such  terms  as  ''natural  corruption," 
"moral  disease,"  "spiritual  wounds,"  and  the  Hke. 
But  such  descriptions,  so  far  as  catholic  doctrine  deter- 
mines their  interpretation,  do  not  necessarily  imply  that 
human  nature  has  been  modified.  They  are  appH- 
cable  to  the  original  state  of  human  nature  as  viewed 
from  a  purely  evolutionary  standpoint.  According 
to  the  evolutionary  theory  primitive  man  possessed  a 
nature   in  which  inherited   animal  propensities  were 


212  ORIGINAL   SIN 

too  strong  for  the  as  yet  undeveloped  moral  instincts 
which  called  for  their  restraint.  In  brief,  the  conflict 
which  is  now  universally  experienced  between  the 
carnal  and  the  spiritual  parts  of  our  nature  is  not 
less  truly  a  conflict  because  said  to  be  the  outcome  of 
natural  evolution ;  and  it  is  precisely  this  state  of  natural 
conflict  to  which  catholic  theologians  suppose  man  to 
have  fallen  when  he  lost  the  supernatural  gifts  which, 
according  to  their  doctrine,  were  designed  to  forestall 
the  conflict.  Such  a  state  of  conflict,  we  maintain,  is 
a  state  of  disease,  whether  it  be  regarded  as  exclusively 
originated  by  natural  evolution,  or  as  resulting  from  a 
loss  of  supernatural  endowments. 

So  far  as  catholic  doctrine  is  concerned,  we  are 
free  to  combine  the  two  accounts.  We  may  at  once 
acknowledge  that  natural  evolution  accounts  for  the 
internal  conflict  which  catholic  theology  explains  by 
its  doctrine  of  the  fall,  and  maintain  that  this  conflict 
would  have  been  prevented  from  becoming  actual,  if 
man  had  rightly  employed  the  supernatural  advantages 
that  were  afforded  to  our  first  human  parents.  It  is 
as  if  a  stream  were  to  be  diverted  by  artificial  means  in 
order  that  destructive  floods  might  be  prevented,  and 
subsequent  carelessness  or  malice  were  to  cause  a  break 
in  the  barriers  and  a  resumption  of  the  natural  flow. 
The  result  could  rightly  be  explained  by  the  original 
nature  of  the  stream,  and  yet  the  fact  that  it  was  due 
to  human  carelessness  would  be  undeniable.  The 
application  of  my  illustration  needs  no  elaborate  ex- 
planation.    The  original  nature  of  man  explains  his 


/ 


SPIRITUAL    HEREDITY  213 

present  state  of  moral  corruption.  Yet  it  was  avoid- 
able human  sin  that  nullified  the  supernatural  means 
which  were  sufficient  to  prevent  such  a  state  from  being 
actualized.  This  view  leaves  place  for  both  the  evo- 
lutionary and  the  cathoHc  explanations  of  our  moral 
condition,  and  shows  that  both  explanations  are  neces- 
sary for  a  full  account  of  things.  It  also  shows  that 
the  question  of  the  truth  of  Weismann's  denial  of  the 
transmission  of  acquired  characters  need  not  disturb 
a  believer  in  catholic  doctrine,  because  that  doctrine 
does  not  depend  for  its  validity  upon  the  fact  of  such 
transmission.  It  permits  us  to  agree  with  St.  Athana- 
sius  and  other  ancient  writers  in  regarding  the  fall  as 
a  reversion  to  the  limitations  and  liabilities  of  man's 
unassisted  and  created  nature.^  The  view  that  natural 
evolution  describes  his  creation  does  not  militate 
against  such  doctrine. 

Ill 

Our  task  is  nearing  its  completion;  and  all  that  re- 
mains for  us  to  do  is  to  deal  with  two  rival  theological 
theories  as  to  the  method  by  which  original  sin  is 
transmitted,  and  to  indicate  the  moral  importance  of 
the  catholic  doctrine  of  sin. 

The  two  theories  to  which  I  refer  are  known  as 
traducianism  and  creationism.^     Both  are  ancient,  and 

1  De  In-carn.,  ch.  5.  See  Tennant,  Sources,  pp.  310-314,  on  the 
teaching  of  that  writer. 

2  On  this  subject  see  A.  Moore,  Essays  Scientific  and  Phil.,  pp. 
75-82;  Science  and  the  Faith,  pp.  208-211;  Prof.  Le  Conte,  Evolu- 


214  ORIGINAL   SIN 

either  one  can  be  held  without  prejudicing  catholic 
doctrine;  but  neither  one  can  claim  ecumenical  author- 
ity. Modern  science  is  thought  by  some  to  have  thrown 
difficulties  around  the  acceptance  of  either.  According 
to  traducianism  both  the  souls  and  the  bodies  of  infants 
are  derived  through  natural  generation  from  their 
parents;  whereas,  according  to  creationism,  the  body 
only  is  thus  derived,  the  soul  coming  into  existence 
in  each  case  by  special  creation,  and  being  united  with 
the  physical  organism  after  its  conception  —  whether 
immediately  or  at  some  subsequent  stage  of  develop- 
ment in  the  womb. 

If  traducianism  is  true,  the  inference  is  natural  that 
moral  dispositions,  so  far  as  they  are  transmissible,  are 
directly  and  spiritually  transmitted  through  the  deriva- 
tion of  the  souls  of  children  from  their  parents.  The 
fact  of  moral  heredity  is  not  to  be  denied,  although 
different  views  are  tenable  as  to  the  amount  of  such 
heredity,  and  both  theologians  and  physical  scientists 
can  be  found  who  regard  this  heredity  as  dependent 
upon  the  validity  of  the  traducianist  view. 

The  naturalistic  philosophy  obviously  leaves  no  place 
for  the  antithesis  between  matter  and  spirit  which  is 
involved  in  the  argument  between  traducianists  and 
creationists.  And  among  those  modern  scientists  who 
are  not  thus  precluded  from  considering  the  problem 

lion  and  Its  Relation  to  Religious  Thought,  pp.  293-304;  R.  I.  Wil- 
berforce,  Incarnation,  pp.  29  et  seq.;  H.  P.  Liddon,  Some  Elernents  of 
Religion,  pp.  93-104;  St.  Thos.  Aq.,  Sum.  Theol.,  I.  ex,  cxviii;  Cath. 
Encyclopedia^  5.  v.  "Creationism,"  Vol.  IV,  p.  475. 


SPIRITUAL   HEREDITY  215 

—  their  number  is  large  —  difficulties  appear  to  sur- 
round both  views.  Their  habit  of  interpreting  things 
in  evolutionary  and  physical  terms  makes  it  difficult 
for  them  to  accept  the  hypothesis  of  the  special  creation 
of  individual  souls;  and  this  difficulty  is  not  wholly 
removed  by  a  theoretical  rejection  of  naturahsm.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  notion  that  an  indivisible  entity, 
such  as  the  soul  is  considered  to  be,  can  reproduce  itself 
by  natural  generation  seems  incredible,  because  hope- 
lessly unimaginable.  Modern  science  may,  therefore, 
be  said  to  leave  the  question  at  issue  unanswered.^ 

Dr.  Tennant  says,^  "Heredity,  in  the  strict  sense  of 
inheritance  by  birth  or  descent  and  not  in  that  of  ap- 
propriation of  environment,  cannot  take  place  'in  the 
region  of  spiritual  personahty.'"  Admitting  that 
mental  qualities  are  inherited,  he  adds,  "But  their 
transmission  takes  place  only  in  the  form  of  modified 
physical  structure,  with  which  the  psychical  quality  is 
necessarily  correlated ;  it  is  mediated  solely  through  the 
body."  This  makes  for  the  creationist  view,  and,  in 
a  very  subtle  and  vague  form,  he  appears  to  accept  it.^ 
He  says  that  it  is  "a  debatable  question"  whether  St. 

1  Biological  science,  as  science,  has  indeed  no  direct  concern  with 
the  problem  of  the  soul's  origin,  for  its  subject-matter  is  the  organ- 
ism.    The  heredity  which  it  investigates  is  physical. 

2  He  discusses  the  subject  in  Origin  of  Sin,  pp.  31-35. 

3  He  borrows  from  Lotze.  "The  soul  ...  is,  as  it  were,  a  'uni- 
formly maintained  act  of  God,'  begotten  from  Himself  when  the 
organism  with  which  it  is  destined  to  be  associated  has  been  prepared; 
He  is  the  One  which  supplies  underlying  unity  to  the  many,  and  they, 
despite  that  unity  in  Him,  when  once  arisen,  are  independent  things." 
Op.  cit.,  p.  S3. 


2i6  ORIGINAL   SIN 

Augustine's  doctrine  of  ''inherited  sinfulness"  does  not 
require  some  such  view  as  that  of  traducianism;  and 
adds,  "If  it  does,  both  fall  together.  For  philosophy 
will  not  allow  such  notions  as  those  which  traducian- 
ism, when  least  materialistic,  necessarily  involves."  * 
Dr.  Tennant's  language  amounts  to  an  assertion  that 
traducianism  is  untenable,  and  to  a  suggestion  of  doubt 
whether  the  creationist  view  will  logically  permit  us  to 
accept  St.  Augustine's  doctrine  of  inherited  sinfulness. 
I  am  not  defending  Augustinianism,  but  Dr.  Tennant's 
argument  seems  to  suggest  doubts  as  to  the  logical 
validity  for  creationists  of  any  form  of  the  doctrine  of 
original  sin,  whether  it  includes  St.  Augustine's  theory 
of  inherited  guilt  or  not. 

Now  modern  investigation  has  certainly  increased 
the  difficulty  of  accepting  the  traducianist  view;  al- 
though the  preference  for  creationism  which  is  widely 
felt  among  theologians  does  not  owe  its  origin  to  this 
cause,  but  is  of  many  centuries'  standing.  Without 
being  a  catholic  doctrine,  creationism  is  the  usual 
concomitant  of  belief  in  the  doctrine  of  original  sin.^ 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  31. 

-  Tertullian  was  the  chief  patristic  defender  of  traducianism, 
but  took  a  semi-materialistic  view  of  the  nature  of  the  soul.  St. 
Augustine  apparently  leaned  to  the  same  view,  but  did  not  definitely 
teach  it,  and  did  not  share  in  Tertullian's  materialism.  His  failure 
to  teach  it  in  connection  with  his  defence  of  original  sin  is  highly 
significant.  Traducianism  was  widely  accepted  by  Western  fathers 
and  by  St.  Gregory  Nyss.  in  the  East.  The  Easterns,  however, 
generally  held  the  creationist  view.  Traducianism  practically  dis- 
appeared from  catholic  theology  in  subsequent  ages;  partly  because 
of  its  materialistic  implications,  and  partly  by  reason  of  apparent 


SPIRITUAL   HEREDITY  217 

The  question  of  their  mutual  consistency  is  therefore 
well-nigh  unavoidable  in  a  defence  of  catholic  doctrine. 
It  seems  to  me  that  when  Dr.  Tennant  acknowledges 
an  inheritance  of  mental  qualities,  and  from  a  creation- 
ist standpoint  explains  this  inheritance  as  taking  place 
"in  the  form  of  modified  physical  structure,"  "medi- 
ated solely  through  the  body,"  ^  he  supplies  a  theory 
which  completely  removes  the  inconsistency  which  he 
suggests  as  possibly  existing  between  creationism  and 
the  doctrine  of  original  sin.  In  its  catholic  form  that 
doctrine  hypothecates  the  transmission  of  a  state  of 
conflict  between  animal  and  moral  tendencies  in  which 
animal  propensities  are  found  frequently  to  gain  the  vic- 
tory. But  this  conflict  is  certainly  due  to  physical  ante- 
cedents, although  it  is  mental  and  moral  in  its  results. 
That  is,  the  state  of  the  soul  is  determined  to  an  im- 
portant extent  by  the  physical  organism  in  which  it 
exercises  its  functions.  If,  therefore,  the  physical  con- 
ditions under  which  a  new-bom  child  develops  moral 
character  and  performs  moral  actions  are  inherited, 
it  is  clear  that  the  tendency  to  sin  which  these  conditions 
explain  is  also  inherited,  whatever  view  we  may  take  as 
to  the  origin  of  the  soul.  If  the  soul  owes  its  origin  in 
each  child  to  special  creation,  the  fact  remains  that  it 
begins  its  moral  and  spiritual  functioning  under  ahandi- 

success  of  the  efforts  made  to  reconcile  creationism  with  the  doctrine 
of  original  sin.  See  J.  F.  Bethune-Baker,  Early  Hist,  of  Christ. 
Doctrine,  pp.  302-304.  It  seems  impossible  to  accept  this  writer's 
assertion  in  a  concluding  note,  that  "the  Traducian  theory  is  the 
only  one  which  modern  biological  knowledge  supports." 
1  Op.  cit.,  p.  35. 


2i8  ORIGINAL   SIN 

cap  which  has  been  physically  inherited.  The  con- 
clusion to  which  we  are  led  is  that  an  acceptance  of 
creationism  need  not  in  the  least  interfere  with  the 
reasonableness  of  behef  in  the  cathoHc  doctrine  of 
original  sin. 

We  come  at  last  to  the  question  of  the  moral  value 
and  importance  of  the  doctrine  of  original  sin.  If  it 
has  no  moral  value  —  no  bearing  upon  practical  prob- 
lems and  issues  —  it  was  hardly  worth  our  while  to 
employ  so  much  argument  in  its  defence.  The  doc- 
trines of  Christianity  are  not  imposed  upon  us  as  mere 
trials  of  faith,  but  as  affording  the  knowledge  which 
must  determine  a  true  ideal  of  human  destiny  and  of 
the  method  of  attaining  it.  Saving  doctrine  should  not 
be  regarded  as  an  arbitrary  stipulation,  but  as  called 
saving  because  needed  for  the  guidance  of  those  who 
would  Hve  a  saving  Hfe.^  I  have  already  shown  that, 
if  the  moral  state  in  which  mankind  has  found  itself 
during  all  the  ages  which  our  natural  knowledge  of 
his  condition  embraces  is  its  original  condition,  the 
language  of  redemption  and  of  baptismal  regeneration 
which  is  so  much  employed  in  the  New  Testament 
needs  correction;  for  these  doctrines,  as  they  are  there 
exhibited,  imply  a  fall  from  grace,  and  depend  for  their 
truth  upon  the  doctrine  of  original  sin.  The  practical 
importance  of  the  doctrine  of  the  fall  is  therefore 
involved  in  that  of  the  New  Testament  dispensation 
of  salvation.^ 

1  Cf.  the  author's  Introd.  to  Dog.  TheoL,  ch.  ix.  §§  i,  2. 

2  Cf.  p.  185,  above. 


IMPORTANCE   OF  THE  DOCTRINE  219 

I  have  also  called  your  attention  to  the  fact  that  our 
belief  in  divine  righteousness  is  imperilled  by  the  sup- 
position that  man's  existing  incapacity  to  avoid  sin 
represents  the  condition  in  which  God  constituted  our 
first  parents  when  He  made  them  responsible  agents.^ 
The  necessity  for  moral  endeavours  of  belief  in  divine 
righteousness  is  too  obvious  intelligently  to  be  denied. 
It  seems  worth  while,  however,  again  to  emphasize  the 
incongruity  between  an  exclusively  evolutionary  view  of 
the  origin  of  man's  sinful  tendencies  and  the  truth  of 
divine  justice.  Under  the  conditions  of  human  knowl- 
edge during  this  earthly  Hfe,  the  problem  of  evil  can 
never  cease  to  be  a  problem.  Theodicies  that  claim  to 
be  adequate  really  explain  away  the  fact  of  sin  and  are 
therefore  altogether  futile.  Sin  is  a  fact,  and  it  con- 
stitutes a  seeming  infringement  upon  either  the  power 
or  the  righteousness  of  God.  We  grant  that  without  the 
capability  of  sinning  being  given  to  men  by  God  the 
development  of  a  kingdom  of  human  righteousness 
could  not  be  achieved,  for  real  freedom  in  choosing 
between  good  and  evil  appears  to  be  involved  in  the 
development  of  human  character.  Yet  we  do  not 
escape  the  difficulty  that  sin,  once  committed,  and  in 
whatever  degree  of  culpabihty,  looks  Hke  either  a  failure 
of  divine  arrangements  or  a  result  of  divine  connivance 
with  evil.  To  suppose  that  God  may  do  evil  that  good 
may  come  is  impossible  for  those  who  perceive  what 
evil  means.  We  are  precluded  by  all  our  knowledge 
of  God  from  beheving  that  the  origin  of  sin  is  due  to 

*  Cf.  pp.  170-175,  above. 


220  ORIGINAL    SIN 

divine  connivance.  The  only  road  to  a  solution  of  the 
problem  lies  through  a  larger  knowledge  of  the  nature 
and  possibihties  of  infinite  power  than  we  possess.^ 

But  when  we  are  told  that  man's  present  incapacity 
to  avoid  sinning  is  not  only  a  natural  incapacity,  which 
is  to  be  explained  by  the  evolutionary  method  of  his 
creation,  but  represents  the  condition  under  which 
God  arranged  man's  original  moral  probation,^  the 
mystery  of  evil  becomes  something  more  than  a  mystery. 
It  becomes  what  we  can  only  regard  as  undeniably  an 
act  of  injustice  on  the  part  of  God.  To  hold  men 
responsible  for  the  impossible  cannot  be  made  to  appear 
righteous  to  an  enlightened  conscience,  and  yet  that 
same  conscience  bears  constant  witness  that  God  does 
hold  us  responsible  for  every  sin. 

The  reply  that  the  culpability  of  sinners  varies  in 
degree  with  their  moral  development,  and  that  we 
ought  not  to  measure  the  guilt  of  our  undeveloped  first 

1  The  problem  of  evil  is  more  fully  considered  in  the  author's 
Being  and  Attributes  of  God,  ch.  vii,  §  5. 

2  Dr.  Tennant  acknowledges  that  his  account  of  sin  "sees  in  it 
something  empirically  inevitable  for  every  man":  Origin  of  Sin,  p. 
113;  and  says  elsewhere  "that  the  impulses  of  our  nature  are  in  full 
sway  before  the  moral  consciousness  begins  to  dawn:  "  op.  cit.,  pp. 
96,  97;  also  that  "the  iron  chains  of  habit  have  already  begun  to 
be  forged  before  the  expulsive  power  of  new  affection  and  reverence 
can  be  felt":  op.  cit.,  p.  109.  Yet  he  maintains  that  this  "internal 
conflict  between  .  .  .  natural  desire  and  moral  end  is  .  .  .  the 
expression  of  God^s  purpose  "  (italics  mine):  op  cit.,  pp.  118,  119.  We 
agree  with  him  when  he  says  that  animal  propensities  "belong  to 
man  as  God  made  him":  op.  cit.,  p.  95.  Our  point  is  that,  if  the 
resulting  inevitableness  of  sin  was  left  unremedied  by  grace,  God 
became  the  cause  of  sin  —  an  impossible  conclusion. 


IMPORTANCE   OF  THE  DOCTRINE  221 

parents  by  the  standards  of  a  Christian  conscience/  is 
to  miss  the  point,  although  the  fact  that  an  undeveloped 
soul  incurs  less  guilt  in  sinning  than  an  enhghtened 
Christian  is  hardly  to  be  disputed.  It  is  not  the  degree 
of  guilt  that  determines  the  responsibility  of  God,  if  He 
puts  them  of  His  own  will  to  a  probation  in  which  avoid- 
ance of  sin  is  practically  impossible,  and  then  holds 
them  guilty  for  sinning.  The  slightest  sin,  and  the 
slightest  responsibihty  therefor,  when  sinlessness  is  in 
effect  impossible  for  the  individuals  involved,  warrants 
the  charge  of  injustice  against  Him  who  created  such 
conditions  and  yet  holds  men  accountable.  Men  can- 
not be  held  responsible,  even  in  the  very  lowest  degree, 
for  the  unavoidable,  when  the  Judge  is  also  the  cause 
of  its  being  unavoidable,  without  a  violation  of  right- 
eous judgment.  We  beheve,  of  course,  that  the  Judge 
of  all  the  earth  must  do  right;  and  this  conviction, 
combined  with  our  knowledge  that  that  Judge  holds 
men  accountable  in  some  degree  for  the  slightest  sins  — 
I  mean  for  every  sin  the  wrongfulness  of  which  is  to 
any  extent  perceived  by  the  sinner,  —  compels  us  to 
regard  an  exclusively  evolutionary  explanation  of 
man's  existing  tendency  to  sin  as  incredible. 

If  the  reply  is  made  that  catholic  doctrine  is  open  to 
the  same  objection,  inasmuch  as  it  teaches  an  existing 
incapacity  for  sinlessness  on  the  part  of  men,  and  yet 
declares  them  to  be  held  accountable  by  God,  the 
answer  is  this:  Catholic  doctrine  does  not,  as  does  an 
exclusively  evolutionary  view  of  sin,  compel  us  to  ex- 

1  Tennant,  op.  cit.,  pp.  91-94. 


2  22  ORIGINAL   SIN 

plain  our  moral  incapacity  as  coming  from  God.^  It 
teaches,  on  the  contrary,  that  God  imparted  to  man 
such  supernatural  endowments  that  he  could  have 
avoided  sin,  in  spite  of  the  handicap  of  inherited  car- 
nal impulses.  It  also  teaches  that,  when  creaturely 
wilfulness  nullified  these  endowments,  and  caused  man- 
kind to  revert  to  the  moral  incapacity  of  his  unassisted 
nature,  God  provided  a  dispensation  of  redeeming  grace 
which  enables  men  to  meet  their  responsibility  for  sin 
and  ultimately  to  escape  from  its  power.^ 

An  exclusively  evolutionary  view  of  sin  certainly  has 
a  tendency  to  lower  men's  sense  of  its  seriousness.  This 
has  been  denied,  and  it  has  been  urged  "that  the  sin- 
fulness of  sin  is  really  more  stoutly  maintained  by  a 
theory  which  makes  all  sin  actual  and  a  matter  of 
personal  accountability,  however  less  guilty  its  earlier 
stages  may  be  than  its  later,  than  by  a  theory  which 
finds  the  source  of  sinfulness  in  a  supposed  hereditary 
state  for  which  no  man  is  responsible."  ^  Such  a  reply 
appears  to  have  some  force  as  against  the  view  that  we 

1  We  are  not  committed,  for  instance,  to  the  supralapsarian  theory 
that  God  predestined  man's  fall.  Yet  that  horrible  theory  is  the 
theological  counterpart  of  the  evolutionary  view  that  our  moral  help- 
lessness is  "the  expression  of  God's  purpose." 

2  The  catholic  doctrine  of  justification  does  not  mean  that  our  faith 
in  Christ's  death  exempts  us  from  responsibility  for  sin;  but  that  such 
faith  initiates  in  us  a  state  in  which,  by  repentance  and  sacramental 
grace,  we  are  enabled  to  suffer  with  Christ  in  such  wise  as  to  satisfy 
through  Him  the  justice  of  God  and  attain  to  holiness  and  eternal  life. 

3  Tennant,  Origin  of  Sin,  Pref .  of  2d  ed.,  p.  xx.  The  context, 
pp.  xix-xxvii,  constitutes  Dr.  Tennant's  reply  at  large  to  the  charge 
that  his  view  logically  involves  a  minimizing  of  sin. 


IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  DOCTRINE  223 

inherit  guilt  as  well  as  incapacity  to  avoid  sin;  but  it 
has  none  whatever  in  relation  to  catholic  doctrine, 
which  borrows  St.  Paul's  secondary  use  of  the  word 
sin  to  describe  our  inherited  moral  weakness,  but  im- 
putes personal  guilt  to  those  only  who  have  actually 
sinned.  In  tracing  to  natural  heredity  the  internal 
conflict  which  inevitably  issues  in  acts  of  sin,  catholic 
doctrine  does  not  conflict  with  Dr.  Tennant's  view, 
that  we  can  "assign  the  rise  of  evil  itself  ...  to  the 
difficulty  of  the  task  which  has  to  be  encountered  by 
every  individual  person  alike,  the  task  of  enforcing  his 
inherited  organic  nature  to  obey  a  moral  law  which  he 
has  only  gradually  been  enabled  to  discern.''  ^ 

The  evolutionary  and  cathoHc  views  of  sin  differ  in 
their  methods  of  accounting  for  our  sin-producing  in- 
heritance rather  than  in  their  definitions  of  its  nature 
and  their  estimates  of  the  responsibility  of  children. 
The  evolutionary  view  that  our  inheritance  is  wholly 
due  to  the  laws  of  natural  development  compels  us 
to  regard  the  Creator  as  responsible  for  our  inability 
to  avoid  sin  and  guilt.  The  catholic  explanation,  that 
it  has  been  caused  by  an  unnecessary  human  act  of 
wilfulness  which  has  nullified  divinely  provided  means 
for   transcending   our   naturally   inherited   weakness,^ 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  81. 

2  We  should  not  overstate  the  supernatural  factors  of  man's  orig- 
inal righteousness.  All  that  is  required  by  catholic  doctrine  is  that 
our  first  parents  should  have  been  sufficiently  endowed  with  grace 
to  make  them  really  free  and  responsible  under  the  conditions  of 
their  beginnings  of  human  experience  —  really  capable  of  avoiding 
conscious  sin. 


224  ORIGINAL   SIN 

places  the  responsibility  for  our  slavery  to  sin  upon 
human  shoulders.  It  is  this  difference  that  justifies 
our  contention  that  the  purely  evolutionary  view  must 
result  in  minimizing  the  awfulness  of  sin.  If  sin  is  the 
inevitable  fruit  of  natural  incapacity,  and  this  natural 
inheritance  constitutes  the  sum  of  the  resources  af- 
forded to  primitive  man  by  the  Creator,  it  is  difficult 
to  justify  any  serious  estimate  of  human  guilt,  so  long 
as  sinlessness  remains  an  unattainable  ideal.  Catholic 
doctrine  justifies  the  fearful  condemnations  of  sin  which 
we  find  in  Scripture,  as  no  other  doctrine  does.  It 
relieves  God  of  all  responsibility  for  the  inevitableness  of 
sin,  and  by  its  doctrine  of  redeeming  grace  shows  that, 
without  the  slightest  change  in  His  condemnatory  atti- 
tude towards  sin,  God  has  found  a  way  of  showing 
mercy  to  the  victims  of  the  sin  of  our  first  parents  and 
of  gradually  saving  us  from  its  consequences.  The 
experience  of  mankind  bears  out  what  I  am  saying. 
Wherever  men  have  referred  their  inability  to  avoid 
sin  entirely  to  the  original  and  necessary  constitution  of 
things  human,  they  have  been  tempted  to  abandon 
the  struggle,  and  to  minimize  the  witness  of  conscience 
to  human  responsibility  and  guilt. 

It  has  been  denied  by  Pelagians  and  others  that  sin 
is  an  inevitable  result  of  the  natural  condition  in 
which  we  are  born.  One  fact  alone  shows  the  purely 
abstract  and  unconvincing  nature  of  such  a  denial. 
All  men  sin.  The  only  sinless  man  known  to  history 
is  One  who,  because  of  His  sinlessness  as  well  as  for 
other  reasons,  is  known  to  be  the  eternal  Son  of  God. 


IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  DOCTRINE  225 

If  His  sinlessness  was  human  sinlessness,  it  was  none 
the  less  a  result  of  transcending  grace  —  not  a  result 
which  the  purely  natural  man  has  shown  himself  to  be 
capable  of  producing  in  any  stage  of  his  development. 
Apart  from  supernatural  assistance  man  misses  the 
mark,  and  exhibits  the  one  example  in  creation  of  a 
species  that  invariably  fails  to  fulfil  the  distinctive  law 
of  its  being.  To  deny  that  primitive  man  enjoyed 
special  assistance,  and  to  exclude  the  sin  of  our  first 
parents  from  our  explanation  of  universal  human  sin- 
fulness logically  involves  that  we  should  make  God  the 
author  not  only  of  the  possibility  of  sin,  as  Dr.  Tennant 
puts  it,  but  also  of  the  practical  impossibility  of  avoiding 
it.  That  natural  evolution  has  been  a  factor  in  pro- 
ducing our  fallen  state,  we  are  free,  as  believers  in  catho- 
lic doctrine,  to  acknowledge.  To  regard  it,  however, 
as  the  whole  explanation  is  to  impugn  divine  justice 
and  to  stultify  our  moral  instincts.  Evolutionary 
science,  as  distinguished  from  naturalistic  philosophy, 
leaves  us  free  to  avoid  such  a  nightmare  of  belief. 


16 


By  the  Rev.  Francis  J.  Hall,  D.D.,  Pro- 
fessor of  Dogmatic  Theology  in  the  Western 
Theological    Seminary,    Chicago,    Illinois. 

DOGMATIC   THEOLOGY 

A  series  of  ten  volumes,  crown  8vo.,  each  complete  in  itself, 
designed  to  constitute  a  connected  treatment  of  the  entire 
range  of  Catholic  Doctrine.  Price,  each  volume,  $1.50  net  or 
$1.60  postpaid. 

I.    Introduction  (published  in  1907). 
II.    Authority,   Ecclesiastical  and    Biblical  (pub- 
lished in  1908). 

III.  The  Being  and  Attributes  of  God  (published  in 
1909). 

IV.  The  Trinity  (to  appear  in  1910). 
V.    Creation  and  Man. 

VL  The  Incarnation. 

VII.  The  Redemption  and  Exaltation  of  Christ. 

VIII.  The  Church  and  Her  Sacraments. 

IX.  The  Minor  Sacraments. 

X.     ESCHATOLOGY    AND    INDEXES. 

The  point  of  view  of  the  writer  is  Anglican  and  Catholic. 
He  aims  to  supply  an  obvious  gap  in  Anglican  literature  — 
a  large  and  systematic  treatment  of  doctrine,  scientifically 
arranged.  That  is,  he  seeks  to  achieve  for  this  age  what  St. 
Thomas  Aquinas  achieved  for  the  thirteenth  century.  His 
method  is  modern;  and  an  effort  is  made  to  employ  a  term- 
inology and  forms  of  thought  which  are  intelligible  and  con- 
genial to  twentieth-century  students,  without  compromising 
Catholic  doctrine,  and  without  forgetting  the  requirements 
of  his  Anglican  allegiance.  It  is  believed  that  such  an  under- 
taking is  much  needed ;  and  that  it  is  one  which  will  enlist  the 
interest  and  support  of  all  serious  students  of  Christian 
doctrine  —  especially  of  those  who  realize  that  the  Catholic 
faith  needs  only  to  be  exhibited,  adequately  and  coherently,  in 
terms  intelligible  to  modern  minds,  to  be  seen  to  show  the 
way  out  of  modern  doubt  and  out  of  the  existing  theological 
chaos. 


HALL'S    DOGMATIC   THEOLOGY 


The  author  realizes  that  his  undertaking  is  a  formidable 
one,  and  that  imperfections  must  appear  in  its  execution. 
But  the  volumes  which  have  thus  far  been  published  have 
secured  a  favourable  and  encouraging  reception  on  both  sides 
of  the  Atlantic.  The  learning,  skill  in  argument  and  clearness  of 
exposition  shown  in  the  work ;  the  author's  success  in  translating 
ancient  doctrines  into  modern  terms,  and  his  sympathetic 
understanding  of  new  knowledge  and  contemporary  thought , 
have  been  acknowledged  by  reviewers  of  every  type  —  Ro- 
man Catholic,  Anglican,  and  Protestant  alike;  —  and  his 
reverent  adherence  to  Catholic  doctrine  has  also  been  noticed. 
The  following  extracts  are  selected  from  a  considerable  number 
of  generally  favourable  reviews. 

VOLUME    I  —  INTRODUCTION 

Church  Times,  London:  "This  admirable  treatise  should 
be  found  very  useful  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic.  .  .  .  To 
our  mind,  the  most  valuable  chapter  ...  is  the  one  in  which 
he  demolishes  this  confusion  between  the  supernatural  and 
the  abnormally  natural,  and  shows  that  no  advance  in  man's 
knowledge  of  the  universe  could  ever  bring  what  is  super- 
natural under  natural  law.  .  .  .  We  would  gladly  have  quoted, 
had  we  had  space,  from  Dr.  Hall's  remarks  on  Anglicanism 
and  Catholicism.  .  .  .  The  book  reaches  a  high  level  of  excel- 
lence." 

The  Living  Church,  Milwaukee:  "It  exhibits  the  qualities 
which  previous  books  have  led  us  to  expect  from  Dr.  Hall, 
the  severely  restrained  language,  the  careful  accuracy  of 
statement,  the  equitable  judgment,  and  the  background  of 
knowledge.  ...  It  is  this  success  ...  in  reconciling  loyalty 
to  Anglican  authority  with  loyalty  to  the  greater  authority 
of  the  Catholic  Church,  that  may  perhaps  be  said  to  give 
his  book  its  greatest  measure  of  value  .  .  .  When  completed, 
the  service  will  undoubtedly  be  a  monumental  addition  to 
Anglican  and  indeed  to  Catholic  Theology.  It  may,  indeed, 
in  time  be  recognized  as  holding  such  a  place  in  Anglican 
theology  as  is  held  by  the  Summa  of  St.  Thomas  Aquinas 
in  the  Lg-tin  communion." 


HALL'S   DOGMATIC   THEOLOGY 


Journal  of  Theological  Studies,  Oxford  and  Cambridge: 
"The  author's  learning  and  wide  reading  are  as  conspicuous 
throughout  the  book  as  is  his  fidelity  to  the  point  of  view  "... 

Church  Union  Gazette,  London:  ...  "is  a  compara- 
tively small  book  into  which  an  immense  amount  of  valuable 
fact  and  criticism  has  been  compressed  .  .  .  there  breathes  a 
spirit  of  large-mindedness,  a  refusal  to  be  confined  within  any 
groove  of  prejudice.  The  last  chapter,  on  the  literature  of 
Dogmatic  Theology,  is  particularly  valuable." 

Church  Standard,  Philadelphia:  "He  is  a  brave  man  who 
ventures  to  undertake  a  task  of  such  magnitude  and  character 
in  a  country  where  theological  literature  does  not  find  nu- 
merous purchasers.  Dr.  Hall  has  this  courage,  and  the  Intro- 
duction leads  us  to  trust  that  he  will  persist  in  his  boldness 
and  that  a  favouring  Providence  will  permit  him  to  complete 
his  undertaking.  .  .  .  Dr.  Hall  is  not  Latin.  He  is  Catholic, 
to  be  sure,  very  much  so,  but  in  the  true  Anglican  spirit  he 
continues  to  bring  the  modern  into  his  Catholicity,  and  give 
us  a  modern  while  he  is  giving  a  Catholic  theology." 

Expository  Times:  After  referring  to  the  writer's  briefer 
outlines,  "the  fuller  scope  of  the  new  volume  reveals  a  new 
writer,  a  writer  with  a  very  extensive  knowledge  of  the  litera- 
ture of  his  subject,  to  which  he  makes  continual  reference, 
and  one  who  has  manifestly  mastered  its  literature  and  made 
his  subject  a  real  personal  possession." 

Scottish  Chronicle:  "Those  who  have  read  the  author's 
'Kenotic  Theory'  will  expect  to  find  in  this  book  learning, 
clear  exposition,  and  lucidity  of  style,  and  they  will  not  be 
disappointed,  for  here  we  find  all  the  characteristics  of  the 
former  volume.  .  .  .  Its  earnestness  and  learning  are  ad- 
mirable." 

The  Tablet,  London:  "Much  in  the  work  we  should  like 
to  commend;  there  is  a  goodly  proportion  of  teaching  drawn 
from  St.  Thomas  and  other  Catholic  theologians,  and  many 
acute  observations  occur  on  modern  difficulties.  .  .  .  This 
book  will  be  of  some  use  for  those  for  whom  it  is  intended." 


HALL'S   DOGMATIC  THEOLOGY 


Pax,  England:  "We  welcome  this  Introduction  to  Dr.  Hall's 
Dogmatic  Theology,  for  the  need  of  a  standard  work  on  this 
subject  has  long  been  keenly  felt.  That  Dr.  Hall  possesses 
the  necessary  qualifications  for  the  task  will  be  apparent  to 
those  who  know  his  theological  monographs  and  his  book 
on  The  Kenotic  Theory;  and  this  volume  promises  well  for 
the  success  of  his  undertaking." 

The  Interior,  Chicago:  "So  far  as  the  first  part  reveals 
the  man.  Professor  Hall  is  admirably  fitted  to  complete  the 
work  with  credit  to  himself  and  the  denomination  he  repre- 
sents." 

Church  Work,  Sydney,  Australia:  "The  writer  has  little 
doubt  that  those  who  read  this  introductory  volume  will 
not  be  satisfied  without  those  which  are  to  follow." 

Irish  Theological  Quarterly,  Dublin:  "I  am  sure  that 
Dr.  Hall  is  eminently  qualified  for  the  task  he  has  under- 
taken. ...  It  is  somewhat  remarkable  that  an  American 
should  lead  the  way  in  a  movement  to  revive  systematic 
theology  among  Anglicans.  .  .  .  Not  the  least  of  Dr.  Hall's 
qualifications  as  a  theologian  is  his  extensive  acquaintance 
with  our  Catholic  authors  .  .  .  his  style  may  be  commended 
as  a  model  of  theological  writing  in  English :  it  is  clear,  con- 
cise, direct,  dignified,  and  elegant.  .  .  .  His  tone  and  temper 
towards  ourselves  leaves  hardly  anything  to  be  desired." 


VOLUME   II  — AUTHORITY 

Church  Union  Gazette,  London:  "It  will  be  found  that 
throughout  its  pages  the  author  is  careful  to  confute  false 
arguments  as  well  as  to  establish  clear  statements  of  posi- 
tive truth.  .  .  .  But  its  chief  value  lies  in  the  way  in  which  he 
recognizes  and  emphasizes  all  the  factors  which  are  involved 
in  any  true  knowledge  of  Divine  things,  not  minimizing  any, 
nor  exalting  one  at  the  expense  of  another;  but  showing  how, 
by  the  combination  of  all,  we  obtain  a  certitude  which  nothing 
can  overthrow." 


HALL'S   DOGMATIC  THEOLOGY 


Record-Herald,  Chicago:  "It  is  refreshing  to  meet  such 
a  book,  simple  and  lucid  in  style,  scholarly,  thorough,  con- 
servative, but  not  bigoted,  marshalling  arguments  and  meet- 
ing objections  after  the  manner  of  the  masters  of  theology. 
It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  author  will  be  permitted  to  complete 
this  monumental  work." 

Church  Standard,  Philadelphia:  "The  statement  of  the 
meaning  and  limitations  of  authority  is  very  reasonable.  .  .  . 
The  whole  doctrinal  statement  is  temperate  and  cautious, 
and  its  language  for  the  most  part  is  determined  by  the  trend 
of  modern  discussion." 

The  Churchman,  New  York:  "Of  special  value.  .  .  is  the 
chapter  on  the  Dogmatic  Office  and  Tradition.  .  .  .  There  is 
a  good  analysis  of  the  various  theories  of  inspiration  and  a 
cautious  discussion  of  the  functions  and  legitimate  scope  of 
Biblical  criticism." 

Pacific  Churchman,  San  Francisco:  "Any  review  of  it 
in  the  least  degree  adequate  to  its  value  and  importance 
would  take  up  not  only  all  the  space  reserved  for  reviews, 
but  about  half  of  the  whole  Journal.  .  .  .  The  book  suggests 
and  compels  thought." 

Scottish  Chronicle:  "This  book  .  .  .  will  be  welcomed  by 
many  students  of  divinity.  It  is  a  well  thought-out  treatise 
on  the  meaning  of  authority  in  religion,  in  which  are  consid- 
ered the  three  factors  of  spiritual  knowledge  .  .  .  viz.,  eccle- 
siastical authority,  biblical  authority,  and  reason  .  .  .  though 
we  do  not  pretend  that  we  agree  with  the  author  in  all  his  con- 
clusions, we  nevertheless  believe  that  his  present  treatise  cannot 
fail  to  have  a  stimulating  effect  upon  any  thoughtful  reader." 

The  Guardian,  London:  "The  present  volume,  which 
forms  a  treatise  complete  in  itself,  is  even  abler  than  the 
first,  and  most  opportune  .  .  .  The  entire  book  is  marked  by 
caution,  balance,  and  restraint,  and  deserves  to  be  carefully 
read.  A  noticeable  feature  of  the  work  is  the  immense 
number  of  modern  writers  referred  to  or  discussed." 


HALL'S   DOGMATIC   THEOLOGY 


London  Quarterly  Review:  "Dr.  Hall  uses  his  space 
well  ...  he  writes  with  candour  and  ability." 

Church  Times,  London:  "Everything  that  is  said  in  this 
book  about  oecumenical  authority,  the  authority  of  Councils, 
of  National  Churches,  and  so  forth,  is  admirable  .  .  .  [Referring 
to  the  whole  series].  That  is  a  great  enterprise,  worthily 
begun."  In  this  paper's  annual  summary  of  theological 
literature  occurs  the  passage,  "Dr.  F.  J.  Hall's  great  work  on 
dogmatic  theology  has  come  to  its  second  volume." 

Pax,  England:  "As  a  really  good  compendium  with  valu- 
able references,  this  book  deserves  all  praise." 

Sewanee  Review,  Tennessee:  "  Prof.  Hall  has  a  very  dis- 
tinct gift  for  systematizing." 

Irish  Theological  Quarterly,  Dublin:  "  Viewing  this 
volume  independently  on  its  merits  there  are  many  things 
in  it,  as  in  the  Introduction,  which  we  can  heartily  praise  and 
commend.  .  .  .  His  volume  is  well  worthy  of  being  read,  not 
only  by  those  Anglicans  for  whom  it  is  intended,  but  by 
Catholic  theologians  and  apologists." 

Living  Church,  Milwaukee:  On  the  authority  of  the 
papacy,  "Perhaps  no  concise  statement  of  this  subject  in 
Anglican  literature  excels  that  which  Professor  Hall  gives 
to  it.  .  .  .  Not  less  important  ...  is  the  writer's  considera- 
tion of  biblical  authority.  He  succeeds  in  doing  that  which 
so  many  have  essayed  to  do  and  have  often  failed;  that  is 
to  say,  in  harmonizing  the  undoubted  position  of  the  Church 
to  the  effect  that  'the  Bible  is  the  Word  of  God'  with  the  rec- 
ognition of  the  manifold  elements  which  make  up  the  books 
collected  in  the  sacred  scriptures.  .  .  .  We  believe  that  .  .  . 
Dr.  Hall  states  most  adequately  and  most  accurately  the 
answer  of  the  Anglican  communion  to  the  questions  that 
divide  Christians  to-day,  and  that  on  substantially  the  lines 
of  his  answer  must  be  built  up  the  position  that  will  ulti- 
mately prove  the  factor  that  will  unite  Christendom." 


HALL'S    DOGMATIC   THEOLOGY 


VOLUME    III  — THE    BEING   AND   ATTRIBUTES 

OF    GOD 

Church  Union  Gazette,  London:  "An  atmosphere  of 
solid,  hard  work  breathes  through  this  book.  The  reader  is 
made  to  feel  that  every  sentence  has  been  deeply  weighed, 
and  more  than  once  rewritten.  The  task  ...  is  of  an  in- 
tensely difficult  nature,  but  the  result  .  .  .  can  be  generally 
described  as  successful  in  the  better  sense  of  the  word.  The 
success  chiefly  consists  of  the  lucid  classifications  of  argument 
and  criticism  which  surround  these  first  principles  of  theology. 
.  .  .  Some  of  the  sentences,  from  their  condensed  nature,  are 
extremely  valuable." 

Expository  Times:  "Its  doctrine  of  God  is  not  in  every 
respect  our  doctrine.  What  of  that?  We  shall  learn  the 
more  from  it.  It  is  the  book  of  a  student,  the  book  of  a 
thinker,  the  book  of  a  believer.  There  is  not  a  loose  sentence 
in  it,  and  there  is  no  trivial  rhetoric.  It  is  above  all  the  book 
of  a  student.  Professor  Hall's  knowledge  of  the  subject  is 
an  amazement." 

Pacific  Churchman,  San  Francisco:  "This  is  the  third 
volume  of  what  bids  fair  to  be  a  monumental  work,  and  that 
not  in  the  brainal  sense  of  the  phrase,  but  a  really  enduring 
work  based  on  a  solid  foundation  of  adequate  learning  .  .  . 
we  may  be  allowed  to  bear  such  witness  as  we  can,  not  merely 
to  the  profound  learning  in  which  its  arguments  are  rooted, 
but  to  the  lucid  way  in  which  those  arguments  are  marshalled 
and  worked  out.  We  cannot  just  now  recall  any  book  which 
covers  anything  like  the  ground  this  does." 

Sewanee  Review,  Tennessee:  "In  spite  of  the  above 
strictures  which  we  have  felt  it  our  duty  to  make  (and  which 
of  course  by  no  means  indicate  the  positive  and  constructive 
value  of  Dr.  Hall's  work),  we  feel  that  we  ought  not  to  lay 
down  these  volumes  without  saying  that  in  our  judgment 
the  present  series,  as  it  has  thus  far  appeared,  is  making  a 
significant  and  encouraging  addition  to  the  somewhat  scanty 
theological  literature  of  the  Protestant  Episcopal  Church." 


8  HALL'S   DOGMATIC   THEOLOGY 

The  Guardian,  London: .  .  .  "the  admirable  second  volume 
on  Authority  led  us  to  expect  much  from  the  writer.  .  .  .  One 
of  the  best  things  between  the  covers  is  the  discussion  of  the 
Ontological  Argument.  ...  It  should  be  needless  to  add  that 
Professor  Hall's  work  is  marked  throughout  by  the  firm  and 
reverential  adherence  to  the  Catholic  religion  which  char- 
acterizes all  the  products  of  the  author's  mind." 

Dr.  Hall  has  very  thoroughly  grasped  the  substance  of 
these  [theistic]  proofs  and  sets  them  forth  in  his  own  clear 
language  and  with  much  ability.  He  writes  with  the  pen 
of  a  man  who  has  given  years  of  thought  and  reading  to  this 
branch  of  Divine  Science.  It  requires  more  than  a  'prentice 
hand  to  write  in  such  clear  and  precise  language  a  philo- 
sophic discussion  and  definition  of,  say,  the  Teleological  and 
Ontological  arguments. 

Our  notice  of  the  book  has  hardly  done  more  than  indicate 
its  contents.  We  therefore  the  more  earnestly  urge  our 
clerical  readers  to  study  the  volume  and  also  to  bring  it  to 
the  notice  of  those  educated  men  and  women  of  their  flocks 
who  may  be  able  to  do  a  little  close  reading.  Dr.  Hall  has 
produced  a  noble  book. 

Irish  Theological  Quarterly,  Dublin:  "We  .  .  .  are 
glad  to  be  able  to  praise  the  third  still  more  unreservedly 
than  its  predecessors.  It  is  an  excellent  manual  of  systematic 
theism,  the  very  best  of  its  kind  by  an  Anglican  that  we 
know  of,  and  one  of  the  absolutely  best  .  .  .  the  book  has  to 
be  read  in  order  to  be  appreciated.  .  .  .  We  recommend  our 
readers  to  buy  and  study  Dr.  Hall's  book,  and  we  venture 
to  prophesy  that  those  who  do  so  will  thank  us  for  our 
advice." 

Journal  of  Theological  Studies,  London:  "No  argu- 
ment for  the  existence  of  God  has  escaped  his  notice,  and 
any  one  who  reads  his  book  must  feel  that  Christian  theists 
have  no  cause  to  be  ashamed  of  the  intellectual  case  they  can 
present." 

LONGMANS,    GREEN,    AND    CO. 

NEW  YORK,  LONDON,  BOMBAY,  and  CALCUTTA 


THE     KENOTIC    THEORY 

CONSIDERED  WITH  PARTICULAR  REFERENCE 
TO   ITS   ANGLICAN   FORMS    AND    ARGUMENTS 

By  the  Rev.  Francis  J.  Hall,  D.D.,  author  of  "Dogmatic 
Theology,"  etc.    Crown  8vo,  pp.  xviu+ 247.    Cloth  $1.50. 

This  volume  is  written  in  opposition  to  the  theory  that, 
in  order  to  assume  a  real  manhood  and  submit  to  human  con- 
ditions, our  Lord  emptied  Himself  of  certain  divine  preroga- 
tives and  attributes  during  the  period  of  His  earthly  life. 

The  writer  endeavours  to  show  that  this  theory  is  (a)  a 
modern  novelty;  (b)  contrary  to  the  Church's  oecumenical 
decrees  of  faith;  (c)  rejected  by  Catholic  doctors;  (d)  not 
warranted  by  the  facts  contained  in  the  Gospels  of  the  state- 
ments of  Holy  Scripture;  (e)  fallacious  in  its  reasoning;  and 
(/)  perilous  in  its  logical  results.  Clearness  and  simplicity  of 
treatment  is  aimed  at,  and  numerous  citations  are  made 
from  ancient  and  modern  authorities. 

CONTENTS 

HISTORICAL    INTRODUCTION 

1.  The  Incarnation.  9.    The   Teaching   of  Scrip- 

2.  The  Humiliation  of  Christ.  ture. 

3.  Kenotic  Arguments.  10.    The  Scriptures   and   the 

4.  Appeal  to  Catholic  Antiq-  Knowledge  of  Christ. 

uity.  II.    The  Doctrine  of  our 

5.  The  Ethical  Argument.  Lord's  Knowledge. 

6.  The  Example  of  Christ.  12.    The    Relations    between 

7.  The  Relative  Attributes  of  our  Lord's  Knowl- 

God.  edges. 

8.  The  a  ^n'ori  Argument.  13.    Issues  Involved. 

Bibliography. 


Reviews 

"It  is  his  thorough  grasp  of  those  fundamental  principles 
that  has  enabled  Dr.  Hall  to  give  us  in  his  '  Kenotic  Theory ' 
a  theological  treatise  of  more  than  ordinary  value.     It  has 


the  singular  charm  of  being  direct,  to  the  point,  lucid,  and 
without  verbiage  from  beginning  to  end.  .  .  .  Dr.  Hall  .  .  , 
lays  down,  with  exactness  and  precision,  the  question  at 
issue.  .  .  .  Dr.  Hall  has  done  good  work  in  discriminating  as 
he  has  done  between  the  views  of  Kenotic  Schools.  .  .  .  No- 
where have  we  seen  a  better  answer  to  the  baseless  assump- 
tions which  have  been  made  in  England  and  America  to 
formulate  a  complete  doctrine  of  the  Incarnation  out  of  a 
single  passage  in  St.  Paul's  w^ritings."  —  Living  Church. 

"Professor  Hall  has  presented  us  with  a  strong  plea  for  the 
orthodox  and  traditional  teaching  on  the  side  of  the  doctrine 
of  the  Incarnation."  — The  Churchman,  Toronto. 

"Dr.  Hall's  book  ...  is  valuable  and  opportune.  .  .  .  We 
can  commend  it  to  the  clergy  and  to  students  of  theology  and 
to  general  readers  as  containing  a  powerful  argument  very 
clearly  expressed,  and  as  bearing  marks  of  much  careful 
study  and  thought."  —  Church  Quarterly  Review,  Jan. 
1899. 

"Many  a  larger  treatise  lacks  the  note  of  distinction  so 
evident  here.  Really  this  book  is  a  patient,  scholarlike  and 
judicial  examination  of  the  most  pressing  problem  of  present 
day  Christology.  .  .  .  The  book  is  a  fine  study  in  dogmatic 
method.  .  .  .  No  sufficient  insight  in  so  brief  a  review  can  be 
given  into  his  constant  alertness,  his  scholarlike  prepared- 
ness, and  his  entire  freedom  from  remarks  that  may  wound." 
—  Alfred  Cave,  in  the  Critical  Review. 

"The  book  should  be  in  every  circulating  library,  and 
should  be  not  merely  read,  but  studied,  as  a  treatise  which 
from  its  merits  is  a  candidate  for  a  place  as  a  handbook 
upon  an  integral  question  in  theology."  — Church  Times. 

"Dr.  Hall  has  given  us  in  a  small  compass  a  really  learned 
and  able  treatise  on  a  doctrine  which  has  recently  been  made 
the  subject  of  much  earnest  discussion  among. us.  He  writes 
with  real  knowledge  of  his  subject,  and  brings  to  bear  upon 
it  a  singularly  acute  and  thoughtful  mind." — Guardian, 

LONGMANS,    GREEN,   AND    CO. 

NEW  YORK,  LONDON,  BOMBAY,  and  CALCUTTA 


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